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Extending and Automating a Systems-Theoretic Hazard 
Analysis for Requirements Generation and Analysis 
John Thomas 
ABSTRACT 
Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a powerful new hazard analysis method designed to 
go beyond traditional safety techniques—such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)—that overlook 
important causes of accidents like flawed requirements, dysfunctional component interactions, and 
software errors. Although traditional techniques have been effective at analyzing and reducing 
accidents caused by component failures, modern complex systems have introduced new problems 
that can be much more difficult to anticipate, analyze, and prevent. In addition, a new class of 
accidents, component interaction accidents, has become increasingly prevalent in today’s complex 
systems and can occur even when systems operate exactly as designed and without any component 
failures. 
While STPA has proven to be effective at addressing these problems, its application thus far has 
been ad-hoc with no rigorous procedures or model-based design tools to guide the analysis. In 
addition, although no formal structure has yet been defined for STPA, the process is based on a 
control-theoretic framework that could be formalized and adapted to facilitate development of 
automated methods that assist in analyzing complex systems. This dissertation defines a formal 
mathematical structure underlying STPA and introduces a procedure for systematically performing 
an STPA analysis based on that structure. A method for using the results of the hazard analysis to 
generate formal safety-critical, model-based system and software requirements is also presented. 
Techniques to automate both the STPA analysis and the requirements generation are introduced, as 
well as a method to detect conflicts between safety requirements and other functional model-based 
requirements during early development of the system. 
Thesis Supervisor: Nancy. G. Leveson 
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Page intentionally left blank] 
  
7 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
“The future pivots around you. Here. Now. So do good. For humanity, and for Earth.” 
—The Doctor 
First and foremost, I must thank my advisor Professor Nancy Leveson for believing in me. If she 
had not invited me into her research group that first semester, none of this would have been 
possible. I had a lot to learn, and your inspiration and encouragement were essential in taking those 
first steps and eventually bringing the ideas in this dissertation to life. 
Thanks are also due to my committee members, Professor Joseph Sussman and Professor John 
Carroll, who offered much needed advice when I was getting started and have since provided 
invaluable feedback along the way. Without their support, this work would not have been possible. 
I owe gratitude to the current researchers in Nancy’s group that I work with every day. Cody 
Fleming, John Helferich, Bill Young, and Takuto Ishimatsu all provided comments and feedback 
every step of the way, which was immensely helpful in improving and refining the ideas in this 
dissertation. Blandine Antoine, who finished her dissertation just before me, was especially helpful 
in offering constructive feedback when these ideas were brand new and was even brave enough to 
apply some of these ideas to the largest project in our lab at the time. Previous graduate students—
Maggie Stringfellow, Matthieu Couturier, Brandon Owens—gave early advice that had a lasting 
impact and helped shape the direction of this research. For the new students—Cameron, Seth, Dan, 
Connor, Dajiang, and Ian—thanks for keeping me on my toes with your excellent questions and 
comments. I also thank Dr. Qi Hommes, who offered support throughout the process. 
I need to give special thanks to Francisco Luiz De Lemos, an Engineer at the Nuclear and Energy 
Research Institute, IPEN/CNEN, in Brazil. Without your expertise, the nuclear examples throughout 
this dissertation and in the appendix would not exist. 
Finally, my greatest appreciation goes to my wife Judy and my family. You supported me from the 
beginning and without that, I could not have done any of this. I love you all! 
  
8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Page intentionally left blank] 
  
9 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION .............................................................................. 17 
1.1 CHALLENGES IN ENGINEERING SAFE SYSTEMS ........................................................................................... 17 
1.2 LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT APPROACHES .................................................................................................. 18 
1.3 RESEARCH GOALS AND OUTLINE ............................................................................................................. 19 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND EVALUATION ....................................................................... 21 
2.1 ACCIDENT MODELS ............................................................................................................................. 21 
2.1.1 Domino Accident Model ............................................................................................................. 21 
2.1.2 Extended Domino Models .......................................................................................................... 32 
2.1.3 Swiss Cheese Accident Model ..................................................................................................... 33 
2.1.4 Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM).......................................................................... 35 
2.1.5 System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) ....................................................... 36 
2.2 HAZARD ANALYSIS METHODS ................................................................................................................. 40 
2.2.1 Failure-based methods ............................................................................................................... 40 
2.2.2 Systems-based Hazard Analysis Methods .................................................................................. 58 
2.3 TERMINOLOGY .................................................................................................................................... 70 
CHAPTER 3. EXTENDING SYSTEM THEORETIC PROCESS ANALYSIS ..................................................... 71 
3.1 GENERAL STRUCTURE FOR HAZARDOUS CONTROL ACTIONS ....................................................................... 71 
3.2 PROCESS MODEL HIERARCHY ................................................................................................................. 74 
3.3 A SYSTEMATIC PROCEDURE TO IDENTIFY HAZARDOUS CONTROL ACTIONS .................................................... 80 
3.3.1 Part 1: Control actions provided in a state where the action is hazardous ................................ 81 
3.3.2 Part 2: Control actions not provided in a state that makes inaction hazardous ........................ 84 
3.3.3 Application to a nuclear power plant system ............................................................................. 88 
3.4 IDENTIFYING CAUSAL FACTOR SCENARIOS .............................................................................................. 102 
3.4.1 Identifying how safe control actions may not be followed or executed .................................. 102 
3.4.2 Identifying the causes of hazardous control actions ................................................................ 106 
CHAPTER 4. FORMAL METHODS FOR STPA HAZARD ANALYSIS AND REQUIREMENTS GENERATION .. 113 
4.1 A FORMAL SPECIFICATION FOR HAZARDOUS CONTROL ACTIONS ............................................................... 114 
4.2 AUTOMATABLE METHOD TO GENERATE HAZARDOUS CONTROL ACTIONS ..................................................... 117 
10 
 
4.3 AUTOMATED GENERATION OF MODEL-BASED REQUIREMENT SPECIFICATIONS .............................................. 119 
4.4 IDENTIFYING CONFLICTS AND POTENTIAL DESIGN FLAWS ........................................................................... 124 
4.5 EXTENSIONS FOR NON-SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ........................................................ 125 
CHAPTER 5. SCALABILITY TO COMPLEX SYSTEMS ............................................................................ 127 
5.1 ABSTRACTION AND HIERARCHY ............................................................................................................ 127 
5.2 LOGICAL SIMPLIFICATION .................................................................................................................... 128 
5.3 CONTINUOUS PROCESS MODEL VARIABLES ............................................................................................. 129 
5.4 DEFINING RULES TO QUICKLY CREATE AND EVALUATE LARGE TABLES ........................................................... 130 
5.5 AUTOMATICALLY GENERATING LOW-LEVEL TABLES .................................................................................. 132 
5.5.1 Train door controller example .................................................................................................. 132 
5.5.2 Nuclear power plant example .................................................................................................. 138 
5.6 AUTOMATED TOOLS........................................................................................................................... 143 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK ............................................................................. 147 
APPENDIX A: CASE STUDY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SYSTEMS ......................................................... 151 
A.1 ACCIDENTS ....................................................................................................................................... 152 
A.2 SYSTEM HAZARDS ............................................................................................................................. 153 
A.3 SAFETY CONTROL STRUCTURE ............................................................................................................. 154 
A.4 CONTROLLER RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................................... 158 
A.5 PROCESS MODEL VARIABLES ............................................................................................................... 159 
A.6 UNSAFE CONTROL ACTIONS ................................................................................................................ 160 
A.7 SAFETY CONSTRAINTS ........................................................................................................................ 168 
A.8 CAUSAL FACTORS .............................................................................................................................. 169 
A.8.1 Operator Causal Factors ........................................................................................................... 170 
A.8.2 DAS Causal Factors ................................................................................................................... 187 
A.8.3 PS Causal Factors ..................................................................................................................... 202 
A.9 EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE STEAM GENERATORS ....................................................................................... 215 
A.10 LIMITATIONS OF THIS ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................ 216 
A.11 RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS .................................................................................................................. 216 
A.12 POTENTIAL USE OF STPA IN LICENSING ................................................................................................. 219 
A.12.1     Classification of components as safety-related vs. non-safety-related .................................. 219 
A.12.2     Identifying potential operator errors and their causes and safety culture flaws ................... 221 
11 
 
A.12.3     Broadening the Analysis and Oversight.................................................................................. 221 
A.12.4     Assisting in Understanding Applicant Functional Designs...................................................... 221 
A.12.5     Enhancing the Review of Candidate Designs.......................................................................... 222 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 223 
  
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Page intentionally left blank] 
  
13 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Heinrich’s Domino Accident Model ................................................................................................ 23 
Figure 2: Classification of industrial accident causes from Heinrich [11] ....................................................... 24 
Figure 3: Reason’s Swiss Cheese Accident Model [27, 30] ............................................................................ 34 
Figure 4: Generic example of a hierarchical control structure ......................................................................... 38 
Figure 5: Example fault tree from the original Bell Laboratory study [55] ..................................................... 41 
Figure 6: A partial fault tree for an aircraft collision avoidance system [65] .................................................. 44 
Figure 7: A partial fault tree for proposed airspace procedures [66] ............................................................... 45 
Figure 8: Simplified event tree for a nuclear reactor adapted from [80] .......................................................... 48 
Figure 9: A Venn diagram of failure scenarios and unsafe scenarios .............................................................. 52 
Figure 10: HAZOP Flow Diagram (from [108]).............................................................................................. 59 
Figure 11: FRAM functional representation of aircraft area navigation from [36] ......................................... 62 
Figure 12: Preliminary control diagram for an automated door controller ...................................................... 65 
Figure 13: General control loop with causal factors ........................................................................................ 68 
Figure 14: Structure of a hazardous control action .......................................................................................... 72 
Figure 15: Decomposition of context into variables and values ...................................................................... 73 
Figure 16: Example of traceability using a process model hierarchy of a medical device .............................. 77 
Figure 17: Aviation example of traceability using a process model hierarchy ................................................ 79 
Figure 18: Partial control structure for simplified train door controller .......................................................... 81 
Figure 19: Augmented control structure with the door controller’s process model ......................................... 82 
Figure 20: Pressurized Water Reactor (Diagram from [141]) ......................................................................... 89 
Figure 21: High-level control structure for the nuclear power plant................................................................ 92 
Figure 22: Developing an accident scenario using the control structure ....................................................... 105 
Figure 23: Symmetry in the generic set of STPA causal factors ................................................................... 109 
Figure 24: Developing accident scenario S-4 to identify causes of hazardous control actions ..................... 111 
Figure 25: Four main elements of a hazardous control action ....................................................................... 114 
14 
 
Figure 26: Example of variables and values that compose the context ......................................................... 115 
Figure 27: Example SpecTRM-RL table for the door open command .......................................................... 121 
Figure 28: SpecTRM-RL requirements with traceability to system hazards for the nuclear power plant system 
studied in chapter 3 ........................................................................................................................................ 122 
Figure 29: SpecTRM-RL requirements for the nuclear power plant system studied in chapter 3 ................. 123 
Figure 30: Low-level SpecTRM-RL requirements generated for the nuclear power plant system ............... 124 
Figure 31: Example SpecTRM-RL tables defining the relationships between process model variables ....... 135 
Figure 32: Partial low-level SpecTRM-RL table generated for the train door controller example ............... 137 
Figure 33: Logically simplified low-level SpecTRM-RL table generated for the train door controller example
 ....................................................................................................................................................................... 138 
Figure 34: Application of high-level and low-level requirements to a controller .......................................... 139 
Figure 35: Example SpecTRM-RL tables defining the relationships between process model variables for the 
nuclear power plant example. ........................................................................................................................ 140 
Figure 36: Partial low-level SpecTRM-RL table generated for the nuclear reactor example ........................ 143 
Figure 37: Logically simplified low-level SpecTRM-RL table generated for the nuclear reactor example .. 143 
Figure 38: Pressurized Water Reactor (Diagram from [141]) ....................................................................... 152 
Figure 39: High-Level PWR Safety Control Structure .................................................................................. 156 
Figure 40: More detailed safety control structure for MSIV control ............................................................. 157 
Figure 41: A classification of causal factors leading to hazards .................................................................... 169 
Figure 42: Causal factors leading to operator unsafe control actions ............................................................ 170 
Figure 43: Causal factors leading to operator unsafe control actions not being followed ............................. 181 
Figure 44: Causal factors leading to DAS unsafe control actions.................................................................. 187 
Figure 45: Causal factors leading to DAS control actions not being followed .............................................. 197 
Figure 46: Causal factors for PS unsafe control actions ................................................................................ 202 
Figure 47: Causal factors leading to PS control actions not being followed ................................................. 211 
  
15 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Example FMECA worksheet adapted from [99] ............................................................................... 51 
Table 2: HAZOP parameters and guidewords (adapted from [108]) ............................................................... 58 
Table 3: Potentially hazardous control actions for a simple automated door controller .................................. 66 
Table 4: Examples of hazardous control actions.............................................................................................. 72 
Table 5: High-level process model variables for a proton therapy machine .................................................... 75 
Table 6: Context table for the open door control action .................................................................................. 83 
Table 7: Context table for the lack of an open door control action ................................................................. 85 
Table 8: Hazardous control actions for the Part 1 and Part 2 context tables .................................................... 87 
Table 9: System hazards for the nuclear power plant ...................................................................................... 90 
Table 10: Hazardous Control Actions for Close MSIV ................................................................................... 94 
Table 11: Context table for Operator provides Close MSIV control action..................................................... 96 
Table 12: Context table for Close MSIV control action is not provided .......................................................... 99 
Table 13: Basic scenarios and safety-critical contexts generated from hazardous control actions ................ 104 
Table 14: Examples of causal factors and safety-critical requirements for accident scenario S-1 ................ 105 
Table 15: Process model flaws generated from context tables for each hazardous control action ................ 108 
Table 16: Basic scenarios for identifying causes of hazardous control actions ............................................. 110 
Table 17: Basic scenarios for identifying timing-related causes of hazardous control actions ..................... 110 
Table 18: Examples of causal factors and safety-critical requirements for accident scenario S-4 ................ 112 
Table 19: Context table for the open door control action .............................................................................. 129 
Table 20: Context table for Operator provides Close MSIV control action................................................... 131 
Table 21: Context table for the open door control action .............................................................................. 133 
Table 22: Partial low-level generated context table for train door controller ................................................ 136 
Table 23: Partial low-level generated context table for the nuclear reactor example .................................... 142 
Table 24: NPP system-level accidents to be prevented ................................................................................. 152 
Table 25: NPP system-level hazards .............................................................................................................. 153 
16 
 
Table 26: Hazardous Control Actions for Close MSIV ................................................................................. 161 
Table 27: Context table for Operator provides Close MSIV control action................................................... 162 
Table 28: Context table for Operator does not provide Close MSIV control action ..................................... 165 
Table 29: Post-conflict-resolution unsafe control actions and safety constraints .......................................... 168 
  
17 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction and Motivation 
The introduction of new technology, such as computers and software, is changing the types of 
accidents we see today. The level of complexity in many of our new systems is leading to accidents 
in which no components failed but instead unsafe interactions among non-failed components lead to 
the loss. At the same time, traditional hazard analysis techniques assume accidents are caused by 
component failures or faults [1] and oversimplify the role of humans [2, 3]. Attempts have been 
made to extend these traditional hazard analysis techniques to include software and cognitively 
complex human errors, but the underlying assumptions do not match the fundamental nature of 
systems we are building today. For example, most software-related accidents can be traced to 
incomplete or flawed software requirements [4, 5], however current hazard analysis methods like 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) analyze component failures and easily overlook unsafe requirements. In 
addition, new technology is changing the role of humans in systems from followers of procedures to 
supervisors of automation and high-level decision makers [6, 7]. New models of accident causation 
and hazard analysis techniques are needed to address these issues. 
1.1 Challenges in engineering safe systems 
In the past, most accidents could be traced to unreliable components or sudden failures in the 
system. Fortunately, safety engineering techniques today are very effective at preventing accidents 
caused by component failures. In fact, they have become so effective that most major accidents 
today are caused not by component failures but by complex and often unexpected interactions 
among components operating as designed. This is especially true for software components notorious 
for causing accidents by faithfully executing flawed programming and instructions. While modern 
software is becoming more and more complex and difficult to analyze, safety-critical systems are 
growing increasingly dependent on and integrated with software components.  
The increasing use of software is also changing the nature of human-computer interaction and 
operator tasks. In the past, operators often had straightforward tasks with simple and precise 
instructions. However, more and more systems today employ automation whenever possible to 
perform these tasks, thereby reducing operator workload and the human resources required. More 
and more operators have therefore had to adapt to a new role of supervising these advanced 
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computer systems and performing miscellaneous tasks that could not be automated. Instead of 
executing straightforward procedures and learning simple rule-based behaviors, operators are now 
responsible for much more complex decision-making such as diagnosing new problems and 
developing solutions on-the-fly. This trend significantly increases the coupling between man and 
machine—human errors are no longer dominated by trivial problems like lapses or distractions but 
by complex processes that depend on the type and quality of feedback humans receive and the 
context of the system in which they are operating. 
1.2 Limitations of current approaches 
Current approaches to safety engineering are well-suited to prevent some accident causes, such as 
component failures, but identifying other causes like flawed requirements is much more difficult. In 
addition, the most popular approaches are based on a model of components that can misbehave in 
predictable ways or with well-known failure modes, but complex software and new types of human 
errors are outgrowing those models. Safety engineering activities are usually restricted to later 
phases in the development process when a fairly detailed design is available to analyze, but this 
approach limits the number of solutions available and causes design changes when they are most 
expensive to implement.  
A number of approaches have been developed to analyze complex human tasks [8] or detailed 
software models [9]. However, these techniques are only applicable to specific system 
components—humans or software, respectively—and do not provide an integrated view of the 
overall safety at a system level. Safety is an emergent system property [5, 10] that depends on the 
behavior of and interactions among many components in the system—in other words, safety is a 
system property that only emerges from the integration of components within the system and the 
environment. Software, for example, is by definition an idea abstracted from physical realization 
and cannot by itself be safe or unsafe; software can only cause an accident by affecting the behavior 
of other components. In fact, many accidents are caused not by any single component but rather 
from complex processes involving a series of interactions among concurrently operating 
components. Unfortunately, while various analysis methods exist for individual components, there 
are very few comprehensive approaches that can be applied to analyze the entire system including 
complex relationships and interactions between software, hardware, and human components.  
19 
 
System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a promising approach that was designed to analyze 
safety in socio-technical systems with many diverse components interacting together [10]. Rather 
than beginning with an assumption of known and predictable component behavior, STPA derives 
the necessary safety constraints from the top down in progressive levels of detail. STPA has been 
successful at identifying a wide range of potential accident causes, including flawed software 
requirements and complex human interactions. However, STPA is relatively new and its application 
has thus far been ad-hoc with no rigorous procedures, formal mathematical definition, or model-
based design tools to aid in analyzing complex human- and software-intensive systems. 
1.3 Research goals and outline 
The goal of this dissertation is to advance the state of the art by defining a formal mathematical 
structure underlying STPA and by creating procedures for systematically performing an STPA 
analysis. Chapter 2 reviews hazard analysis techniques and discusses the underlying assumptions 
and implications for complex human- and software-intensive systems. Chapter 3 proposes 
extensions to STPA including a new procedure for identifying unsafe control actions and causal 
factors. Chapter 4 provides formal mathematical definitions and presents automated methods to 
assist in identifying hazardous control actions during early system development as well as 
automatically generating or validating formal model-based safety requirements. An algorithm for 
automated conflict detection using the results of the hazard analysis is also discussed, as well as 
application to non-safety-related functional goals of the system. Chapter 5 discusses the scalability 
of these extensions and proposes several techniques to manage the complexity of large-scale 
systems. 
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Chapter 2. Literature review and evaluation 
This chapter briefly reviews traditional system safety approaches including models and analysis 
techniques and evaluates current approaches with respect to their ability to ensure safety in complex 
systems. This is followed by a broader evaluation of failure-based models in general and a 
discussion of the need for a more powerful systems-based approach to safety.  
2.1 Accident Models 
All safety efforts, whether prospective or retrospective, are based on some accident model that 
represents the theory of accident causation used to analyze or design a system [10]. An accident 
model includes a set of assumptions about how accidents arise, what factors can lead to accidents, 
and how those factors combine, interact, or propagate to cause an accident. In practice, an accident 
model may be a model taught during formal education/training or it may be a mental model that 
exists only in the mind of the analyst or engineer, perhaps formed over years of experience. In either 
case, knowing the accident model that is used and recognizing the underlying assumptions is the 
first step to understanding the strengths and limitations of any safety analysis. 
This section describes various accidents models in use today and summarizes their assumptions and 
limitations. The next section describes analysis methods that use accident models to identify 
potential accident scenarios and causes in a given system. 
2.1.1 Domino Accident Model 
Herbert Heinrich published one of the earliest accident models in 1931, known as the Domino 
Accident Model [11]. Heinrich worked for Travelers Insurance Company, where he was exposed to 
countless industrial accident reports. Although ad-hoc analyses were common, Heinrich believed 
that most investigations were too superficial and provided insufficient information to identify root 
causes and prevent future accidents. Heinrich believed that the vast majority of industrial 
accidents—98 percent—were preventable if the “true causes” could be identified using a better 
model of accident causation. 
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At the time, industrial accidents were often traced to faulty machinery or design flaws such as 
inadequate safety guards on industrial machines. However, Heinrich believed that as more complex 
industrial machinery was introduced and safety features became common, a new cause was 
increasingly to blame: “man failure”. As he explains: 
Mechanization of industry created new machines and new dangers. At first these 
additional hazards received little attention, and the greater number of industrial 
accidents were caused by the use of unguarded mechanical equipment. Under these 
conditions it was perfectly proper to charge accidents to specifically named machines, 
parts of machines, or mechanical equipment, and to state that these things were the 
actual causes of accidents. With the passing of time, important changes took place in 
industry. Improved equipment and methods were introduced, better guards were devised 
and were more commonly used, accidents from purely mechanical or physical causes 
decreased, and man failure became the predominating cause of injury. [11] 
Faulty instruction, lax discipline, unsafe practices, inattention, and physical and mental 
impairment or inefficiency are some of the real causes of construction accidents, and they 
produce 88 per cent of all injuries [11]. 
Heinrich’s Domino model, shown in Figure 1, models five stages of an industrial accident. 
According to the model, accidents are inevitably caused by either unsafe acts of a worker or unsafe 
conditions in the workplace. Heinrich believed that 88% of accidents were caused by unsafe acts 
while 10% of accidents were caused by unsafe conditions. These acts and conditions are in turn 
caused by the fault of a person, which is a result of their ancestry and social environment. Heinrich 
argued that accident processes were like a series of dominos falling—each event in the sequence 
automatically causes the next event. Removing any domino would break the chain and prevent 
accidents. Much of Heinrich’s work focused on identifying and removing the middle domino—
especially unsafe acts in an industrial workplace—and he published several classifications of this 
cause. One such classification is shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 1: Heinrich’s Domino Accident Model 
Unfortunately, the data and accident reports Heinrich used were never published. The claims that 
98% of accidents are preventable or that 88% of accident causes are due to unsafe human 
supervision could not be verified. Nevertheless, many find the model intuitive and it quickly 
became popular. Although the original purpose of the Domino model was to understand operator 
injuries in an industrial environment, it has been applied in almost every industry and was very 
influential in shaping subsequent accident models. Several key assertions in the Domino model still 
persist today, however critics argue that these assertions can lead to serious problems when applied 
to modern complex systems. 
Key assertions in the Domino Accident Model: 
1. Accidents are best understood as a chain of events 
2. A direct causal relationship exists between events resulting in linear propagation 
3. Accidents are primarily caused by a single “root cause” or “proximate cause” 
4. Accidents are primarily caused by operator error 
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Figure 2: Classification of industrial accident causes from Heinrich [11] 
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Assertion 1: Accidents are best understood as a chain of events 
Heinrich’s Domino model is one of the earliest examples of a chain of events model. The basic 
premise is that accidents are caused by events and that events provide the information necessary to 
prevent accidents. Heinrich argued that once the true cause is identified, the “practicable remedy” 
for other similar accidents can be expressed as the reverse of the assigned cause. For example, he 
notes that if the unsafe act in the Domino model is identified as “instruction disregarded” then the 
appropriate remedy should be to simply “enforce instruction”. 
Critics argue that this characterization omits many important interacting factors including the 
operator’s understanding of the machine, past experiences with other machines or supervisors, 
cognitive learning processes, and potentially conflicting goals. In fact, instructions can be 
disregarded for good reasons and the best remedy may actually involve adopting a more intuitive 
procedure rather than increasing the enforcement of a poor procedure. Moreover, the reason for a 
disregarded instruction may not be due to an inferior operator or procedure but due to a system 
design in which proper operation is cumbersome or may cause unexpected problems elsewhere. In 
addition, factors such as the organizational safety culture, management pressure, goal prioritization, 
and financial incentives can all play critical roles in influencing the events that unfold even though 
none of these factors is an actual event. These facts have been found again and again not only in 
industrial workplaces, but also in modern systems across many industries including aviation, space 
systems, ground transportation, and nuclear power systems [10]. The complex causes behind many 
of today’s accidents can only be found by exploring beyond a chain of events; accident prevention 
requires consideration of many interacting factors that are easily omitted in a chain of events model. 
Assertion 2: A direct causal relationship exists between events resulting in linear propagation 
The Domino model is also an example of a linear model: each event propagates automatically in a 
direct causal manner to the next event in the linear time-ordered sequence. Given that the accident 
occurred, each domino in the model is treated as necessary and sufficient to cause the subsequent 
domino to fall [5, 11].  
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However, linear models only capture one-way dependencies and do not include non-linear 
interactions and indirect causation such as continuous feedback loops, mutually reinforcing 
behavior, adaptive processes, changing environments, etc. In reality, accidents are complex 
situations involving many interdependent causes—each of which may be insufficient and not 
necessary to cause an accident—but in combination they can produce disastrous and often 
unanticipated results. Events do not always propagate automatically in a neat linear fashion; an 
action or behavior that did not cause an accident yesterday may very well cause an accident today. 
Critical factors can influence, but not directly cause, the events leading to an accident. Operators 
and engineers learn and adapt not only from recent events, but also from previous accidents 
(modeled in event chains as an outcome only), from other past experiences, and from collaboration 
with each other. Actions in software or human systems are rarely purely unidirectional; they are 
often cooperative in nature and may involve several feedback loops and iterations before an 
accident occurs. Although linear models are intuitive and easy to apply, they do not match the 
fundamental nature of accidents in today’s complex systems. 
Assertion 3: Accidents are primarily caused by a single “root cause” or “proximate cause” 
An important consequence of a linear propagation model is that the outcome can be easily 
prevented in the model if any single event in the chain is prevented—i.e. by breaking the chain. As 
a result, linear propagation models tend to place emphasis on a single “root cause” that is easy to 
prevent while overlooking other contributory causes. Although Heinrich admits that some accidents 
have multiple causes, he argues that accidents still can and should be traced to a single primary or 
proximate cause for the purpose of preventing accidents. Heinrich praises the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics for providing a “clear and satisfactory definition” of proximate cause as follows: 
The accident should be charged to that condition or circumstance the absence of which 
would have prevented the accident; but if there be more than one such condition or 
circumstance, then to the one most easily prevented. [12] 
Heinrich adopts this definition, but also advocates an alternative criterion. By following a process of 
elimination, Heinrich proposes starting with the most common causes until one is found that in the 
analyst’s opinion is responsible for the accident. Heinrich refers to this cause as both the “real 
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cause” and the “proximate cause” and argues that the selection is not arbitrary but an obvious and 
demonstrable fact that in most cases is easily determined. 
The person who is to select the cause must know all the pertinent facts. With these in 
mind, he may follow a process of elimination, beginning by considering the most common 
and most readily attacked causes. If he has already decided that machine guarding was 
not at fault, nor did congestion or inadequate light, lack of protective appliances, or other 
possible physical causes exist, he may proceed to eliminate the moral causes. He should 
find out whether safety instructions were required; if so, whether they had been given and 
enforced, or disobeyed and disregarded by the employee. If so far is satisfactory, he should 
proceed to the next item in the list of true cases and so exhaust the various probabilities 
until he strikes the cause which in his opinion is responsible. Laborious at first, practice 
shortly enables rapid diagnosis to be made. Having assigned a tentative cause, the test of 
reversal as explained in the first part of this chapter is applied, and if by this method a 
practicable remedy is evolved, the task of cause-analysis is completed [11]. 
If an employee, for example, contrary to instructions and with knowledge of the hazard, 
deliberately removes a guard from a set of gears and gets hurt, it is obvious that a moral 
rather than a physical cause of the accident existed and, more specifically, that it was 
disregard of instruction. Certainly this is the obvious proximate, real cause—one that can 
be attacked and that should be attacked if recurrence is to be avoided. Moral fault in 
many cases is a demonstrable fact which may easily be determined [11]. 
If the principles advocated in this book are followed, analysis will reveal the first 
immediate or proximate real cause of such accidents [11]. 
Stated in another way, the application of sound principles not only shows what to attack 
but also indicates what not to attack; and, again, by this process of eliminating non-
essentials, focuses attention upon a major remedy in the control of the frequency and 
severity of injuries [11]. 
Although identifying a single primary cause greatly simplifies the analysis effort, doing so omits 
other important causes and is contrary to the goal of preventing accidents. Limiting the identified 
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causes severely limits the potential solutions, while identifying more causes allows several potential 
solutions to be readily identified—including solutions that may be more flexible, more effective, 
and less expensive. Moreover, the determination of a single cause is always arbitrary and dependent 
on opinion rather than any demonstrable fact. In Heinrich’s own example, the declaration that 
“moral fault” and “disregard of instruction” is the real cause is not obvious and overlooks many 
equally important causes including machines in which guard removal is necessary to oil the gears, a 
lack of interlocks to prevent unsafe guard removal (whether intentional or not), and managerial 
pressures and financial incentives to perform maintenance without interrupting production. 
Although linear models suggest that in theory only one factor needs to be addressed to break the 
chain, in reality it is only a matter of time before these other unchecked hazardous conditions can 
lead to an accident. Linear models can also lead to overconfidence through an oversimplified 
analysis based on a few very specific accident scenarios while in reality an infinite number of 
accident scenarios are possible; preventing a single event may not actually prevent or even delay an 
accident. In fact, any one of these hazardous conditions could be called an “accident waiting to 
happen”. If the goal is to prevent future accidents, then such hazardous conditions cannot be omitted 
outright from consideration as potential targets for correction. 
In practice, the ascription of primary cause is often influenced by other qualities—whether 
intentional or not—including legal liability and the cost to resolve it. Unfortunately, the cheapest 
solutions are often the least effective in preventing accidents, and organizations may be more likely 
to blame factors outside their responsibility for legal and other reasons. In Heinrich’s example, 
reprimanding the employee who is already injured may be the cheapest response, but if the 
conditions that prompted his action are never addressed then the accident is likely to recur with the 
same or a different worker. 
The tendency to assign blame to a small number of causes is profound. In the recent Toyota 
unintended acceleration debacle, Toyota and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
primarily blamed the cause on dealerships who installed oversize floor mats, accelerator pedals that 
became stuck, or driver error [13, 14]. However, many other causes were just as important including 
the inability to brake under engine power, a design that permitted simultaneous braking and 
acceleration, and a keyless electronic ignition that by design ignored user attempts to turn off the 
engine while driving. 
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During the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, British Petroleum (BP) argued that the primary 
accident causes involve failures of the Transocean rig crew and unstable cement provided by 
Halliburton [15, 16]. Meanwhile, Transocean insisted BP’s risky but cost-saving well design was to 
blame and Halliburton argued that BP’s specifications were at fault [17, 18]. BP’s internal report 
eventually identified eight primary causes, however Senator Ed Markey noted that “of their own 
eight key findings, they only explicitly take responsibility for half of one.” [19] 
This problem is not new. In 1972, a DC-10 aircraft baggage door blew out during flight, collapsing 
part of the floor and severing cables and hydraulics used to control the aircraft [20]. The 
manufacturer found that the proximate cause was improper baggage handler procedures that used 
extra force to close the door. Baggage handlers were advised of proper procedures, however many 
other causes were ignored including a door design that closed without latching, a handle that 
appeared locked when it wasn’t, a cockpit light that incorrectly indicated the door was secure, the 
lack of a vent to prevent floor collapse during depressurization, and redundant control lines that all 
ran along the section of floor that would collapse during depressurization [20-22]. Despite all the 
emphasis on one small part of the event chain—baggage procedures—the other hazardous 
conditions remained and the accident happened again two years later when a second DC-10 
baggage door blew out during flight. This time the crash was fatal, killing all 346 people aboard 
[22].  
In each case, the conclusions were based on an implicit linear chain of events model that focuses on 
proximate causes as Heinrich and others proposed nearly a century ago. The selection of the 
proximate cause or causes is clearly not free from bias or opinion, and in many cases the selection 
only masks many other equally important underlying causes that must be identified and examined if 
we are to prevent accidents. Although many find linear models intuitive at first and may not give 
much thought to the underlying assumptions and implications, in reality these factors deserve 
careful evaluation before any conclusions are drawn. 
Assertion 4: Accidents are primarily caused by operator error 
Heinrich not only believed that most accidents have a primary cause—he argued that the primary 
cause is almost always human error. Although progress had been made in terms of improved safety 
features like machine guards to protect from powerful gears or other dangerous components, 
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accidents still happened. Heinrich noted that in almost every accident—whether or not safety 
features were present—an alternative human behavior could usually be identified that would have 
prevented the accident. Heinrich believed that by simply enforcing proper behavior and procedures, 
88% of all industrial accidents could be prevented. This approach was notably different from the 
conventional practice at the time that primarily identified causes rooted in the physical environment 
such as hazardous conditions or design flaws that could be corrected. 
Heinrich was very influential in shifting safety efforts from designing machines and procedures that 
better accommodate human behavior to a renewed focus on adapting human behavior to better 
accommodate the existing physical environment and enforcing strict supervision. As a result, blame 
for accidents began to shift from poor workplace conditions and poorly designed machines to 
human and supervisory errors, or as Heinrich called it, “man failure”. He writes: 
The causes enumerated … are the first, true, proximate or immediate causes most readily 
and practicably eliminable. A point of real distinction, however, is that heretofore it has 
been thought possible to apply such a definition only to purely physical or mechanical 
conditions (for example, unguarded machinery) and not to moral conditions or man 
failure; whereas, research, experimentation, and practice now prove conclusively that the 
generality of “man failure” may be broken down just as readily into specific causes of 
accidents [11]. 
It was discovered that 25 per cent of all accidents would, according to the usual improper 
method of analysis, be charged to plant physical or mechanical causes, but that in reality 
the causes of many accidents of this type were either wholly supervisory or chiefly 
supervisory and partly physical. This group, therefore was found to be actually 10 instead 
of 25 per cent. This difference (15 per cent) added to the 73 per cent of causes that are 
obviously of a supervisory nature, gives a total of 88 per cent of all industrial accidents 
that can be prevented through the enforcement of proper supervision. 
[regarding a fatal accident] Employee opened the door of a gear guard to oil the 
machinery. His arm was drawn into the heavy gears. Instructions had been issued not to 
open the door of a guard while the machinery was in motion. … The gear guard was so 
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built that the door could readily be opened. The oil cup was located inside the guard 
instead of outside. … There is no question as to the primary cause. Disregard of 
instructions was deliberate. An employee of this type would find ways to get hurt even on 
well-guarded equipment [11].1 
Employees are continually being hurt because they do unsafe things or omit to take safety 
precautions. The immediate practical remedy must be based on knowledge of what these 
dangerous practices are, of the first most readily corrected cause, and on supervisory 
observation and pressure in correction. If the cause should, for example, be non-
enforcement of instruction, it is not always necessary to find out why the instruction is not 
enforced. …. Since it is not always necessary to delve so deeply into the origin of accidents, 
it is clear that for all practical present purposes a line of demarcation may be drawn after 
the first of the chain of real causes and subcauses has been found [11]. 
Critics argue that focusing primarily on human contributions to accidents omits many other possible 
causes and results in a limited number of solutions for accident prevention [5, 23]. More 
importantly, human behavior is intimately connected to the context in which it is made; human error 
is usually a symptom of deeper trouble and the beginning of an inquiry, not a conclusion [2, 3]. 
Because decisions are rarely made without any reason, preventing unsafe human behavior requires 
understanding the reason behind potentially unsafe actions. In Heinrich’s example above, reasons 
for opening the door during operation may include the ease of opening the door, oil cup located 
inside the guard instead of outside, production pressures, contradicting instructions, past 
experiences, observations of other workers, cumbersome procedures, and organizational culture. 
Even if the employee is incompetent, there is still the question of what inadequate policies and 
procedures led to hiring an incompetent employee and placing him in command of a lethal machine. 
If the employee is merely fired (or in this case, killed) without addressing any of these issues, the 
risk of similar future accidents remains; the hazardous conditions and risks caused by deficiencies 
                                                 
1
 Here Heinrich himself noted some of the other factors involved, but still he insisted that man-failure was 
unquestionably the primary cause that deserves attention in preventing similar future accidents using the Domino 
model. 
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in the system are not eliminated, they are merely applied to a new employee. Nevertheless, linear 
models like the Domino model suggest that it is only necessary to identify and classify the unsafe 
act with very little analysis of the environment or context that might permit the unsafe act or, worse, 
make it appear safe and reasonable. In practice, simply admonishing workers and reissuing existing 
instructions while ignoring the underlying causes—such as inadequate information available, 
conflicting goals, external pressures, etc.—has not been very successful. 
Critics also note that many potential human acts in the Domino model may not always be 
undesirable. Because of Heinrich’s experience at an insurance company, his data sample was 
inherently biased with samples selected based on outcome (accident or insurance claim). In a linear 
model, every event preceding an accident is a potential cause; there was very little, if any, study of 
events that did not lead to an accident or actions that prevented accidents. For example, disregard of 
instruction may appear as an event preceding an accident but the same action may also occur—
perhaps more often—without causing an accident. In fact, disregard of instruction may be praised in 
some cases if it leads to increased efficiency or savings and may even prevent accidents in other 
cases when unanticipated conditions or unexpected equipment behavior is encountered. In fact, the 
recommendations suggested by a linear model—e.g. enforce instructions—may lead to new kinds 
of accidents. 
More recent work [24] has found that occasional deviation from procedure is an essential part of 
human learning and adaptation processes, and that the best approach is often to provide more 
flexibility in the procedures that people follow. By enforcing stricter and more detailed procedures 
as suggested by a linear model, workers’ ability to learn and adapt may be impaired, limiting their 
ability to effectively prevent accidents in the future. Moreover, the focus on proximate human acts 
tends to overemphasize certain behaviors in the narrow context of a single accident scenario while 
discounting the effects in other situations. The result is often a set of overly generalized conclusions 
and rigid procedures that may only be valid in a few specific situations.  
2.1.2 Extended Domino Models 
Heinrich’s Domino model was revised twice in 1976 to provide additional emphasis on certain 
management issues. Bird and Loftus [25] proposed renaming the five stages as follows: 
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1. Lack of control by management 
2. Basic causes (personal and job factors) 
3. Immediate causes (substandard practices/conditions/errors) 
4. Accident or Incident 
5. Loss 
Adams [26] proposed the following stages instead: 
1. Management structure (objectives, organization, and operations) 
2. Operational errors (management or supervisor behavior) 
3. Tactical errors (caused by employee behavior and work conditions) 
4. Accident or incident 
5. Injury or damage to persons or property 
Both proposals suggest consideration of management rather than ancestry and social factors, but 
neither proposal deviated from the fundamental linear structure of the model or the underlying 
assumptions. Both retained the basic 5-stage model and inherited the same major deficiencies of the 
original Domino model described above. 
2.1.3 Swiss Cheese Accident Model 
The Swiss Cheese model was proposed by James Reason in 1990 [27], and it has become 
increasingly popular in aviation [28] and healthcare [29]. Reason argued that accidents were caused 
by failures in four stages: organizational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe 
acts, and unsafe acts. Each stage can be represented by a slice of Swiss cheese and the holes in the 
cheese represent a failed or absent defense in that layer. Figure 3 illustrates this model. 
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Figure 3: Reason’s Swiss Cheese Accident Model [27, 30] 
Reason argues that the holes representing individual weaknesses are randomly varying in location 
and size. Eventually the holes come into alignment so that a trajectory is possible through all slices, 
representing a sequence of failures throughout several layers of defense. Failures then propagate 
along the trajectory through each defense barrier and cause an accident.  
The Swiss Cheese model includes many features of the Domino model—including the linear chain 
of events structure—and suffers from many of the same weaknesses. However, the Swiss Cheese 
model also relies on two new assumptions: random behavior of components and independence 
between failures in each layer. Critics argue that these assumptions do not hold in practice, 
especially for safety-critical software and human behavior [3, 31, 32]. Both software and human 
behavior are governed by human perception and understanding of the system and environment, 
which is not random. In fact, most software-related accidents are caused not by random 
programming mistakes but by systematic flaws in requirements produced by humans [10, 33-35]. 
For the same reason, the behavior of system components is usually not truly independent in 
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practice. Many important systemic factors can simultaneously affect the behavior of multiple 
layers—including flawed requirements, inadequate communication, past experiences, etc. While the 
Swiss Cheese model tends to focus safety efforts on individual holes or failures, the implication of 
randomness and independence overlooks processes that create holes in every layer, accidents that 
can occur without any failures, and systemic factors that cause the system as a whole to migrate 
towards states of high risk. 
Like the Domino model, the Swiss Cheese model also emphasizes human error as a primary cause 
of accidents. One notable addition by Reason is the classification of errors into one of two 
categories: active errors and latent errors. Active errors are defined as errors “whose effects are felt 
almost immediately” while latent errors are defined as errors “whose adverse consequences may lie 
dormant within the system for a long time” [27]. However, critics argue that the distinction between 
active and latent is arbitrary and the boundary between “immediate” and “for a long time” is not 
always clear. Moreover, the classification is based on the eventual outcome of the action, which is 
usually not known at the time the action is performed and may not be useful in understanding why 
errors occur and how to prevent them.  
2.1.4 Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) 
The Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) was proposed by Erik Hollnagel in 2004 to 
capture emergent phenomena in complex nonlinear systems [36]. The model is derived from the 
idea of stochastic resonance [37], which describes the detection of a weak periodic signal 
superimposed on a stronger random noise component. The weak signal is such that it is normally 
undetectable due to the relative strength between signal and noise, and therefore the presence of the 
weak signal has very little affect on any downstream systems. However, in certain conditions, 
increasing the amount of random noise by a small amount can induce resonance in nonlinear 
components of the system, which counterintuitively allows downstream components to react to the 
weak signal resulting in better detection ability. Stochastic resonance was first described by Roberto 
Benzi in 1982 to explain the periodic behavior of the earth’s ice ages [38, 39], and has since been 
studied in neurology [40-42], electrical engineering [43-45], ecological models [46], financial 
models [47], social systems [48], and game-theoretic strategies [49].  
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In Hollnagel’s model the performance of any subsystem may be variable to some extent, which is 
seen as a weak modulated signal. The “signal” is normally weak enough to remain undetectable and 
within the tolerance of the system (no accident occurs). However, other subsystems also exhibit 
variable performance, and together the aggregated variability of other subsystems is modeled as a 
noise component. If the noise meets certain criteria, it can cause resonance in nonlinear components 
of the system that effectively increases sensitivity to the weak signal (i.e. component variability) 
beyond the tolerance of the system resulting in an accident. In other words, FRAM models how the 
combined performance variability of multiple nonlinear subsystems can create an environment in 
which otherwise acceptable and normal component deviations may lead to an accident. 
Although adapted from the concept of stochastic resonance, Hollnagel uses the term functional 
resonance because the nature of the noise component in his model is fundamentally different. In 
stochastic resonance the noise component is purely random, but in FRAM the “noise” represents the 
performance variability of many subsystems and is not purely random. Hollnagel argues that the 
noise is determined by the functions and structure of the system and therefore the resulting 
resonance is more correctly labeled functional resonance. 
FRAM has been applied to a few systems [50, 51], but it not been as popular as other accident 
models. Although stochastic resonance has been discovered and quantitatively established in many 
domains, Hollnagel’s application assumes that the reaction of engineered subsystems to non-
random and potentially undefined noise will mimic the reaction of well-defined nonlinear 
components to random noise. However, there has been little evidence to verify this claim. In 
addition, although the model is most applicable to accidents in which component variability is a 
factor, the model is not comprehensive and may be much less suitable for accidents with 
components that fail or components (e.g. software) that cause accidents by performing exactly as 
designed and do not exhibit variability. 
2.1.5 System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) 
System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) [10] was published by Nancy Leveson 
in 2002 [52, 53] to capture more types of accident causal factors including social and organizational 
structures, new kinds of human error, design and requirements flaws, and dysfunctional interactions 
among non-failed components. Rather than treating safety as a failure problem or simplifying 
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accidents to a linear chain of events, STAMP treats safety as a control problem in which accidents 
arise from complex dynamic processes that may operate concurrently and interact to create unsafe 
situations. Accidents can then be prevented by identifying and enforcing constraints on component 
interactions. This model captures accidents due to component failure, but also explains increasingly 
common component interaction accidents that occur in complex systems without any component 
failures. For example, software can create unsafe situations by behaving exactly as instructed or 
operators and automated controllers can individually perform as intended but together they may 
create unexpected or dangerous conditions. 
STAMP is based on systems theory and control theory. Complex systems are viewed as hierarchical 
structures with multiple levels; each level controls lower levels by imposing constraints on the level 
beneath it. Figure 4 shows a generic example hierarchical control structure. Control processes 
operate throughout the hierarchy whereby commands or control actions are issued from higher 
levels to lower levels and feedback is provided from lower levels to higher levels. Accidents arise 
from inadequate enforcement of safety constraints, for example due to missing or incorrect 
feedback, inadequate control actions, component failure, uncontrolled disturbances, or other flaws.  
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Figure 4: Generic example of a hierarchical control structure 
STAMP defines four types of unsafe control actions that must be eliminated or controlled to prevent 
accidents: 
1. A control action required for safety is not provided or is not followed 
2. An unsafe control action is provided that leads to a hazard 
3. A potentially safe control action is provided too late, too early, or out of sequence 
4. A safe control action is stopped too soon or applied too long 
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One potential cause of a hazardous control action in STAMP is an inadequate process model used 
by human or automated controllers. A process model contains the controller’s understanding of 1) 
the current state of the controlled process, 2) the desired state of the controlled process, and 3) the 
ways the process can change state. This model is used by the controller to determine what control 
actions are needed. In software, the process model is usually implemented in variables and 
embedded in the program algorithms. For humans, the process model is often called the “mental 
model” [52]. Software and human errors frequently result from incorrect process models; for 
example, the Mars Polar Lander software prematurely believed the spacecraft had landed and shut 
off the descent engines too early [54]. Accidents like this can occur when an incorrect or incomplete 
process model causes a controller to provide control actions that are hazardous. While process 
model flaws are not the only cause of accidents in STAMP, it is a major contributor. 
STAMP has been successfully used in many domains including aerospace, defense, energy, 
chemical, healthcare, and transportation systems. STAMP is especially adept at capturing behavior 
in modern complex human- and software-intensive systems where component interaction accidents 
have become increasingly common and traditional chain of events models have proven inadequate. 
However, no formal structure has previously been defined for STAMP to permit the development of 
automated analysis methods based on the STAMP model. 
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2.2 Hazard analysis methods 
While accident models explain why accidents occur and what assumptions can be made, they do not 
specify what steps need to be taken to analyze a system or accident. There are two main classes of 
methods that use accident models: accident analysis methods and hazard analysis methods. 
Accident analysis methods describe how accident models can be applied to identify the causes of an 
accident that has already occurred. Hazard analysis methods describe how to use accident models to 
identify potential causes of a future accident in a system that already exists or is being designed. 
The following sections review current hazard analysis methods used today. 
2.2.1 Failure-based methods 
2.2.1.1 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed at Bell Laboratories in 1961 under a U.S. Air Force 
contract to analyze the Minuteman missile system [55]. FTA is based on the chain of events 
accident model, and was designed for component failure events. Electromechanical component 
failures were quite common at the time, but there was no method to analyze the many potential 
combinations of failures that could cause hazardous behavior like an accidental missile launch. Bell 
Labs developed FTA as a way to identify critical failure combinations, determine which 
combinations were most likely, and establish whether individual failure rates are sufficiently low. 
The analysis approach was first demonstrated on the Launch Control System of Minuteman I, and 
then extended by Boeing and AVCO to include components throughout the entire Minuteman II 
system [56]. Following its success on missile systems, FTA was adopted by organizations in many 
different industries and is now one of the most popular methods used during hazard analysis. 
FTA begins with an undesirable event, such as an inadvertent missile launch or aircraft engine 
failure, and proceeds in a top-down fashion to identify the causes of the undesirable event in 
progressive levels of detail. The result is documented in a tree structure, where high-level 
undesirable events or faults are caused by combinations of lower-level component failures. A 
failure is an event in which a component does not operate in accordance with its specification, for 
example if a relay fails to close properly when a voltage is impressed across its terminals. A fault 
event describes component behavior that results from a failure and causes an unsatisfactory state, 
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such as a relay closing at the wrong time due to the improper functioning of an upstream component 
[1, 5]. Events at the top of the tree describe faults while the lowest-level events, called primary 
events, describe failures. Figure 5 shows an example fault tree from the original Bell Laboratory 
report. 
 
 
Figure 5: Example fault tree from the original Bell Laboratory study [55] 
Events at each level are decomposed using either OR logic or AND logic into more detailed events. 
AND logic is used to indicate that an event will occur only if all events in the immediately lower 
level occur. OR logic indicates that the event will occur if any events in the immediately lower level 
occurs.  
In 1981, Vesely further refined and standardized FTA with a number of rules, symbols, and 
rationale for connecting nodes in a fault tree [1]. For example, he argued that causality passes 
through AND but never through OR gates; inputs to OR gates should always be “identical to the 
output but more specifically defined as to the cause” [1]. He also argued that fault trees should not 
be constructed with direct connections between gates, as in Figure 5, but instead the intermediate 
events should always be identified and labeled, as in Figure 6. Vesely’s work became very popular, 
and most applications of fault trees today adopt the conventions he endorsed [57-59]. 
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When the fault tree is complete, it can be analyzed to identify combinations of component failures 
or cut sets sufficient to cause the top-level undesirable event. For example, one cut set for the fault 
tree in Figure 5 consists of event A together with event B; another cut set consists of event A 
together with C and D. The former cut set also a minimal cut set because it cannot be further 
reduced into a smaller cut set. Minimal cut sets from a fault tree can be used to help prioritize the 
importance of component failures and focus engineering efforts. For example, failures that appear in 
every minimal cut set—such as event A in Figure 5—might warrant a higher ranking than other 
failures [60]. 
If the component failure rates or probabilities of individual failures are known then a quantitative 
analysis may be performed to calculate the likelihood of the top-level event. In a quantitative 
analysis, the failure events are typically assumed to occur independently, which greatly simplifies 
the analysis and does not require the measurement of complex dependent failure rates. Although the 
independence assumption is often made for physical devices, it may not be valid if the failure rates 
are substantially affected by changes in independent variables such as temperature, vibration, 
mechanical stresses, etc. For example, the two O-rings involved in the loss of the Challenger shuttle 
were originally believed to be independent, but it was later discovered that certain failures of the 
first O-ring would inevitably lead to the failure of the second O-ring [61]. 
2.2.1.1.1 FTA Evaluation 
FTA is a powerful top-town method of analyzing combinations of failures that can cause an 
undesirable event. The method was designed for engineered components with well-known failure 
modes and effects and has been very successful when applied to physical systems where most 
accidents are due to component failures. In fact, techniques like FTA have been so effective at 
preventing component failure accidents that a new type of accident—component interaction 
accidents—are becoming much more predominant in modern complex systems. More and more 
accidents are being caused by problems such as flawed requirements, design errors, and unsafe 
interactions among components that have not failed. However, these causes are much more difficult 
to capture in a fault tree. 
Software errors are notoriously difficult to capture in a fault tree because software does not fail; 
software often causes accidents by performing exactly as instructed. Unlike physical components 
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with a small number of well-known failure modes that can be added to a fault tree, software can 
misbehave in a practically infinite number of unpredictable ways. Some attempts have been made to 
include software in fault trees by adding a single box labeled “software error” or “computer failure” 
as in Figure 6, but doing so doesn’t provide software engineers and developers with the information 
they need to ensure the software will be safe. Other attempts add very specific software behaviors to 
the fault tree [62, 63], but these are either incomplete or they quickly become incredibly complex 
and inefficient when applied to modern complex software. In practice, software errors are often 
ignored completely in fault trees [5, 64], as well as design errors and requirement flaws for the same 
reasons. Human behavior is also extremely difficult to capture in a fault tree because humans are 
adaptive creatures that can learn to react in new ways and can respond to unexpected situations. In 
fact, a major reason why humans are still chosen to operate safety-critical systems like aircraft and 
nuclear reactors is to handle exactly those unexpected situations that engineers might not have 
anticipated. 
Because FTA begins with an undesirable event, some other method must be used first to identify the 
set of undesirable events to be analyzed with FTA. Another issue is identifying the lower-level 
events. Although some limited guidance is provided in terms of when certain logical operators can 
be used and how faults can be combined, much less guidance is provided for identifying the actual 
faults and failures in the tree. As a result, many completed fault trees are later found to omit 
important events. For example, the fault tree in Figure 6 was produced in 1983 for an aircraft 
collision avoidance system but omits the possibility that a conflict alert is displayed and the 
controller does not observe it. Similarly, the fault tree in Figure 7 was produced in 2008 for new 
NextGen procedures but omits the possibility that Air Traffic Control does not check the Mach 
differential.  
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Figure 6: A partial fault tree for an aircraft collision avoidance system [65] 
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Figure 7: A partial fault tree for proposed airspace procedures [66] 
At each level, FTA users must seek out additional information and identify lower level causes, but 
there is no systematic method for doing so. The analysis itself—i.e. finding causes and linking them 
together—is performed mentally based on one’s own experience and knowledge; the fault tree 
simply documents the output of the analysis. The analysis must also be based on some existing 
system model, but because FTA does not include any standard system model a mental model is 
typically used instead. For these reasons, there is no way to check or verify that all the causes have 
been identified at any given point or that all users are operating on the same understanding and 
assumptions of the system. Meanwhile, some of the most important contributors to accidents in 
complex systems today involve subtle behavior that was never anticipated or not included in the 
developers’ mental model. Because FTA relies on an existing model of the system it is also less 
useful for driving critical decisions during early stages of development when a detailed system 
model does not yet exist. 
Another disadvantage is the lack of a stopping rule when performing FTA. Failure and fault events 
can almost always be decomposed further, and a subjective assessment must always be made about 
when to stop. For example, the diamond shapes in Figure 6 indicate events that are not further 
decomposed in the analysis. The lowest-level boxes Figure 7 were not decomposed further either. In 
practice, decomposition often stops when the causes are no longer obvious or become too complex. 
However, the subtle or complex factors are often the most important ones to examine, especially for 
software- and human-intensive systems. For example, the event “controller believes conflict alert is 
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a false alarm” cannot be addressed without understanding why that behavior may occur (e.g. the 
system may have generated too many false alarms in the past). These explanations, which may not 
be events or even faults, are not easily included in FTA. As others have noted, FTA often finds only 
what is already intuitively obvious. [5, 67] 
Although quantitative FTA was originally developed to analyze combinations of electromechanical 
device failures, various attempts have been made since its original inception in the 1960s to extend 
quantitative FTA to other types of components. Boeing used simulators to attempt to identify and 
quantify potential pilot errors for use in a fault tree as early as 1968, but noted that the human 
system was far too complex for an accurate assessment and that developing numerical probabilistic 
values was slow and painful process [68]. A number of improvements have been made since then, 
but the same limitations are still being observed: 
Operators do not get simulator sickness as do pilots, they do not have to make billion dollar 
tradeoffs which they might in an actual severe accident, and the simulators themselves can 
only simulate ‘standard, textbook scenarios.’ .... ‘Hot cognition’, decision making under fire 
and uncertainty, is just not elicited in a simulator. [69] 
The most serious problem … continues to be the same problem that was recognized in the 
early 1960s among HRA practitioners—the scarcity of data on human performance that are 
useful for quantitative predictions of human behavior in complex systems. … Except for use 
of highly fallible expert judgment, the training simulator is the only practical method for 
collecting data on human errors that have very low probabilities of occurrence (1E-4 or 
smaller) or which are associated with operating conditions that would occur with a very low 
frequency. Yet the simulator is not the real world. How can raw data from training 
simulators be modified to reflect real-world performance? This is not a small problem. [70] 
Expert judgments have also been utilized as a way to identify and quantify probabilities of operator 
errors in a fault tree [66, 71]. In practice, this approach is typically used when there is little or no 
objective data available for the quantity of interest and critics argue that it is therefore not possible 
to validate (or disprove) the expert estimates that are used [72]. Expert estimates are also subject to 
a number of cognitive biases: estimates are almost always overconfident, usually over- or under-
estimate the quantity of interest, and vary significantly between experts [73, 74]. Although some 
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methods have been proposed to reduce systematic biases, critics argue that such approaches only 
improve inter-judge reliability and do not necessarily validate the estimates themselves [72, 73]. 
2.2.1.2 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) was developed during the WASH-1400 nuclear power plant safety 
study in 1974 [75, 76]. A comprehensive fault tree analysis was originally attempted for this task, 
but was deemed too large and cumbersome to be practical [5, 75]. Event trees were originally 
conceived as a way to condense the analysis by defining potential accident paths so that each failure 
in the path can be further analyzed using a fault tree. Although event trees were originally designed 
to be combined with fault trees as part of an overall Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) has also been introduced as a separate method in its own right [75, 77-79]. Like 
FTA, ETA is based on the chain of events accident model. 
A simplified event tree for a nuclear reactor is shown in Figure 8. The first step is to identify an 
initiating failure event such as a ruptured pipeline or loss of power. Next, the set of barriers or 
protective functions intended to prevent the initiating event from leading to an accident are listed in 
the anticipated sequence of operation. Finally, a logical tree is constructed by tracing forward in 
time from the initiating event and inserting a binary branch at each barrier to represent the possible 
success or failure of that barrier.  
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Figure 8: Simplified event tree for a nuclear reactor adapted from [80] 
Like fault trees, the structure of an event tree lends itself well to a quantitative analysis if the 
probabilities of each barrier’s success or failure are known. In practice each barrier is often assumed 
to operate independently, which allows computing the probability of each end state (conditioned on 
the initiating event) by simply multiplying the probabilities of success or failure along each path to 
the end state. The end state probabilities can also be calculated if the barriers operate dependently 
and the probability of each barrier’s success or failure (conditioned on the success or failure of the 
previous barrier) is known. 
2.2.1.2.1 ETA Evaluation 
Event Trees Analysis is a useful way to examine the anticipated effects of physical protection 
systems when the probabilities of failure are known, but like any method there are several 
limitations. Event trees must start with an initiating event, but do not provide a way to 
systematically identify the initiating events or to be sure that all relevant initiating events are 
included. Some other method must be used to identify the initiating events that need to be 
considered. In addition, because the analysis starts by assuming the initiating event has occurred, 
the method focuses on functions to mitigate its consequences; preventative measures to avoid the 
initiating event are not considered. 
End State
Success Success
Failure Success Success Success
Failure Success Success
Success Core melt
Failure
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When human behavior is included in an event tree, human actions are reduced to a binary decision 
that is equated to a success or failure in the tree. Critics argue that this simplification can mask the 
wide range of behaviors possible at any given moment and removes critical context that explains 
why a person would choose a given action [3]. Human behavior is intimately connected to and 
influenced by the context in which it occurs: the information available, goals, past experiences, 
beliefs about the current system state, interpretation of various observations, etc. By removing the 
context, preventative measures to ensure safe behavior are easily overlooked.  
Various extensions have been developed to better capture human behavior in event trees including 
Dynamic Event Trees that model stochastic variations in operating crew states [81], time-dependent 
event trees that include certain operator interventions [82], and Fuzzy Event Tree Analysis (FETA) 
that employs fuzzy logic to integrate human errors into event trees [83]. However, these extensions 
all employ the same basic chain of events accident model and inherit the same weaknesses 
including oversimplification of human behavior as binary decisions (e.g. success/failure), 
assumptions of a pre-defined sequence of barriers or process events, and emphasis on deviation 
from specified procedures rather than evaluating how the procedures may be flawed or inadequate. 
With a few exceptions (e.g. ATHEANA [84]), these extensions also assume human behavior is 
random and tend to focus on quantification and assessment of operator errors rather than explaining 
the underlying reasons or providing engineering insight to prevent errors. 
Although the barriers in an event tree are often assumed to operate independently of each other, in 
practice they may not be truly independent. For example, in the recent Fukushima accident the loss 
of offsite power and the loss of the diesel generators were not independent events as Figure 8 
suggests; they were both caused by the same factors. In general, the behavior of multiple barriers 
can be heavily dependent on the same set of factors, especially if human behavior is involved. For 
example, in the infamous Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, the operators were unaware of steam 
forming in the core and they manually disabled the primary loop pumps and the emergency core 
cooling pumps. Clearly, the failure of these barriers to operate was not independent. 
Critics also argue that design errors and requirements flaws are critical factors that cannot be 
analyzed with an event tree [5, 85]. In the example above, an important reason TMI operators did 
not initially believe coolant was being lost is that an indicator lamp erroneously suggested that a 
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relief valve was closed and a water level indicator erroneously suggested the water level was 
sufficient. Both of these instruments satisfied their individual requirements and, in fact, operated 
exactly as designed, but the design and requirements were flawed. The indicator lamp was designed 
such that it would not reflect the actual state of the valve when the valve became stuck, and the 
water level indicator was designed such that it overestimated the amount of water present when 
steam became trapped in the reactor core. Design and requirements flaws such as these are not 
amenable to analysis using an event tree and are easily overlooked. 
Higher-level systemic causes such as organizational and managerial issues are also omitted from an 
event tree [5, 86]. For example, poor management, ineffective communication, misplaced 
regulatory priorities, and complacent attitudes were important contributors at TMI [87] and 
simultaneously affected the efficacy of multiple barriers, but these aspects are all omitted in event 
trees. Event trees also omit non-linear or feedback relationships that can contribute an accident, 
such as two or more processes that mutually affect each other. For example, the operators at TMI 
initially believed that coolant was not being lost because their interactions with the system 
reinforced this belief. Processes operating at a much higher level are also important; for example, 
low accident rates can give rise to complacency and increased pressures to reduce budget and 
oversight, which in turn leads to higher accident rates [88]. These aspects are overlooked by event 
trees. 
Note that many of these omitted factors are also missing in FTA; combining event trees and fault 
trees may improve some aspects of the analysis but it does not address these critical factors that are 
missing from both techniques. This is discussed in more detail in section 2.2.1.4. 
2.2.1.3 FMEA and FMECA 
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and its cousin Failure Modes Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) were developed by reliability engineers to systemically evaluate the effect of 
individual component failures on system performance [77]. Both approaches are based on the chain 
of events accident model. They were first introduced as a procedure for weapons systems in 1949 
[89], and in 1955 a similar procedure was introduced by the U.S. Navy Bureau of Aeronautics [90]. 
In the 1960s these methods were refined and adopted by the aerospace industry, and they began to 
be applied on a number of NASA programs including Apollo and Voyager [91, 92]. By the 1970s 
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they were being used in civil aviation, the automotive industry, and even offshore petroleum 
exploration [91, 93-95]. Today FMEA and FMECA are used across a broad array of fields including 
food, drug, and cosmetic industries [96]. 
Due to its popularity, FMEA has been implemented in a number of different ways but generally 
follows the same bottom-up approach. First, the various components in the system are identified. 
Next, the failure modes—defined as mechanisms by which a component may fail to achieve its 
designed function—are identified [97, 98]. For each failure mode, the potential causes and effects 
on the system are investigated. FMECA follows the same basic process, but in addition assigns a 
criticality to each failure mode by examining the severity and probability of each identified effect.  
Table 1 below shows an example FMECA worksheet that summarizes the analysis. 
 
Table 1: Example FMECA worksheet adapted from [99] 
Component 
Failure 
Mode Cause Effect Severity 
Probability 
of 
Occurrence Criticality 
Water Tank Leak Corrosion Lost water Catastrophic 0.0001 High 
Valve 
Stuck 
closed 
Dirt, 
corrosion 
No water Catastrophic 0.00012 Very High 
Stuck open 
Corrosion, 
power 
False trip Marginal 0.0002 Low 
Note that FMEA/FMECA can be applied to either physical or functional models of the system, 
although in practice physical and functional applications can overlap significantly and are not 
always distinct. For example, if applied to a physical model then the analysis of failure modes, 
effects, and severity are still identified with respect to the designed function of each component, and 
if applied to a functional model then the causes and failures may still be based on the physical 
implementation of the components. [97, 98, 100] 
2.2.1.3.1 FMEA and FMECA Evaluation 
FMEA and FMECA are useful methods for analyzing the reliability of physical system components 
and identifying single points of failure that may lead to an accident. However, there are a number of 
limitations especially when applied to other goals or other types of components. Because these 
methods start by identifying low-level failures to consider, the resulting scenarios that are analyzed 
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include both hazardous and non-hazardous scenarios triggered by a failure. Both types of scenarios 
are analyzed in similar levels of detail. If the goal is safety-related, then the effort spent analyzing 
non-hazardous failures may require significant time and effort without adding value to the analysis. 
More importantly, the set of scenarios triggered by a failure does not include all unsafe scenarios, as 
illustrated in Figure 9. For example, if the system requirements are flawed then the emergent 
behavior of the system may be unsafe even though all components operate exactly as designed and 
required. Filtering out all scenarios that do not begin with a failure effectively excludes these types 
of hazardous scenarios. 
 
Figure 9: A Venn diagram of failure scenarios and unsafe scenarios 
Like other methods, FMEA/FMECA assume a linear progression of events and do not capture non-
linear and feedback relationships. Like ETA, FMEA/FMECA only consider scenarios initiated by a 
single failure and omit scenarios that result only from a combination of several failures. By focusing 
only on single failures, only a subset of all failure scenarios (the left circle in Figure 9) are analyzed. 
2.2.1.4 General evaluation of failure-based methods 
One of the most important limitations of failure-based methods is that by definition they omit entire 
classes of factors that lead to accidents. Failure-based methods are generally designed to capture the 
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propagation of component failures in a system that causes an undesired event. However, many 
causes of accidents do not involve any component failure. With today’s systems becoming 
increasingly complex, more and more accidents are occurring not due to component failures but 
instead due to critical design errors or requirements flaws. In addition, socio-technical systems tend 
to exhibit dynamic non-linear behavior that is difficult or impossible to capture with a technique 
designed for a linear propagation of faults. Continuously adaptive behavior, goal-seeking behavior, 
local optimization with global deterioration, goal erosion, mutually reinforcing relationships with 
exponential growth or collapse, and budgetary/financial pressures are just a few factors that can 
have a critical impact on the safety of a system. However these are dynamic processes, not 
independent failure events, and are not explained with a one-way linear fault propagation structure. 
Similarly, human error in a failure-based method is treated in exactly the same way as a hardware 
failure—as a deviation from a specified behavior or procedure. However, like software, the number 
of potential ways a human can deviate is virtually infinite. Even if all noncompliant behaviors could 
be listed, it is not sufficient to just identify them; in order to prevent a behavior it is necessary to 
understand why a person might behave that way. In other words, it requires first understanding the 
conditions under which unsafe decisions might make sense to a person at the time and then 
modifying or adding requirements to make the correct decisions obvious. Unfortunately, framing 
human error as a failure requires oversimplifying human behavior as a binary decision between 
right and wrong—a determination that is often only clear in hindsight and does not reflect the 
perspective of the person at the time. In fact, this over-simplification can obscure the underlying 
reasons for the behavior, including many important causal factors that are difficult or impossible to 
model in a failure-based method such as: 
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 Correct human behavior that is not defined for certain situations 
 Specified human behavior that is known by operators but thought to be incorrect 
 Procedures that conflict with each other, or it is not obvious which procedure applies 
 Information necessary to carry out a procedure is not available or is incorrect 
 The person has multiple responsibilities or goals that may conflict 
 Past experiences and current knowledge conflict with a procedure 
 Procedures are not clear or misunderstood 
 Procedures are known but responsibility for the procedures is unclear or misunderstood 
 Procedures are known and followed, but they are unsafe 
Consider an example
2
: In the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, a critical factor was that workers 
reported a successful negative pressure test when in reality oil had already begun seeping into the 
well. [101, 102] The workers did not know that earlier tests had clogged a pipe that rendered a key 
instrument reading invalid. Note that in this case the behavior was compliant—the workers 
followed procedures but the procedures were inadequate and unsafe. The behavior was not a 
“failure event” because nothing failed – the flaw existed from the beginning in the form of 
inadequate procedures and feedback for the crew. A failure-based method could help focus 
engineering efforts on preventing the pipe from getting clogged or perhaps preventing workers from 
deviating from procedures, but would not help address the flawed requirements, inadequate 
procedures, and inadequate feedback loops that existed. For example, a potential solution that adds 
equipment to detect a clogged pipe and adjusts worker procedures to utilize this information would 
be masked by a failure-based method that focuses only on preventing clogs and enforcing worker 
compliance with existing procedures. 
Most failure-based methods were originally designed and developed to handle simple 
electromechanical components. Numerous attempts have been made to extend these methods to 
other components like software, but software is fundamentally different in the sense that it does not 
fail like hardware does. Unlike hardware, software always behaves exactly the way it was 
                                                 
2
 This example is necessarily an oversimplification of the complex events that unfolded on the Deepwater Horizon, but 
it is nevertheless a useful illustration for the point being made. 
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programmed (and therein lies the problem). If software exhibits unsafe behavior, it is because that 
unsafe behavior was programmed from the beginning—not because the software “wore out” or 
“broke” over time. Because of this fundamentally different problem and the virtually infinite 
number of ways software can be programmed incorrectly, it is very difficult to capture software-
related causes in a failure-based method. In practice, failure-based methods often ignore software 
errors completely [5, 64] or include them under a generic label of “software failure” that is not 
decomposed further. However, simply stating that the software could cause an undesirable event 
offers little assistance to the system and software developers who need to make the software safe.  
Failure-based methods are often applied quantitatively to consider the probability of certain failures 
and outcomes. Assuming independence between different failure events is very common and can 
significantly simplify the analysis, but this assumption is often made incorrectly. For example, the 
primary and backup O-rings on the Challenger shuttle were originally believed to be independent 
and redundant
3
 [61]. Unfortunately, they weren’t truly independent because low temperature and 
mechanical pressures affected both O-rings and contributed to their simultaneous failure in the 
famous 1986 accident. While assuming independence between failure events may simplify the 
probabilistic calculations, doing so has often resulted in overconfident probabilities for hazardous 
events. 
Accurately quantifying probabilities for software errors is difficult or impossible. Even if all 
potential software errors could be listed for a simple system, predicting their probability of 
occurrence is not feasible. An error is either known to exist or not known to exist. Critics argue that 
if an error is ever known, it’s far more effective to simply fix it than to add events to a fault-based 
model or guess a probability of occurrence [5].  
Although software errors are important, the majority of software-related accidents can be traced to 
flawed requirements rather than a problem with the software implementation itself [103, 104]. 
                                                 
3
 The SRB O-ring joint criticality status was originally classified as C 1R (redundant). Marshall eventually proposed 
changing the status to C 1 (non-redundant), but Thiokol engineers still disagreed with the change and argued that it 
should remain C 1R. Although the status was later officially changed to C 1 in some databases, this issue remained an 
important factor in the resulting accident. [61] 
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Clearly in any system—whether dealing with software, hardware, or even human components—
safety is dependent on having correct and safe requirements. However, there is no empirical data for 
quantifying the probability that a requirement is flawed. Like software instructions, if a requirement 
is known to be flawed, it is far more effective to fix it than to guess the probability that it is wrong. 
Requirements provided in the form of procedures for human operators are also critical for ensuring 
safety. For example, inadequate procedures played an important role in the Three Mile Island partial 
nuclear meltdown in 1979. Many operating and emergency procedures contained substantive errors, 
typographical errors, imprecise or sloppy terminology, and violated the nuclear reactor’s 
specifications [5]. As with requirements, there is typically no data to support a probabilistic estimate 
of a flawed procedure before an accident. Even if such an estimate had been produced for Three 
Mile Island before 1979, it most likely would have been incorrect; before the accident the 
procedures were thought to be safe. Only afterward in hindsight were the flaws discovered. 
Given the lack of a probabilistic estimate for these problems, it’s easy to focus on creating methods 
to produce such estimates. However, it’s important to recognize that the problem is much larger 
than just the lack of a quantitative probability. Suppose such an estimate did exist for requirements. 
What would the number mean? Any value other than 0% or 100% just indicates a lack of 
knowledge—i.e. it is not known whether a given requirement is flawed or safe, and the engineering 
task is therefore incomplete. The core issue is therefore not a difficulty quantifying existing 
knowledge; the core issue is obtaining the right knowledge in the first place. Addressing these 
problems will require better methods for finding flaws and creating safe requirements, not methods 
that estimate what is already known. 
When human behavior is included in a quantitative failure-based analysis, the analysis typically 
assumes that the behavior is random with a given probability. However, human behavior is not 
random—it is heavily influenced by the context in which is appears and only appears random if we 
ignore the most important factors that explain it. For example, in the 2005 Texas City explosion a 
critical factor is that operators did not follow standard operating procedures to release hydrocarbons 
safely via the 3-pound venting system [105]. Instead, they bypassed the venting system and released 
flammable hydrocarbons through a blowdown stack into open air, contributing to the accident. In 
the absence of any knowledge about the system it might appear that these operators “flipped a coin” 
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and randomly decided whether to follow the procedure, but this is far from true. The decision was a 
direct result of influence from supervisory personnel who advocated the bypass because it 
significantly shortened the startup time and had been used successfully many times in the past [105, 
106]. With this additional knowledge, the operators’ behavior does not appear random at all—it was 
both predictable and preventable given the context in which it occurred. While quantitative failure-
based methods tend to isolate behavior from context by emphasizing human actions as random 
events, a better understanding of the context can often lead to a more accurate perception and much 
more effective solutions. 
Although human error is often only used to refer to behavior during the operation of a system, it 
also applies to the development of a system. For example, software errors and flawed requirements 
are really just forms of human error. In fact, even hardware failures can be traced back to human 
decisions regarding the design and construction of the component, the selection of the component 
for a specific purpose in an assumed operating environment, the design of the system that interfaces 
with the component, and the inclusion of any protective measures that detect and handle (or don’t) 
the potential failure of the component. Therefore it is not surprising that the same issues that plague 
software errors and flawed requirements appear again for human behavior in general. 
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2.2.2 Systems-based Hazard Analysis Methods 
2.2.2.1 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
Hazards and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) was developed in 1964 by Imperial Chemical 
Industries (ICI) in England [85], although the method was not published until 1974 [107]. HAZOP 
was developed to help multidisciplinary teams identify ways chemical processes can lead to 
accidents. The analysis starts with a firm design [108], including a full description of design 
intentions, and proceeds to identify parameters in various parts of the system as shown in Table 2. 
For each parameter, a set of guidewords are applied to identify how the system may deviate from 
the design intention. 
 
Table 2: HAZOP parameters and guidewords (adapted from [108]) 
Parameter Guidewords 
Flow  None 
 More of 
 Less of 
 Reverse 
 Elsewhere 
 As well as 
Temperature  Higher 
 Lower 
Pressure  Higher 
 Lower 
 Reverse 
Level  Higher 
 Lower 
 None 
Mixing  Less 
 More 
 None 
Once the potential deviations have been identified, they are evaluated to determine whether the 
consequences are hazardous and, if so, to identify possible causes of the deviation. A flow diagram 
of the HAZOP process is shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: HAZOP Flow Diagram (from [108]) 
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2.2.2.1.1 HAZOP Evaluation 
A notable advantage of HAZOP is its simplicity [5, 109]. The emphasis on deviations from intended 
behavior is also quite powerful and often captures accident causes beyond component failures. 
However, the method requires a fairly detailed system model to identify parameters and apply 
guidewords and is most often applied after detailed development phases when many important 
design decisions have already been made. This limits the number of potential solutions to minor 
changes like patches or protection systems added to an existing design.  
Although HAZOP is most popular in the process industries, it has been applied in other domains 
and several extensions have been developed to accommodate human and software behavior [110]. 
A number of Human HAZOP variants have been developed to analyze human deviations from 
procedures [111-114]. Using similar guidewords, human tasks are identified and analyzed to find 
potential procedural deviations that may cause accidents. However, while these approaches provide 
ways to describe and classify human errors, they do not explain non-trivial errors and do not 
examine underlying causes of human behavior such as operator mental models. Human HAZOP 
methods have also been criticized for only focusing on errors during operation without considering 
broader organizational decisions or design flaws that can make human deviations from procedures 
more likely or inevitable [115]. 
Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD) is an approach inspired by HAZOP 
to identify potentially hazardous software behavior [116]. Like HAZOP, SHARD begins with a 
proposed design. Data flows in the software system are identified and a set of guidewords including 
omission, commission, early, and late are applied to each data flow. The result is evaluated in terms 
of possible effects and causes, and documented in a worksheet much like a FMEA. A number of 
Computer HAZOP (CHAZOP) variants have also been defined for applying HAZOP to computer 
systems [117, 118]. For example, guidewords such as early, late, before, and after may be applied 
to attributes such as data flow, control flow, data rate, event, response time, etc. Many similar 
CHAZOP variants have also been described in the literature [119-122]. 
Software HAZOP methods have been criticized for ambiguity, incompleteness, nonsensicality, 
inefficiency, and redundancy [123]. They have also been criticized for being time and labor 
intensive [117], and for the ad-hoc schemes that are used to derive the guidewords [118]. Although 
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HAZOP is a powerful technique, bottom-up approaches that start at the software level can be 
inefficient because both hazardous and nonhazardous data flows must be analyzed, and the analysis 
can be overwhelming when performed on complex software systems with large quantities and 
varieties of data flows. In addition, isolating individual attributes or flows can mask more complex 
problems that arise only when multiple attributes or flows interact in complex ways. In many cases, 
data or other information flows may not be the right units of analysis—for example, in process-
oriented control systems with very little flow of information but with complex control algorithms 
and coordination schemes. Another important issue is that HAZOP relies on the user’s 
understanding of the software behavior, interactions, and effects on other systems. While the 
physical pipe-and-process diagrams that HAZOP was originally created to analyze were relatively 
straightforward and exhibited well-understood behavior, today’s complex and integrated software 
systems are fundamentally different and often cause problems precisely because they behave in 
ways that were unexpected or never anticipated [124].  
2.2.2.2 Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) Analysis 
In 2004, Erik Hollnagel proposed an analysis method based on the Functional Resonance Accident 
Model (FRAM) [36, 50]. To apply FRAM, the functional entities of a system must first be defined 
along with their interdependencies and couplings. For this purpose, Hollnagel proposes a hexagonal 
functional representation as shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: FRAM functional representation of aircraft area navigation from [36] 
The functional representation models the essential functions of the system and their relationship in 
terms of six attributes [36]: 
 Inputs (I) needed to perform the function 
 Outputs (O) produced by the function 
 Resources (R) representing what is needed by the function to process the input 
 Controls (C) that serve to supervise or restrict the function 
 Preconditions (P) specifying system conditions that must be fulfilled before the function is 
carried out 
 Time (T) including actual process duration and permissible time window for the activity 
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Using the functional representation of a system, the FRAM analysis is conducted in 4 main steps 
[36]: 
1) Identify and characterize essential system functions; the characterization can be based on 
the six connectors of the hexagonal representation 
2) Characterize the (context dependent) potential for variability using a checklist 
3) Define functional resonance based on identified dependencies among functions 
4) Identify barriers for variability (damping factors) and specify required performance 
monitoring 
Once the functions and their relationships have been identified (step 1), each function is analyzed 
for potential variability that may be due to contextual influences in the system. Given potential 
sources for variability in each individual function, the next step looks for ways in which the 
variability of multiple functions may combine to cause an incorrectly performed or missed function. 
This includes identifying existing connections in the functional representation that might cause 
problems as well as new connections that might develop. Finally, barriers and preventative 
measures are identified to prevent the identified possibilities for functional resonance from causing 
an accident. 
2.2.2.2.1 FRAM Analysis Evaluation 
One advantage with this approach is that FRAM analysis defines the type of system representation 
that the analysis is performed on, as opposed to other methods that rely on a user’s internal model of 
the system. Using a formal system representation may help ensure that engineers and other team 
members are on the same page with respect to the essential system functions and the behavioral 
assumptions used in the analysis. The functional representation also emphasizes the importance of 
interactions and dependencies, which is easily overlooked with other methods. 
However, FRAM analysis was developed much more recently than other analysis methods and has 
only been applied to a few systems. It has been applied to better understand human behavior [51, 
125], but it has not yet been applied to study complex software systems in detail. FRAM analysis is 
also limited to preventing accidents caused by normal variations in performance [50], which 
captures some causes but omits many types of accidents including those caused when there are no 
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performance variations (e.g. as with deterministic software common in safety-critical systems) or 
when the variations are abnormal. 
2.2.2.3 STPA Hazard Analysis 
STPA (System Theoretic Process Analysis) is a hazard analysis method based on the STAMP 
model of accident causation. STPA has two main steps. STPA Step 1 identifies the potentially 
unsafe control actions for the control processes in the system being considered. These hazardous 
control actions are used to create safety requirements and constraints on the behavior of both the 
system and its components. Additional analysis is then performed to identify additional causal 
factors and scenarios that can lead to the violation of the safety constraints. As in any hazard 
analysis, these scenarios are used to control or mitigate the hazards in the system design.  
Before beginning an STPA hazard analysis, potential accidents and related system-level hazards are 
identified along with the corresponding system safety constraints that must be controlled. As an 
illustrative example, consider a simple automated door control system for a train. The accidents to 
be considered are: injury to a person by falling out of the train, being hit by a closing door, or being 
trapped inside a train during an emergency. The system-level hazards for the door control system 
that are relevant to this definition of accidents include:  
H-1: Doors close on a person in the doorway 
H-2: Doors open when the train is moving or not in a station 
H-3: Passengers/staff are unable to exit during an emergency 
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Figure 12: Preliminary control diagram for an automated door controller 
STPA is performed on a functional control diagram of the system. Figure 12 shows a simplified 
control diagram for the train door controller. The first part of STPA identifies hazardous control 
actions for each component that could produce a system-level hazard by violating the system safety 
constraints. Once the set of hazardous control actions has been identified, the second part of STPA 
analyzes the system to determine the potential scenarios that could lead to providing a hazardous 
control action and scenarios that lead to hazards without hazardous control actions. These scenarios 
can be used to design controls for the hazards or, if the design already exists, to ensure that these 
issues are adequately controlled.  
STPA Step 1: The first step of STPA identifies control actions for each component that can lead to 
one or more of the defined system hazards. This step is guided by the four general types of unsafe 
control actions defined in STAMP: 
1. A control action required for safety is not provided or is not followed 
2. An unsafe control action is provided that leads to a hazard 
3. A potentially safe control action is provided too late, too early, or out of sequence 
4. A safe control action is stopped too soon or applied too long 
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Specific hazardous control actions for each type can be identified and documented using a table as 
in Table 3. The hazardous control actions can then be translated into system and component safety 
requirements and constraints.  
Table 3: Potentially hazardous control actions for a simple automated door controller 
Control 
Action 
1) Not Providing Causes 
Hazard 
2) Providing 
Causes Hazard 
3) Wrong Timing or 
Order Causes Hazard 
4) Stopped too 
soon or applied 
too long 
Provides 
door open 
command 
Doors not commanded open 
once train stops at a platform 
[not hazardous]
4
 
 
Doors not commanded open 
for emergency evacuation 
[see H-3] 
 
Doors not commanded open 
after closing while a person 
or obstacle is in the doorway 
[see H-1] 
Doors commanded 
open while train is 
in motion [see H-2] 
 
Doors commanded 
open while train is 
not aligned at a 
platform [see H-2] 
Doors commanded open 
before train has stopped 
or after it started moving 
(same as “while train is 
in motion”) [see H-2] 
 
Doors commanded open 
late, after train has 
stopped [not hazardous] 
 
Doors commanded open 
late after emergency 
situation [see H-3] 
Door open 
stopped too soon 
during normal 
stop [not 
hazardous] 
 
Door open 
stopped too soon 
during 
emergency stop 
[see H-3] 
Provides 
door close 
command 
Doors not commanded 
closed or re-closed before 
moving [see H-2] 
Doors commanded 
closed while person 
or object is in the 
doorway [see H-1] 
 
Doors commanded 
closed during an 
emergency 
evacuation [see H-
3] 
Doors commanded 
closed too early, before 
passengers finish 
entering/exiting [see H-
1] 
 
Doors commanded 
closed too late, after 
train starts moving [see 
H-2] 
Door close 
stopped too soon, 
not completely 
closed [see H-2] 
Each item in the table should be evaluated to determine whether it is hazardous as defined by the 
system-level hazards. For instance, in this simple example the doors remaining closed during a 
routine train stop (non-emergency) is not hazardous because it does not lead to any of the three 
system-level hazards specified. If this situation is a safety concern, then the hazard list can be 
updated to include the corresponding hazard. On the other hand, commanding the doors open while 
the train is in motion is hazardous because it leads to hazard H-2. Each unsafe control action is then 
                                                 
4
 This is not hazardous because it does not lead to any of the system-level hazards (see H-1,H-2,H-3 above). If the 
hazards and accidents included in the safety analysis were extended to include inconvenience to the passengers, then 
this item would be considered hazardous. 
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translated into a component-level safety constraint (e.g. train must not be capable of starting with 
door open, doors must remain closed while train is in motion, etc.).  
STPA Step 2: The second step of STPA examines each control loop in the safety control structure to 
identify potential causal factors that explain hazardous control actions or otherwise violate the 
safety constraints.  
Figure 13 shows a generic control loop that can be used to guide this step. While STPA Step 1 
focuses on the provided control actions (the upper left corner of Figure 13), STPA Step 2 expands 
the analysis to include causal factors along the rest of the control loop. 
Consider a hazardous control action for the automated door controller: the doors are commanded 
closed while a person is in the doorway. STPA Step 2 would show that one potential cause of that 
action is an incorrect belief that the doorway is clear (an incorrect process model). The incorrect 
process model, in turn, may be the result of inadequate feedback provided by a failed sensor, the 
feedback may be delayed or corrupted. Alternatively, the system may have operated exactly as 
designed but the designers may have omitted a feedback signal or the feedback requirements may 
be insufficient. 
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Figure 13: General control loop with causal factors 
Once the second step of STPA has been applied to determine potential causal factors, including 
causes for each hazardous control action identified in STPA Step 1, the causal factors are eliminated 
or controlled in the design.  
2.2.2.3.1 STPA Evaluation 
A significant advantage of STPA is the ability to capture a wide array of causes including 
organizational aspects, requirements flaws, design errors, complex human behavior, and component 
failures [126]. The ability to identify requirements flaws is particularly important for software 
systems because most software-related accidents are caused not by software errors but flawed 
software requirements [4, 5]. Although many hazard analysis techniques stop once a chain of events 
or failures has been identified, STPA explains the complex reasons why a sequence of events might 
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occur including underlying processes and control flaws that may exist without any component 
failure. 
Although STPA is a relatively new method, it has been demonstrated on a broad number of systems 
including aviation systems [32, 127, 128], spacecraft [129-132], organizations[133], missile defense 
systems [134], and railway systems [135] among others. However, STPA has only been applied in 
an ad-hoc manner without rigorous procedures, for example, to identify unsafe control actions in a 
system. In addition, STPA has not yet been formalized mathematically to enable automated 
methods that could potentially assist in performing the analysis. Moreover, formalization of STPA 
could be used not only to identify unsafe control actions and other control flaws, but also to 
generate model-based requirements that will enforce safe behavior.  
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2.3 Terminology 
Accident: An undesired and unplanned (but not necessarily unexpected) event that results in an 
[unacceptable] level of loss [5] 
Component failure accidents: An accident that results from component failures, including the 
possibility of multiple and cascading failures [10] 
Component interaction accident: An accident that arises in the interactions among system 
components (electromechanical, digital, human, and social) rather than in the failure of individual 
components [10] 
Failure: non-performance or inability of a component to perform its intended function as defined 
by the component’s behavioral requirements [10] 
Hazard: A system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case 
environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss) [10] 
Safety: The freedom from accidents [5] 
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Chapter 3. Extending System Theoretic Process Analysis 
STPA is a top-down process that begins by identifying the system hazards, the corresponding 
system safety constraints, and the control structure responsible for enforcing the safety constraints. 
Given this information, STPA proceeds to identify individual control actions that can violate the 
system safety constraints and cause hazards. However, thus far the identification of hazardous 
control actions has been ad-hoc, guided only by the definition of four types of hazardous control 
actions: 
1. A control action required for safety is not provided or is not followed 
2. An unsafe control action is provided that leads to a hazard 
3. A potentially safe control action is provided too late, too early, or out of sequence 
4. A safe control action is stopped too soon or applied too long 
This chapter seeks to provide additional guidance to assist in identifying hazardous control actions 
by defining a general structure for all hazardous control actions. The general structure is then used 
to develop procedures that can be applied systematically to identify the hazardous control actions in 
a system. Chapter 4 formalizes this approach mathematically, and develops automated methods that 
can be used to assist in the analysis. 
3.1 General Structure for Hazardous Control Actions 
Hazardous control actions are control actions that violate system safety constraints. Table 4 
provides examples of control actions and hazardous control actions that might be identified in an 
STPA analysis. As seen in the examples, a control action by itself does not provide enough 
information to determine whether it is safe or hazardous—additional information is necessary 
including the controller providing the control action and the context or environment in which the 
control action is given. Figure 14 illustrates a generic structure that applies to the hazardous control 
actions that can be identified.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Note that control actions can be specified in various levels of detail, especially for continuous commands or 
commands with parameters. However, it is advantageous in a high-level analysis to abstract the command to 
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Table 4: Examples of hazardous control actions 
 Control Action Hazardous Control Action 
1 Open train doors Operator opens train doors while train is moving 
2 Capture space vehicle Space station robotic arm captures space vehicle too early 
3 Execute passing maneuver Pilot executes passing maneuver without clearance 
4 Execute passing maneuver Pilot does not execute passing maneuver upon receiving clearance 
5 Execute passing maneuver Pilot executes passing maneuver too late after receiving clearance 
 
 
Figure 14: Structure of a hazardous control action 
The structure in Figure 14 decomposes control actions into four main elements: source controller, 
type, control action, and context.
 
The source controller is a controller that has the capability to 
provide the specified control action.
6
 The type of a hazardous control action identifies whether the 
specified action is provided or not provided—either of which could be hazardous. Finally, the 
context describes the conditions in the system and environment that make action (or inaction) 
hazardous. 
The task of identifying hazardous control actions requires identifying the potentially hazardous 
contexts of each control action. Although the controllers and control actions are described in the 
system control structure and are not difficult to identify, hazardous contexts can be more 
                                                                                                                                                                  
include only the information necessary to determine if a safety constraint will be violated. More detail can 
always be added if needed during later iterations and refinements of the analysis.  
6
 In more complex control structures with controllers that can issue the same command to multiple entities, a 
destination field may be included in the hazardous control action statement. 
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challenging and some contexts may be overlooked using an ad-hoc method. By decomposing the 
context further it is possible to provide additional guidance and reduce the possibility that important 
contexts are overlooked. Figure 15 shows how the context for hazardous control actions can be 
further decomposed into variables and values. 
 
 
Figure 15: Decomposition of context into variables and values 
This simple representation can be much more powerful than identifying hazardous control actions 
with no guidance. For example, the hazardous control action in Figure 14 only considers “train is 
moving” but decomposition can help the user to identify additional contexts from other values, like 
a stopped train, or from other variables, such as train location. The reverse is also true: 
decomposition can help the user evaluate whether all possible values for a variable have been 
considered (e.g. stopped and moving) and that it is time to move on to other variables. Another 
benefit of employing this decomposition is that it reduces ambiguity. For example, consider rows 2 
and 5 in Table 4. Although derived ad-hoc and guided by the four types of hazardous control 
actions, these rows are ambiguous about what constitutes too early or too late and exactly what 
makes the control actions hazardous. Using the proposed decomposition, the hazardous control 
actions can be stated more precisely as “space station captures space vehicle while vehicle thrusters 
are on” and “pilot executes passing maneuver after clearance has expired”. Moreover, ad-hoc 
approaches may not provide enough information to construct software requirements and procedures. 
For example, the conclusion “must not capture the vehicle too early” is not very helpful for 
engineers and operators but the revised statement “must not capture the vehicle while its thrusters 
are on” is actionable and a number of design solutions can be developed to enforce this behavior. 
The structure in Figure 14 can provide further insight by observing that in order to prevent 
hazardous control actions, at a minimum the source controller needs to be aware of the hazardous 
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contexts. In other words, the controller’s process model must contain at least the variables and 
values from the hazardous contexts. For STPA applications with an existing design, this provides a 
way to verify that the design provides controllers with the necessary information—the process 
model variables must be a superset of the context variables. For safety-driven design processes, this 
provides a way to use the STPA results to directly define the design parameters—the context 
variables can be used to define the initial process model and feedback paths in the design, and 
amended as necessary in later design iterations. 
Although this structure provides more guidance than ad-hoc methods, like any hazard analysis 
technique it is not infallible. This approach still relies on the user’s ability to identify the relevant 
context variables and values. However, the need to identify hazardous contexts is a task that cannot 
be effectively avoided with any method; the only choice is whether that task is done indirectly 
without explicit knowledge or guidance versus performing that task directly with an explicit 
understanding of the underlying constructs and a framework to systematically reason about missing 
or complete contexts. Section 3.2 introduces a process that can help users identify the context 
variables from the system hazards by building a process model hierarchy. Section 3.3 provides a 
procedure that uses these structures to identify hazardous control actions.  
3.2 Process model hierarchy 
In systems theory, systems are viewed as hierarchical structures [10]. Although not required, some 
STPA applications have organized the system hazards into a hierarchy [10, 129]. Hazardous control 
actions can also be organized into a hierarchy [136]. This section shows how process model 
variables can also be organized into a hierarchy to provide traceability between the high-level 
system hazards and individual unsafe control actions in an STPA analysis. 
Consider a hypothetical proton therapy machine that treats medical tumors by irradiating a specific 
area inside a patient. At a high level, one important system hazard occurs if the wrong area of the 
patient is irradiated, which can lead to a loss of life or health. The corresponding system safety 
constraint would require that prohibited areas of the patient must not be irradiated. Two system-
75 
 
level conditions or variables can be derived directly from these statements
7
: (1) the area that the 
machine is about to irradiate and (2) the areas that must not be irradiated. This relationship is shown 
in Table 5. 
Table 5: High-level process model variables for a proton therapy machine 
System Hazard H-1 Prohibited area of the patient is irradiated 
System Safety Constraint SC-1 Prohibited areas of the patient must not be irradiated 
Process model variables 
Irradiated areas: the areas about to be irradiated 
Prohibited areas: the areas that must not be irradiated 
At a system level, controllers must have some knowledge or assumptions about these variables in 
order to enforce the safety constraint. An STPA analysis must start at this high level, but also must 
eventually refine these variables for a more detailed analysis of individual controllers within the 
proton therapy machine, each of which have lower-level responsibilities.  
Once the system-level process variables have been identified, refinement can proceed by 
decomposing each variable using the process functions that govern the relationships between 
variables. For example, the irradiated area is a function of the patient’s position relative to the 
machine and the location of the beam target. The patient’s position, in turn, is a function of the table 
position (for example, controlled by a set of servos and software programs) and the patient position 
on the table (for example, controlled by an immobilization device like a custom body cast or bite 
mold). These safety-critical process variables and their relationships can be organized into an STPA 
process model hierarchy as follows: 
                                                 
7
 This relationship exists in general and is actually a natural result of the definition of a hazard used in STPA and 
STAMP; a hazard is a system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case environmental 
conditions, will lead to an accident (loss). 
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Process Model Hierarchy 
- Irradiated Area 
o Patient Position 
 Table Position 
 Patient Position on Table 
o Beam Target 
 Beam energy 
 Beam shape 
 Beam trajectory 
o Beam dose 
 Beam intensity 
 Time at target 
- Protected Areas (defined by radiation oncologist) 
The identification of potentially hazardous contexts and hazardous control actions can then proceed 
at lower levels of refinement guided by the process model hierarchy. For example, low-level 
hazardous control actions like “Table controller does not stop linear X servo when table position 
reaches gantry coupling” could be identified. Figure 16 shows an example of the relationships and 
traceability that can be established between system hazards, the process model hierarchy, and 
hazardous control actions. 
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Figure 16: Example of traceability using a process model hierarchy of a medical device 
This proton therapy example presented here has been simplified for demonstration purposes, 
however a more complete STPA analysis of an actual proton therapy machine using the methods 
developed in this chapter can be found in [136]. 
As another example of a process model hierarchy, consider a new aircraft passing procedure [137]. 
One of the most important system hazards occurs if aircraft come to close to each other and violate 
minimum separation rules. To enforce minimum separation, at a high level there are three process 
variables that must be known or controlled: (1) the current separation, or relative position, of the 
aircraft, (2) the required separation, and (3) the future or anticipated separation. These high-level 
process variables can be decomposed into a hierarchy of process model variables to guide the STPA 
analysis (and the system design process): 
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Process Model Hierarchy 
- Current Separation 
o X,Y, Z position for each aircraft 
- Required Separation 
o Lateral Requirement 
o Vertical Requirement 
- Future Separation 
o X, Y, Z position for each aircraft 
o Current trajectory for each aircraft 
o Flight plan for each aircraft 
By defining the process model hierarchy, potentially hazardous contexts can be derived from the 
system hazard definitions and used to identify lower-level hazardous control actions in STPA. 
Figure 17 shows an example of low-level contexts in hazardous control actions that can be derived 
from (and traced to) the high-level system hazards. By establishing this traceability, the process 
model hierarchy can be used to update relevant parts of the analysis when design changes are made 
or when the system is used in a new environment and environmental assumptions change. Rather 
than repeating the entire analysis, the hierarchy can reveal which low-level aspects are impacted by 
new or different hazards. The traceability in a process model hierarchy can also help to review the 
completeness and consistency of the analysis. A more complete STPA analysis of this system, 
which is based on actual NextGen In-Trail Procedures, can be found in [127]. 
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Figure 17: Aviation example of traceability using a process model hierarchy 
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3.3 A Systematic Procedure to Identify Hazardous Control Actions 
This section introduces a new procedure for rigorously and systematically identifying the hazardous 
control actions during the first step of STPA [138]. The procedure is based on the hazardous control 
action structure described in section 3.2, and involves identifying potential control actions and 
hazardous states and then analyzing which combinations yield a hazardous control action. 
Two parts of the procedure are described in the following sections, and each part can be performed 
independently of the other. The first part deals with control actions that are provided under 
conditions that make the action hazardous. The second part deals with control actions that are not 
provided under conditions that make inaction hazardous.  
A simplified train example is used to introduce the procedure, followed by a more complex 
demonstration with a nuclear power plant application. The simplified train example analyzes the 
train door control loop, including the door controller. The process is applicable to early 
development phases before any detailed design information exists, and the identified hazardous 
control actions apply whether the door controller is ultimately implemented as a human operator or 
as an automated software program. The hazards for the example train door controller are as follows: 
H-1: Doors close on a person in the doorway 
H-2: Doors open when the train is moving or not in a station 
H-3: Passengers/staff are unable to exit during an emergency 
The example control structure used to introduce the procedure is shown in Figure 18.  
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Figure 18: Partial control structure for simplified train door controller 
3.3.1 Part 1: Control actions provided in a state where the action is hazardous 
The first part of the procedure is to select the controller and the associated control actions from the 
control structure. In the train example above, the automated door controller can provide four control 
actions: open doors, stop opening doors, close doors, or stop closing doors.
8
 Although the open 
door command is analyzed in the following examples, the same procedure can be applied to the 
other control actions. 
Next, the controller’s process model is defined to determine the environmental and system states 
that affect the safety of the control actions. As discussed earlier, the required variables in the 
process model can be derived from the system hazards defined at the start of an STPA analysis. For 
example, hazard H-1 identifies the state of the doorway (whether it is clear or not) as an important 
environmental variable in deciding whether to close the doors. Figure 19 shows the required process 
model for the door controller. 
                                                 
8
 Note that when the controller has the ability to command the stopping of some process, that command is also a control 
action and must be analyzed. In this way, continuous hazardous control actions related to “stopped too soon” and 
“applied too long” are explicitly covered by this procedure. In fact, “applied too long” was not included in early 
exploratory applications of STPA [128] but was added to STPA in 2011 [138] when the procedure described here 
identified new hazardous control actions that had not been found previously. 
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Figure 19: Augmented control structure with the door controller’s process model 
Once the process model variables have been identified, potentially hazardous control actions can be 
identified by examining each combination of relevant process model values and determining 
whether issuing the control action in that state will be hazardous. For example, one possible context 
for the open door command consists of the values: the train is stopped, there is no emergency, and 
the train is not aligned with a platform. Providing the open door command in this context is a 
hazardous control action. 
Each row in Table 6 specifies a different context for the open door command. Context here is 
defined as a combination of values of the process model variables. Each context can be evaluated to 
determine whether the control action is hazardous in that context, and the result is recorded in the 
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three columns on the right. The two right-most columns incorporate timing information as well.
9
 
For example, providing an open door command in the context of an emergency while the train is 
stopped is not hazardous; in fact, that’s exactly what should happen for evacuation purposes. 
However, providing the open door command too late in that context is certainly hazardous. 
Table 6: Context table for the open door control action 
Control 
Action 
Train Motion Emergency
10
 Train Position 
Hazardous control action? 
If provided 
any time in 
this context 
If provided 
too early in 
this context 
If provided 
too late in 
this context 
Door open 
command 
provided  
Train is moving No emergency (doesn’t matter) Yes Yes Yes 
Door open 
command 
provided  
Train is moving Emergency exists (doesn’t matter) Yes11 Yes Yes 
Door open 
command 
provided  
Train is stopped Emergency exists (doesn’t matter) No No Yes 
Door open 
command 
provided  
Train is stopped No emergency 
Not aligned 
with platform 
Yes Yes Yes 
Door open 
command 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Aligned with 
platform 
No No No 
Note that during this process, some combinations of conditions may expose conflicts in the design 
that need to be considered. For example, is it hazardous to provide the open door command during a 
fire (an emergency) while the train is in motion? In other words, is it safer to keep the doors closed 
and trap the passengers inside or is it better to open the doors and risk physical injury because the 
train is moving? These questions can and should prompt exploration outside the automated door 
controller. For example, the issue might be addressed in the design by providing a way for 
                                                 
9
 Although some techniques treat “too late” and “too early” actions as subsets or combinations of broader categories like 
not provided (i.e. omission) and provided incorrectly (i.e. commission), we have found that keeping these classes 
explicit often helps analysts consider more types of hazardous control and identify more accident causes than when “too 
late” and “too early” are only implicitly included. 
10
 Note that emergency is defined as in Figure 19, that is, a condition that requires evacuation of the train 
11
 This row is an example of a conflict; see chapter 4 for more information.  
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passengers to exit to nearby train cars when there is an emergency and the train is moving. In 
addition, the braking system controller can be designed to apply the brakes in that context 
(emergency and train is moving) to minimize the duration of that hazardous situation. 
3.3.2 Part 2: Control actions not provided in a state that makes inaction hazardous 
It is also necessary to consider potential contexts in which the lack of a control action is hazardous. 
The same basic process is used: identify the corresponding process model variables and the 
potential values, create contexts for the action using combinations of values, and then consider 
whether an absence of the specified control action would be hazardous in the given context. Table 7 
shows the identification of hazardous control actions for the door open command not being 
provided. 
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Table 7: Context table for the lack of an open door control action 
Control 
Action 
Train Motion Emergency Train Position Door State 
Hazardous if 
not provided in 
this context? 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Aligned with 
platform 
Person not in 
doorway 
No
12
 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Not aligned 
with platform 
Person not in 
doorway 
No 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Aligned with 
platform 
Person in 
doorway 
Yes 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Not aligned 
with platform 
Person in 
doorway 
No
13
 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped 
Emergency 
exists 
(doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) Yes 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is moving (doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) No 
Again, some combinations of conditions are uncovered that expose potential conflicts and need to 
be considered in the design. For example, is it hazardous to provide the open door command when 
the train is stopped away from a platform and a person is in the doorway? Although every effort 
should be made to prevent this context from happening, it may be conceivable; for example, 
perhaps the train can leave the platform after a door closes on a person or their belongings. If a 
person is trapped away from a platform, is it safer to open the door or keep it closed? These 
questions can lead to exploration outside the automated door controller; for example, this issue 
might be addressed by ensuring a crew member will be alerted to assist the passenger. In terms of 
the door controller, for the purpose of this simple demonstration it is assumed that it is best to keep 
the door closed to prevent a potentially trapped passenger from falling out of the train before 
assistance arrives. 
                                                 
12
 This row is not hazardous because it does not lead to any of the system-level hazards (see H-1,H-2,H-3 in the 
previous section). If the hazards and accidents included in the safety analysis were extended to include inconvenience to 
the passengers, then this row would describe a hazardous control action. 
13
 For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed that in this case it is best to keep the door closed and alert a crew 
member to assist the potentially trapped passenger. 
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The procedures described here represent a “brute-force” approach and, although they provide a 
systematic approach with more guidance than previous ad-hoc methods, they can be time-
consuming when applied to low-level contexts with many variables and values. To address this 
issue, chapter 4 proposes automated algorithms that can be used to assist in the analysis and chapter 
5 proposes both manual and automated techniques that can be employed to reduce the amount of 
effort required to analyze extremely complex systems. 
The resulting hazardous control actions can be summarized in a table based on the four types of 
hazardous control actions defined in STAMP, as shown in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Hazardous control actions for the Part 1 and Part 2 context tables 
Control 
Action 
Hazardous Control Actions 
Not Providing 
Causes 
Hazard 
Providing 
Causes Hazard 
Wrong Timing or 
Order Causes Hazard 
Stopped Too 
Soon or 
Applied Too 
Long 
Open train 
doors 
Door open 
command not 
provided when 
train is stopped 
at platform and 
person in 
doorway 
 
Door open 
command not 
provided when 
train is stopped 
and emergency 
exists 
Door open 
command 
provided when 
train is moving 
and there is no 
emergency 
 
Door open 
command 
provided when 
train is moving 
and there is an 
emergency
14
 
 
Door open 
command 
provided when 
train is stopped 
unaligned with 
platform and 
there is no 
emergency 
Door open command is 
provided more than X 
seconds after train 
stops during an 
emergency 
N/A 
 
  
                                                 
14
 To resolve this conflict, a design decision could be made to allow passengers to evacuate to other train cars in this 
situation while ensuring that the brakes are applied so that evacuation from the train will soon be possible. 
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3.3.3 Application to a nuclear power plant system 
The proposed procedure has been applied successfully to complex systems including a medical 
proton therapy machine [136] and nuclear power plant systems [139, 140]. This section 
demonstrates how the procedure can be used to identify hazardous control actions related to a 
critical and partially-automated part of a nuclear power plant. The appendix contains a longer STPA 
analysis of the nuclear power plant system and demonstrates how the concepts developed 
throughout this dissertation can be integrated into a comprehensive STPA-based hazard analysis. 
3.3.3.1 System description 
The system analyzed is a generalized version of an EPR (Evolutionary Power Reactor), which is a 
type of PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor). The EPR reactor is fully digital, that is, all control 
systems, including the Reactor Protection System, are digital. The analysis focuses on one Steam 
Generator (SG), one Main Steam Line (MSL), and the systems involved in closing the Main Steam 
Isolation Valve (MSIV), although the same process could be applied to the rest of the system.  
A generic diagram of a PWR is shown in Figure 20. During normal operation, the coolant in the 
primary cooling system (left of the diagram) transfers heat from the reactor to the Steam Generator 
(SG). The SG contains water that cools the primary coolant and evaporates into steam. The SG 
prevents primary coolant, which is radioactive, from mixing with the water, which is not 
radioactive. The steam produced in the SG travels to a turbine connected to a generator to produce 
electricity. The steam is cooled in the condenser and pumped back into the SG to begin the cycle 
again. The loop formed by the SG, turbine, and condenser is known as the secondary cooling 
system. 
The MSIV is a valve located on the main steam line from the SG. During normal operation, the 
MSIV is kept open to permit cooling of the primary cooling system via the secondary system. In 
case of an abnormal situation, the MSIV can be closed to isolate the SG from the rest of the 
secondary system. MSIV closure is necessary if there is a break in the main feedwater pipe to the 
SG that allows water to leak out, an internal SG Tube Rupture (SGTR) that allows primary coolant 
to mix with secondary water, or a break in the main steam line exiting the SG. 
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Because MSIV closure prevents the secondary system from adequately cooling the primary system, 
a number of backup systems are provided to cool the primary coolant in case of MSIV closure. 
These backup systems include redundant SGs, turbine bypass valves, main steam relief isolation 
valves (MSRIV) and main steam relief control valves (MSRCV), safety relief valves (SRV), the 
Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS), and the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). 
These systems are included in the analysis only to the extent that they impact the decision to close 
the MSIV. 
-
 
Figure 20: Pressurized Water Reactor (Diagram from [141]) 
The hazards for the nuclear power plant are described in Table 9. See the appendix for a more 
detailed description of the accidents and hazards for this system. 
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Table 9: System hazards for the nuclear power plant 
Hazards 
H-1: Release of radioactive materials 
H-2: Reactor temperature too high  
H-3: Equipment operated beyond limits 
H-4: Reactor shut down 
The high-level safety control structure is shown in Figure 21. The dotted (green) arrow represents 
the communication between the MSIV controllers and other controllers. For example, the Protection 
System (PS) contacts the Safety Control System (SCS) in order to initiate the Engineering Safety 
Features (ESF) controls following ESF actuation. The Reactor Controls (RC) controller also 
communicates with Non-Safety System Controller (NSSC) in order to provide command signals for 
actuators used in RC functions other than control rods, such as the BMC (Boron and Makeup 
Control) components for Boron control. 
There are four controllers that can provide a control action to close the MSIV: the Operator, the 
Non-Safety System Controller (NSSC), the Protection System (PS), and the Diverse Automation 
System (DAS). These four controllers send control actions to the MSIV Priority Module (PM), 
which uses a pre-programmed priority setting to determine which control actions to forward to the 
MSIV actuator. In this sense, the PM can also send control actions. 
If the operator detects a need to close the MSIV, he or she may issue a Close MSIV command to the 
PM. The PM determines which controller is in charge according to a priority scheme, and forwards 
commands directly to the MSIV actuator. In this case, the PM would normally forward the 
command from the operator to the MSIV actuator. The operator may also send a Close MSIV 
command to the NSSC, which provides manual control for the MSIV. In this situation, the NSSC 
would normally forward the command from the operator to the PM, which would then forward the 
command to the MSIV actuator. 
The PS is an automated system that can automatically detect some situations in which a Close MSIV 
command is necessary. In these situations the PS can provide the Close MSIV command to the PM, 
which can forward the command to the MSIV actuator. The DAS (Diverse Actuation System) is 
also an automated system, used as a backup in case there is a problem with the PS. The DAS can 
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issue a Close MSIV command to the PM, which would normally forward the command to the MSIV 
actuator. 
A sensor provides feedback about the MSIV status directly to the PM. This sensor does not sense 
process variables such as pressure, temperature, or steam flux. Instead, it senses torque applied to 
the valve itself to detect if the valve has closed. The PM receives this feedback and can provide 
confirmation back to the controller that originally requested the MSIV closure. Other sensors report 
process variables to the controllers including various pressures, SG water level, and the operation of 
other backup systems. This information is used by the controllers to determine whether the MSIV 
should be closed. 
See the appendix for more information about the controllers, control algorithms, and responsibilities 
assigned in this system. 
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Figure 21: High-level control structure for the nuclear power plant 
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3.3.3.2 Identifying Hazardous Control Actions 
The high-level process model variables associated with MSIV closure can be identified by 
considering the purpose of the MSIV. The MSIV remains open during normal plant operation and is 
only needed to control a few specific abnormal conditions. The relevant high-level conditions can 
be derived from the system hazards and system description as follows: 15 
- Steam generator tube rupture (can cause an uncontrolled SG level increase and can release 
contaminated fluid into the secondary system) 
- Steam system piping leak (can depressurize the SG and cause an overcooling transient and 
energy release into containment) 
- Feedwater system piping leak (can depressurize the SG and cause an overcooling transient 
and energy release into containment) 
While these conditions could be caused by physical failures, the latter two could also be caused by 
design flaws or unsafe commands elsewhere in the system. For example, a leak in the main steam 
line could be caused by a physical failure (e.g. rupture in the line) or it could be caused by main 
steam relief valves that are opened inadvertently or at the wrong time. Both situations could require 
MSIV closure to prevent depressurization and an overcooling transient while the issue is 
investigated and resolved. 
In addition to helping to mitigate the conditions above, the MSIV also controls the heat exchange 
that takes place within the SG. Before the MSIV is closed, other support systems16 may need to be 
engaged to provide the additional cooling needed. Therefore, information about additional cooling 
provided by other support systems (i.e. inadequate, adequate
17
) may be needed for the decision to 
close the MSIV and should be included in the process model. 
                                                 
15
 See also [142] chapter 7 pages 7.3-22 and 7.3-11 
16
 Other support systems refers to other components designed to cool the primary system. These include the CVCS, SI, 
CCS, etc.  
17
 Adequate means the system operation is sufficient to provide the cooling normally provided by the SG. 
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When considering whether a potential control action is hazardous or not, it is important to avoid 
assuming that other defense barriers are intact or that they are appropriate, sufficient, and error-free. 
For example, even if there is an emergency feedwater system to provide the necessary cooling in the 
event of a relief valve inadvertently commanded open, it is still hazardous to inadvertently 
command the relief valve open. These hazardous actions must be included in a safety analysis and 
prevented regardless of other protective systems intended to mitigate unsafe behavior.  
Table 10 summarizes the hazardous control actions that were identified for the command Close 
MSIV using the systematic procedure. 
Table 10: Hazardous Control Actions for Close MSIV 
Control 
Action 
Hazardous Control Actions 
Not Providing 
Causes 
Hazard 
Providing 
Causes Hazard 
Wrong Timing or 
Order Causes Hazard 
Stopped Too 
Soon or 
Applied Too 
Long 
Close MSIV Close MSIV 
not provided 
when there is a 
rupture in the 
SG tube, leak 
in main 
feedwater, or 
leak in main 
steam line [H-
2, H-1, H-3] 
Close MSIV 
provided when 
there is no 
rupture or leak 
[H-4] 
 
Close MSIV 
provided when 
there is a rupture 
or leak while 
other support 
systems are 
inadequate [H-1, 
H-2, H-3] 
 
 
Close MSIV provided 
too early (while SG 
pressure is high): SG 
pressure may rise, 
trigger relief valve, 
abrupt steam expansion 
[H-2, H-3] 
 
Close MSIV provided 
too late after SGTR: 
contaminated coolant 
released into secondary 
loop, loss of primary 
coolant through 
secondary system [H-1, 
H-2, H-3] 
 
Close MSIV provided 
too late after main 
feedwater or main 
steam line leak [H-1, 
H-2, H-3, H-4] 
N/A 
The hazardous control actions in Table 10 were identified using the following process. First, a 
controller and control action were selected. The operator and the control action Close MSIV were 
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analyzed first, although the results also apply to other controllers in the system. A context table was 
then constructed for the control action using the corresponding process model variables that were 
defined previously. Table 11 shows the context table for Close MSIV provided.  
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Table 11: Context table for Operator provides Close MSIV control action 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Control 
Action  
Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Condition of 
Main Feedwater 
Pipe 
Condition of 
Main 
Steamline 
Operation of 
other support 
systems 
Control Action 
Hazardous? 
Control Action 
Hazardous if 
Too Late? 
Control Action 
Hazardous if 
Too Early? 
1 
Close 
MSIV 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Adequate H-4 H-4 H-4 
2 Ruptured No Leak No Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
3 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
4 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
5 Ruptured Leak No Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
6 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
7 Ruptured No Leak Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
8 Ruptured Leak Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
9 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Inadequate H-2, H-4 H-2, H-4 H-2, H-4 
10 Ruptured No Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
11 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
12 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
13 Ruptured Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
14 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
15 Ruptured No Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
16 Ruptured Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
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Column 1 in Table 11 is the control action being analyzed while columns 2 to 5 correspond to the 
process model variables identified previously. Column 6 specifies in which contexts it is hazardous 
to provide the Close MSIV control action. For example, row 1 describes a situation in which it is 
hazardous to close the MSIV: if there is no SG tube rupture, no main feedwater pipe leak, and no 
main steam line leak, then there is no need to close the MSIV. Closing the MSIV will cause H-4 
(reactor shut down). If the operation of other support systems cannot make up for the additional heat 
exchange required, closing the MSIV will also lead to a loss of necessary cooling (H-2 in row 9 
column 6). 
If other support systems, including other CVCS, SI, ECCS, etc., are producing the additional 
cooling required during a rupture/leak, then closing the MSIV is not hazardous (rows 2-8, column 
6) and a reactor shutdown is initiated regardless of any MSIV actions. If for some reason the other 
systems are not capable of producing the additional cooling needed, then closing the MSIV may 
cause other hazards (rows 10-16, column 6) including excessive temperature increase (H-2), release 
of radioactive materials (H-1), an immediate reactor shutdown or SCRAM (H-4) if not already 
triggered, and additional equipment damage (H-3). Depending on the type of rupture/leak, it may 
actually be better to keep the MSIV open to control the temperature of the reactor (H-2) even 
though that would permit some radioactive steam to be introduced into the secondary system (H-1). 
The last two columns on the right in Table 11 take into account timing information. If there is a 
rupture/leak and other support systems are adequate, then it is not hazardous to close the MSIV 
(rows 2-8). The MSIV should be closed. However, if the MSIV is closed too late in this context 
then it is hazardous. If the steam generator tube is ruptured, too much radioactive coolant may have 
already been released into the secondary system and the environment (H-1). If the steam line has a 
leak, excessive steam may have been released causing overcooling and overcompensation (H-2). If 
the steam line or feedwater pipe have a leak, the SG may run dry and cause equipment damage (H-
3). Closing the MSIV too early may also be hazardous in some situations. For example, if the steam 
generator tube is ruptured then the SG pressure should be decreased before the MSIV is closed. 
Otherwise, if the MSIV is closed too early after a SG tube rupture, then the SG pressure and 
temperature will increase and may cause equipment damage to the SG, SG piping, or other systems 
(H-3). 
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The contexts used to define hazardous control actions may not be the same as contexts that are 
inherently unsafe. The tables in this section are used to analyze controller behavior and control 
actions in a number of contexts, not to analyze contexts that are unsafe by themselves. For example, 
row 1 column 6 of Table 11 is marked as hazardous because the control action Close MSIV will 
cause a hazard if provided in that context, even though the context by itself (no ruptures/leak) does 
not describe anything hazardous. Conversely, the context in row 2 describes a steam generator tube 
rupture but column 6 is not marked as hazardous because closing the MSIV is not a hazardous 
behavior in that context. In fact, closing the MSIV is exactly what should happen in that situation to 
prevent an accident. 
Although providing a control action can be hazardous, not providing a control action can be equally 
hazardous. Table 12 shows the context table for not providing the Close MSIV control action. As 
before, a reactor shutdown should be initiated for any rupture regardless of the MSIV control action. 
However because these tables are used to identify hazardous control actions, only hazards that are 
affected by an absent Close MSIV control action are listed at this stage of the analysis. 
If there is no rupture/leak, keeping the MSIV open is not hazardous (rows 1 and 9). However, if 
there is a rupture, different hazards may be experienced depending on what part of the system is 
affected. If the SG tube is ruptured and the MSIV is not closed, radioactive material will be released 
into the secondary system (H-1) and the SG water level may increase uncontrollably. A sustained 
release of primary coolant will decrease the effectiveness of the primary cooling system (H-2), and 
the release of radioactive material into the secondary system may cause equipment damage (H-3). If 
the main steam line has a leak and the MSIV is not closed, excessive steam may be released causing 
an overcooling transient and overcompensation by other systems to increase reactivity (H-2). 
Excessive steam release may also lower the SG water level, causing potential equipment damage if 
the SG runs dry (H-3). If the main feedwater pipe has a leak and the MSIV is not closed, the SG 
may be depressurized causing an overcooling transient and water level may drop, leading to H-2 
and H-3 as above.  
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Table 12: Context table for Close MSIV control action is not provided 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Control 
Action 
Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Condition of 
Main 
Feedwater 
Pipe 
Condition of 
Main Steamline 
Operation 
of other 
support 
systems
18 
Not Providing 
Control Action is 
Hazardous? 
1 
Close 
MSIV  
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Adequate No 
2 Ruptured No Leak No Leak Adequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
3 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Adequate H-2, H-3 
4 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Adequate H-2, H-3 
5 Ruptured Leak No Leak Adequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
6 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Adequate H-2, H-3 
7 Ruptured No Leak Leak Adequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
8 Ruptured Leak Leak Adequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
9 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Adequate No 
10 Ruptured No Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
11 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Inadequate H-2, H-3 
12 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Inadequate H-2, H-3 
13 Ruptured Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
14 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Inadequate H-2, H-3 
15 Ruptured No Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
16 Ruptured Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
 
  
                                                 
18
 Other support systems refers to other systems designed to cool the primary system. This includes the CVCS, SI, CCS, 
etc. Adequate means the system operation is sufficient to provide the cooling normally provided by the SG. 
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In the case of SG tube rupture, keeping the MSIV open can cause not only equipment damage but 
also a more immediate shutdown (H-4) via SCRAM and can increase the amount of time the plant 
will need to remain shut down for repairs. The overfilling of the SG could allow water to enter the 
steam lines, damaging the delicate turbine pallets and requiring extensive time for repairs. In 
addition to actual damage, equipment can be overstressed and require more detailed inspections 
before the plant can be operational again. The additional contamination will also require more time 
to decontaminate and will result in the generation of more waste. Because keeping the MSIV open 
during a SG tube rupture will cause a more severe and prolonged shutdown than would otherwise 
occur with a contained SG tube rupture, H-4 is included in Table 12 for these cases. H-4 is not listed 
for other cases because it is assumed that keeping the MSIV open after a leak in the main steamline 
or main feedwater pipe will not cause a more severe or prolonged shutdown than if the MSIV is 
closed, although it does contribute to the other hazards listed. 
Note that for the purpose of reviewing the tables, the rationale behind each of the “hazardous” vs. 
“not hazardous” decisions should be documented during the analysis. In fact, the context tables can 
be used to help verify that the necessary rationales and assumptions are documented during the 
analysis, as opposed to ad-hoc identification of hazardous control actions that may immediately 
discount and omit non-hazardous control actions entirely. Of course, the non-hazardous rows could 
easily be omitted from the context tables if desired; however, documenting the conclusions about 
what behavior is hazardous can be just as important as documenting behavior that is assumed to be 
non-hazardous. Such documentation may be especially important for other long-term project goals 
like future change management activities, design re-use in new environments, and other 
considerations that arise later in the system lifecycle.  
A comparison of Table 11 and Table 12 shows that there are conflicts that must be resolved. In both 
tables, rows 10 to 16 are marked as hazardous. In other words, in these situations it is hazardous to 
close the MSIV yet hazardous to keep the MSIV open. In some cases, it is possible to revisit the 
design to eliminate the conflict and provide a safe option. If the conflict cannot be resolved, a 
decision must be made about what action should be taken in these contexts, that is, which is the 
least hazardous? For this case study, after consultation with nuclear engineers and regulators it was 
found that rows 10 to 16 may not have been analyzed in previous safety analyses with respect to 
MSIV control. For the purposes of this research, the consensus was to assume that it may be best to 
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keep the MSIV open in the context of row 10 to maximize the amount of cooling provided even 
though doing so will contaminate the secondary cooling system and eventually require costly 
repairs. Rows 11-16, on the other hand, involve leaks in the pipe supplying water to the steam 
generator and/or the line that carries steam away. If the MSIV is left open in these situations, the 
amount of water in the steam generator can decrease and eventually lead to less cooling capability 
or an overcooling transient. Therefore, in these situations (rows 11-16), it was assumed that it may 
be best to keep the MSIV closed to maximize the amount of cooling provided even though it is only 
a temporary measure. These solutions were found to differ from current designs of MSIV 
controllers, which do not act based on the state of other support systems and may automatically 
close the MSIV during any rupture. Chapter 4 discusses design conflicts in more detail, including 
search and detection methods that can be performed on STPA results to automatically detect such 
conflicts. 
Both of these assumptions should be reviewed and evaluated carefully by domain experts. The 
purpose of this research case study was not to provide final solutions to these hazardous situations, 
but to develop and apply hazard analysis methods that can uncover hazardous control and provide 
the safety-critical questions that need to be considered. Note that although Table 11 and Table 12 
use high-level contexts, the analysis can also be performed in more detail using the techniques 
described in chapter 5. A more detailed analysis could be necessary if, for example, it is found that 
the best solution depends on the type of steam generator tube rupture, the amount of pressure in the 
SG, etc. 
Of course, in any of these situations, there are other control actions that need to take place outside 
the MSIV control loop—they can be analyzed using the same approach. In addition, every effort 
should be made to prevent many of these contextual conditions from existing in the first place. 
Although such additional efforts were outside the scope of this initial case study, they are 
mentioned here to show how the analysis may branch out into other areas of the system to address 
the issues identified.  
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3.4 Identifying causal factor scenarios 
Although identifying hazardous control actions is an important part of an STPA analysis, it is not 
enough. As described in chapter 2, once hazardous control actions are identified, STPA Step 2 is 
performed to identify the potential causes of hazardous control actions and to provide a better 
understanding of why they might be provided and how they can be prevented. However, accidents 
can still occur even without hazardous control actions if, for example, correct and safe control 
actions are provided but not executed or followed by other components in the system. Therefore, 
STPA Step 2 also identifies the causal factors that can lead to a violation of safety constraints 
despite safe control actions. 
STPA Step 2 has traditionally been performed ad-hoc as a brain-storming exercise based on the 
generic set of causal factors illustrated in Figure 13. However, if STPA Step 1 is performed using 
the processes proposed earlier, it is possible to leverage the STPA Step 1 results to help guide users 
performing STPA Step 2 and to derive some basic application-specific accident scenarios to assist 
in the brain-storming process.  
This section outlines a basic approach to performing STPA Step 2 based on a set of hazardous 
control actions. Two parts are presented: (1) using the list of hazardous control actions to define 
scenarios in which safe control actions may not be followed or executed, and (2) using the 
hazardous control actions to define scenarios that help identify causes of the hazardous control 
action. 
3.4.1 Identifying how safe control actions may not be followed or executed 
When hazardous control actions are identified using the structures proposed earlier, they contain 
information to create accident scenarios in which a provided control action is not hazardous but the 
action is not followed or executed, leading to a hazard. This is true because the work needed to 
identify the hazardous control actions also identifies the safety-critical contexts for each command. 
By using control-theoretic principles, a set of basic accident scenarios can be derived from the 
STPA Step 1 results. For example, consider the following hazardous control actions from the train 
example: 
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Door open command not provided when stopped and emergency 
Door open command not provided when stopped at platform and closing on person 
Even if the controller correctly provides the door open command in these contexts, some other 
controller or some downstream component may interfere with the execution of the control action 
and cause a hazard. From the unsafe control action statements and the safety control structure, the 
safety-critical behavior of downstream components in the control path can be specified as well as 
the safety-critical contexts that are important: 
Safety-critical command: Open door 
Safety-critical function: Door opens when commanded 
Safety-critical contexts: When train is stopped at platform; during emergency conditions; 
and/or while closing on a person 
A basic hazardous scenario can be constructed from this information: 
Hazardous scenario S-1: Door open command provided but door doesn’t open 
If this scenario occurs during one of the safety-critical contexts, a hazard will result. Table 13 shows 
examples of hazardous control actions from STPA Step 1 and the corresponding basic scenarios that 
can be generated for the case of safe control actions that are not followed. 
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Table 13: Basic scenarios and safety-critical contexts generated from hazardous control 
actions 
Hazardous control action Basic scenario (for control 
action not followed) 
Safety-critical contexts 
Door open command not 
provided when train is stopped at 
platform and person in doorway S-1: Door open command 
provided but door does not open 
Train is stopped at platform 
and person in doorway; train 
is stopped and emergency 
exists 
Door open command not 
provided when train is stopped 
and emergency exists 
Door open command provided 
when train is moving 
S-2: Door open command not 
provided but door opens 
Train is moving; train is 
stopped unaligned with 
platform with no emergency 
Door open command provided 
when train is stopped unaligned 
with platform and there is no 
emergency 
Door open command is provided 
more than X seconds after train 
stops during an emergency 
S-3: Door open command 
provided as required but door 
only opens X seconds later 
Train stopped during an 
emergency 
Using the control structure as a guide, Figure 22 shows how the basic scenario S-1 can be refined 
into several sub-cases based on the command’s control path. The next step is to identify potential 
causal factors in the highlighted areas of the control loop that would explain the scenario, keeping in 
mind that each case may have different causes and that some causes may be specific to (or even 
induced by) the safety-critical contexts identified. 
105 
 
 
Figure 22: Developing an accident scenario using the control structure 
For example, the following application-specific causal factors could be identified to explain S-1 and 
to develop specific design requirements. 
Table 14: Examples of causal factors and safety-critical requirements for accident scenario S-1 
Application-specific causal factors Application-specific design requirements 
Door cannot reverse direction fast enough after 
closing on a person 
Door must designed to facilitate immediate 
reversal of direction 
Emergency conditions make actuator inoperable 
(e.g. fire) 
Actuator must be designed and located to 
withstand emergency conditions (e.g. fire) 
Door jams when closing on an object Door must be able to withstand closing on a 
stationary or moving object without jamming 
Note that causal factors in this part of the analysis may include potential component failures, but the 
causal factors are not and should not be limited to component failures. As the examples in Table 14 
demonstrate, consideration should also be given to application-specific design flaws and 
requirements flaws that may explain the basic scenario even when no components have failed. 
Although the set of basic scenarios (e.g. S-1, S-2, S-3) can be generated automatically from a list of 
hazardous control actions and context tables, human input is still required to identify the causal 
factors in Table 14 that can explain the basic scenarios. However, by making use of parts of the 
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analysis that have already been done, this approach can help reduce the amount of work duplicated 
between STPA steps 1 and 2 while providing direct traceability between STPA Step 1 context tables 
and STPA Step 2 scenarios that can be reviewed and verified. In addition, because the scenarios are 
derived from the context tables, no time is wasted considering scenarios that may not lead to 
hazards. 
Although the examples used to explain the approach in this section are intentionally simplistic, the 
approach has also been applied successfully to more complex systems. For a more detailed example 
of scenarios generated from hazardous control actions, see the nuclear power plant system analysis 
in the appendix. 
3.4.2 Identifying the causes of hazardous control actions 
Figure 13 describes the generic set of causal factors used in STPA. An important causal factor is a 
flawed process model: when a controller’s belief about the outside world is incorrect or inadequate, 
it can cause the controller to issue a hazardous control action. The generic set of causal factors in 
Figure 13 does not provide much information about potential process model flaws in a specific 
application other than the generic conclusion that the process model variables must match reality. 
Some additional guidance can be derived from the context tables used in STPA Step 1. In addition 
to specifying which process model variables are safety-critical, the context tables provide 
information about the exact contexts in which flaws can and cannot cause hazards. This information 
can be used to define the application-specific type of process model flaw that may cause a hazard. 
For example, if a train door controller believes the train is at a platform when it is not, then it may 
cause a hazard by opening the doors. However, the inverse case for the same process variable may 
not be hazardous—if the door controller believes the train is not aligned with a platform when it 
actually is, then it may not cause any of the identified hazards. 
Information about the exact types of process model flaws that cause hazards is important because it 
can be used by engineers to design safer sensors, control algorithms, voting logic, or to employ 
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other fault-tolerant and fail-safe techniques.
19
 For example, the control algorithms can be designed 
to assume the train is not at a platform when no input is received from the sensors or when 
messages are found to be corrupt, and platform sensors can be designed so they indicate no 
alignment when they fail. This information about hazardous process model flaws can also be used 
to reduce unnecessary work in the hazard analysis by only focusing on the specific types of flaws 
that are hazardous rather than all the ways the “train aligned” variable may be incorrect.  
Moreover, this kind of information can be derived automatically from the STPA Step 1 context 
tables, reducing the amount of time an analyst needs to spend in STPA Step 2 thinking about all the 
ways a process model variable could be flawed and lead to an accident. This technique also 
provides traceability by allowing the exact hazards relevant to each process model flaw to be readily 
determined from the existing context tables, which can be helpful when assessing future design 
changes or re-use applications that alter the process model variables in the design or the hazards 
involved. Table 15 shows the process model flaws for the train door controller that can be 
automatically computed from the context tables. 
                                                 
19
 This information could also be used to model the “unknown” [104, 143, 144] values in a SpecTRM model of the 
system or controller and define control algorithms that make the right decisions when values are unknown. 
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Table 15: Process model flaws generated from context tables for each hazardous control 
action 
Hazardous control action Relevant process model flaws 
Door open command not 
provided when train is stopped at 
platform and person in doorway 
 Controller incorrectly believes train is moving 
 Controller incorrectly believes no person in 
doorway 
 Controller incorrectly believes train is not aligned 
Door open command not 
provided when train is stopped 
and emergency exists 
 Controller incorrectly believes train is moving 
 Controller incorrectly believes no emergency 
exists 
Door open command provided 
when train is moving  
 Controller incorrectly believes train is moving 
Door open command provided 
when train is stopped unaligned 
with platform and there is no 
emergency 
 Controller incorrectly believes train is aligned 
 Controller incorrectly believes there is an 
emergency 
Door open command is provided 
more than X seconds after train 
stops during an emergency 
 Delayed realization that train is stopped 
 Delayed realization of emergency 
Notice that in Table 15 there are several hazardous control actions that can be caused by the same 
process model flaw. For example, “controller believes train is moving” is identified as a cause of 
three different hazardous control actions. Previous ad-hoc STPA analyses, e.g. [127], can encounter 
a significant amount of repetition during STPA Step 2 because each hazardous control action is 
typically analyzed for causes independently of other hazardous control actions. By first generating 
the relevant process model flaws as in Table 15, the set of unique flaws that may be hazardous in 
several different ways can be identified thereby reducing repetition and the amount of subsequent 
analysis effort needed. The unique process model flaws in Table 15 can be automatically generated 
if the techniques in chapter 4 are used. 
Control flaws in the feedback path can cause the controller to issue hazardous control actions by 
creating process model flaws. As illustrated in Figure 23, the generic set of STPA causal factors 
contains a substantial amount of symmetry. This suggests that the procedures developed earlier for 
hazardous control actions and for the control path in general might also be applicable to analyzing 
the feedback path. In fact, the traditional four types of hazardous control actions defined in STAMP 
could be translated and applied to the feedback path. 
 
Four types of unsafe feedback: 
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1. A feedback parameter required for safety is not provided 
2. An incorrect feedback parameter is provided that leads to a hazard 
3. Correct feedback is provided too late, too early, or out of sequence, causing a hazard 
4. Correct continuous feedback is stopped too soon or applied too long, causing a hazard 
 
 
Figure 23: Symmetry in the generic set of STPA causal factors 
Accident scenarios for the feedback path can now be defined in a manner similar to scenarios for 
the control path. For example, one of the safety-critical process model variables for the train door 
controller represents whether emergency conditions are present. A basic accident scenario involving 
the emergency signal can be developed as follows: 
Safety-critical condition: Emergency condition present 
Safety-critical function: Notify controller of emergency conditions 
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Hazardous scenario S-4: Emergency condition present but door controller is not notified 
Table 16 and Table 17 show basic scenarios that can be generated in this way to explain the process 
model flaws in Table 15. 
Table 16: Basic scenarios for identifying causes of hazardous control actions 
Hazardous process model 
flaws 
Basic scenario (for feedback not 
provided) 
Basic scenario (for 
incorrect feedback 
provided) 
Controller believes no 
emergency exists 
S-4: Emergency condition exists, 
but emergency signal not received 
by controller 
S-5: Controller notified of 
no emergency when 
emergency exists 
Controller believes train is 
aligned 
S-6: Train is unaligned, but 
unaligned signal is not received by 
controller 
S-7: Aligned signal 
received by controller when 
train is unaligned 
Controller believes train is 
moving 
S-8: Train is stopped, but stop 
signal not received by controller 
S-9: Moving signal 
received by controller when 
train is stopped 
Controller believes no person 
in doorway 
S-10: Person in doorway, but 
controller not notified 
S-11: Controller notified 
doors are clear when person 
is in doorway 
Controller believes there is an 
emergency 
S-12: There is no emergency, but 
emergency signal is received by 
controller 
S-13: Emergency signal 
received by controller when 
there is no emergency 
Controller believes train is 
not aligned 
S-14: Train is aligned, but aligned 
signal is not received by controller 
S-15: Unaligned signal 
received by controller when 
train is aligned 
Table 17: Basic scenarios for identifying timing-related causes of hazardous control actions 
Hazardous process model 
flaws 
Basic scenario (for feedback too 
late, too early, out of sequence) 
Delayed realization that train 
is stopped 
S-16: Train stops, but controller 
not notified until after X seconds 
Delayed realization of 
emergency 
S-17: Emergency exists, but 
controller not notified until after X 
seconds 
Similarly to the control path, the accident scenarios for flaws in the feedback can be refined into 
two sub-cases as shown in Figure 24.The highlighted areas of the control loop can then be analyzed 
to identify what application-specific causal factors would explain these scenarios. For example, the 
causal factors in Table 18 could explain S-4 and form the basis for specific design requirements. 
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Figure 24: Developing accident scenario S-4 to identify causes of hazardous control actions 
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Table 18: Examples of causal factors and safety-critical requirements for accident scenario S-4 
Application-specific causal factors Application-specific design requirements 
Sensor inadequate; hasn’t operated for extended 
periods due to lack of emergency conditions 
Sensor must be designed to operate after X 
years with no detections 
Sensor must be tested every Y years 
Sensor must be replaced every Z years 
Gas-based sensor overwhelmed by other 
materials in the environment (e.g. degassing of 
batteries, fuel, etc.) 
Sensor must be designed to operate in the 
presence of X,Y,Z materials 
Limit maximum concentration of X,Y,Z in the 
environment 
Wrong type of sensor; sensor operates but 
doesn’t detect emergency condition 
Sensors must be designed to detect smoke 
particles (e.g. ion sensor), photonic indications 
of flames, etc. 
Provide manual emergency lever 
Although the basic scenarios can be generated from the context tables, human input is still required 
to identify many of the causal factors that explain the basic scenarios. 
As discussed earlier, the examples in this section are intentionally simplified for the purpose of 
describing the proposed process. For a more detailed example of scenarios generated from 
hazardous control actions, see the nuclear power plant system analysis in the appendix. 
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Chapter 4. Formal methods for STPA Hazard Analysis and 
Requirements Generation 
The procedures described in chapter 3 are based on structures that can be formalized and specified 
mathematically. A formalized STPA can help reason about unsafe behaviors and causal factors in a 
system and can lead to more advanced methods of performing the hazard analysis efficiently. In 
addition, formalization would allow automated methods and tools to be defined so that many parts 
of the hazard analysis can be automatically performed. Other parts of the analysis that utilize 
engineering creativity and experience can potentially be refined and guided by tools based on the 
formalization. New techniques can also be developed to detect important types of problems earlier, 
such as conflicts between multiple safety goals.  
Although hazard analysis is used to identify potential causes of hazards and accidents, that is not 
enough to prevent accidents—a solution needs to be devised and appropriate requirements need to 
be defined to ensure safe system behavior. However, if a formal STPA hazard analysis is 
performed, then the results can be specified using a formal language subject to mathematical 
reasoning and translation into different forms. A formal definition opens the possibility for 
additional mathematical algorithms to be developed to automatically search for design solutions 
given the hazard analysis results and produce the set of necessary model-based requirements that 
enforce safety throughout the system. A formal definition could also facilitate the application of 
existing formal requirements methods, such as [104, 143, 145], to STPA hazard analysis results and 
may lead to the eventual integration of these methods into a comprehensive safety-guided design 
process. 
This chapter begins by defining a formal specification for hazardous control actions and develops 
several automated algorithms based on this specification. Parts of the STPA hazard analysis are 
shown to be automatable even during early phases of development when system and component 
models are not available, and new opportunities to assist engineers during a hazard analysis are 
discussed including the ability to detect design conflicts with safety implications. Algorithms are 
also developed to automatically generate formal model-based and executable requirements based on 
STPA results. Finally, these techniques are extended to also consider non-safety-related functional 
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goals of the system, and automated methods to analyze for conflicts in safety vs. non-safety design 
goals are presented. 
4.1 A Formal Specification for Hazardous Control Actions 
In this section, a formal specification is introduced and defined for hazardous control actions. This 
specification is used in later sections to develop automated algorithms that assist in identifying 
hazardous actions and generating requirements that enforce safe behavior. In addition, although the 
formal structure is defined here relative to system-level hazards, an identical structure can be 
applied relative to system-level functions or goals. These parallel structures form the basis for 
methods later in this chapter that can be used to generate both safety and non-safety-related 
requirements as well as to detect potential conflicts between the two. 
The formal specification is based on the hazardous control action definition developed in chapter 3, 
as shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26. 
 
Figure 25: Four main elements of a hazardous control action 
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Figure 26: Example of variables and values that compose the context 
A hazardous control action in the STAMP accident model can be expressed formally as a four-tuple 
(SC,T,CA,Co) where:
20
 
 SC is the source controller that can issue control actions in the system. The controller may 
be automated or human. 
 T is the type of control action. There are two possible types: Provided describes a control 
action that is issued by the controller while Not Provided describes a control action that is 
not issued. 
 CA is the control action (i.e. command) that is output by the controller. 
 Co is the context in which the control action is or is not provided. 
For example, in the case of an automated train door controller, consider the following hazardous 
control action: The train door controller provides the open door command while the train is moving. 
This control command can be expressed as (SC,T,CA,Co) where: 
SC = Train door controller 
T = Provided 
CA = Open door command 
Co = Train is moving 
Each element of a hazardous control action is a member of a larger set, i.e. the following properties 
must hold: 
                                                 
20
 As described in chapter 3, in some cases a destination field may also be necessary. The structures and syntax in this 
chapter can be extended to these cases if necessary. 
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1. SC ∈ Ş𝓒, where Ş𝓒 is the set of source controllers in the system 
2. T ∈ 𝓣, where 𝓣 = {Provided, Not Provided} 
3. CA ∈ 𝓒𝓐(SC), where 𝓒𝓐(SC) is the set of control actions that can be provided by 
controller SC 
4. Co ∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC), where 𝓒𝓸(SC) is the set of potential contexts for controller SC 
To assist in enumerating or aggregating individual contexts, the context Co is further decomposed 
into variables, values, and conditions: 
 V is a variable or attribute in the system or environment that may take on two or more 
values. For example, train motion and train position are two potential variables for a train. 
 VL is a value that can be assumed by a variable. For example, stopped is a value that can be 
assumed by the variable train motion. 
 Cd is a condition expressed as a single variable/value pair. For example, train motion is 
stopped is a condition. 
 The context Co is the combination of one or more conditions and defines a unique state of 
the system or environment in which a control action may be given. 
The following additional properties related to the context of a hazardous control action can 
therefore be defined: 
5. V ∈ 𝓥(SC), where 𝓥(SC) is the set of variables relevant to the system hazards 𝓗 
6. VL ∈ 𝓥𝓛(V), where 𝓥𝓛(V) is the set of values that can be assumed by variable V 
7. Cd = (V, VL) ∈ 𝓒𝓭(SC), where 𝓒𝓭(SC) is the possible set of conditions for controller SC 
8. Co = (Co1, Co2, ...), where each Coi is independent. That is, no two Coi refer to the same 
variable V. 
Finally, each hazardous control action must be linked to a system-level hazard: 
9. To qualify as a hazardous control action, the action (SC,T,CA,Co) must be able to cause a 
hazard H ∈ 𝓗, where 𝓗 is the set of system level hazards. 
A hazardous control action expressed as a four-tuple (SC,T,CA,Co) must satisfy the above 
properties 1-9. 
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4.2 Automatable method to generate hazardous control actions 
This section defines a formal method that can be used to automate much of the manual process 
described in the previous section. Based on the formal structure defined in section 4.1, a set of 
potentially hazardous control actions can be enumerated given certain information about the system. 
The information needed is: 
 𝓗: the set of system-level hazards 
 Ş𝓒: the set of source controllers in the system 
 𝓒𝓐(SC): the set of control actions for each controller SC 
 𝓥: the set of variables relevant to the hazards 𝓗 
 𝓥𝓛(V): the set of potential values for each variable V 
Most, if not all, of this information can be determined well in advance of the detailed design of a 
system. The set 𝓗 is typically determined during the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) of the 
system. The set Ş𝓒 can be extracted from a preliminary control structure of the system. (SC) can be 
defined from the basic control channels in the control structure. The set 𝓥 is identical to the process 
model variables in the control structure, and can be derived from the set of hazards 𝓗. The potential 
values (V) are also found in the process model, and can be defined once 𝓥 is known. 
Given this basic information about the system, properties 1-8 from section 4.1 can be applied to 
automatically generate a list of potential hazardous control actions in the form of combinations of 
(SC,T,CA,Co). First, a controller SC is selected from the set Ş𝓒. Then the set of conditions (SC) is 
generated by pairing each variable in 𝓥 with each value in 𝓥𝓛(V). Then the set of contexts (SC) is 
generated by combining each independent condition from 𝓒𝓭(SC). Finally, the list of potentially 
hazardous control actions for the selected controller SC is generated using each element of 𝓣, (SC), 
and 𝓒𝓸(SC) to produce a series of unique combinations. This process can be repeated for each 
controller SC in the set Ş𝓒. 
This process guarantees that properties 1-8 from section 4.1 are satisfied. If a formal behavioral 
model of the system exists for every component, and it is complete and accurate with respect to all 
safety implications, then automated methods can be used to trim this set of potentially hazardous 
118 
 
control actions to only keep those that satisfy property 9. However, because a detailed behavioral 
model of the system typically does not exist during the earliest phases of development, and because 
models for non-software components are usually incomplete and can only approximate physical 
reality, it may not be possible to automatically apply property 9 in practice. Instead of trying to 
analyze an existing formal model, which has been studied extensively, the proposal here is intended 
to be applicable to early development stages before any formal system model exists. Here, STPA is 
used to help engineers iteratively define the necessary system behavior/model based on high-level 
hazards and objectives. As a result, the model can be derived in such a way that it will be safe. This 
safety-driven design approach is more direct and often more efficient than waiting for a detailed 
formal model, analyzing it, and then performing rework or adding patches and protective systems as 
discussed in chapter 1. 
Instead of applying property 9 automatically, this final step can be performed by the engineering 
team during early development. Because the algorithm above generates combinations that satisfy all 
other criteria, the generated list is a superset of the actual hazardous control actions. Therefore this 
task is essentially a trimming exercise: the team does not need to add any new hazardous control 
actions—they only need to remove non-hazardous control actions from the list based on their 
engineering knowledge, skills, and experience. In fact, this can be done by engineers without any 
training in the formal logic described above.  
Finally, for each potential hazardous control action that is provided (T = Provided), timing 
information such as potentially hazardous delays within a given context must be considered. For 
example, suppose it is not hazardous to provide a door open command while the train is stopped and 
there is an emergency. In fact, this behavior may be exactly what is expected of the system. 
However, providing the door open command too late in that context could certainly be hazardous 
even if the control action is eventually provided. This condition can be addressed by adding the 
columns hazardous if provided too early and hazardous if provided too late as described in chapter 
3. This timing information can be incorporated into the context element of a hazardous control 
action, or it can be translated directly into a set of timing constraints. 
Experience using this approach on real systems such as spacecraft [129] and the air transportation 
system [127, 146] has led to the identification of safety-critical requirements that were never 
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considered during the normal development of these systems. Other examples can be found in the 
appendix, which includes context tables for nuclear power plant control systems that were generated 
using the algorithms in this section. In addition, the example in chapter 5 presents more detailed 
hazardous control actions that can be generated using this approach along with algorithms and 
techniques to address scalability to complex systems. 
4.3 Automated generation of model-based requirement specifications 
Identifying the hazardous behaviors to avoid is necessary, but it is not enough: specific 
requirements need to be created to define the actual behavior necessary to prevent hazards and 
existing requirements need to be checked to verify that these hazardous behaviors will not occur. 
Because hazardous control actions have been defined with a formal representation, it is possible to 
compare these actions against an existing formal model-based specification to determine whether 
the hazardous control actions are precluded. Furthermore, if no formal specification exists, it is 
possible to automatically generate the parts of the specification necessary to ensure hazardous 
behavior is prevented. 
The following functions can be defined from the set of hazardous control actions: 
 HP(H, SC, CA, Co): This function is True if and only if hazard H results from controller SC 
providing command CA in context Co. This function is defined for all H ∈ 𝓗, SC ∈ Ş𝓒, CA 
∈ (SC) , Co ∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC). 
 HNP(H, SC, CA, Co): This function is True if and only if hazard H results from controller 
SC not providing command CA in context Co. This function is defined for all H ∈ 𝓗, SC ∈ 
Ş𝓒, CA ∈ (SC) , Co ∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC). 
The formal specifications and control algorithms to be generated can be expressed as the following 
function: 
 R(SC, CA, Co): This function is True if and only if controller SC is required to provide 
command CA in context Co. This function must be defined for all SC ∈ Ş𝓒, CA ∈ (SC), Co 
∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC). 
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The function R must satisfy certain criteria to prevent hazardous behavior. Firstly, any control 
action that is hazardous in a given context must not be provided by the control algorithm in that 
context: 
 ∀ H ∈ 𝓗, SC ∈ Ş𝓒, CA ∈ 𝓒𝓐(SC), Co ∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC): HP(H, SC, CA, Co) ⇒ ¬R(SC, CA, Co) (1) 
In addition, if a control action that is absent in a given context will produce a hazard, then the 
control action must be provided by the control algorithm in that context: 
 ∀ H ∈ 𝓗, SC ∈ Ş𝓒, CA ∈ 𝓒𝓐(SC), Co ∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC): HNP(H, SC, CA, Co) ⇒ R(SC, CA, Co) (2) 
The required behavior R can then be generated by searching the set of possible (SC, CA, Co) and 
assigning values that satisfy these two criteria. Any behavior appearing in HNP must appear in R, 
and any behavior that appears in HP must be absent from R. If the same behavior appears in HNP 
and HP, then no R can satisfy both criteria
21
. 
The resulting requirements in R can be specified using a formal requirements language. In this 
section, a formal requirements language called Specification Tools and Requirements Methodology 
Requirements Language (SpecTRM-RL) [104] is used. SpecTRM-RL is a blackbox formal system 
modeling language that uses a state-based representation of a system. In addition to mathematical 
constructs, SpecTRM-RL provides a graphical representation of formal requirements that can be 
used effectively by engineers and developers with very little explanation. Although the examples in 
this chapter are expressed using SpecTRM-RL graphical tables, almost any formal state-based 
requirements language could be adapted and used. 
Figure 27 shows the SpecTRM-RL representation of R generated automatically using a software 
tool that implements the procedure above. The example is based on the context tables for the train 
door controller discussed in chapter 3. Each row in the table describes a state or input to the 
controller and a possible value for that state or input. The three columns on the right side describes 
the AND-OR logic used to determine whether the command should be provided. OR relationships 
exist between columns while AND relationships exist between rows. Empty cells are treated as 
                                                 
21
 For more information, see the discussion of conflicts and design flaws in the next section. 
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“don’t cares” or wildcards. For example, the first column specifies that if the train is stopped and 
aligned with a platform, then the door open command must be provided. The middle column 
specifies another situation in which the door open command must be provided: if the train is 
stopped and an emergency exists. The two right-most columns define the required behavior for safe 
operation and represent the requirements in R. The left column was not generated from the context 
tables in chapter 3 because the context tables describe only hazardous control actions, not non-
hazardous control actions required for safety. However, this column can be generated automatically 
using the approach in section 4.5, which extends context tables to non-safety-related functional 
requirements. 
 
Figure 27: Example SpecTRM-RL table for the door open command 
Although this example is intentionally simple for purpose of demonstrating the procedure
22
, the 
same approach can be applied to more complex control systems to evaluate existing requirements or 
to generate the initial set of requirements. For example, Figure 28 below shows the SpecTRM-RL 
representation of the high-level requirements in R as generated for the nuclear reactor power plant 
system in chapter 3.
23
 Chapter 5 describes an example of more detailed lower level requirements for 
the same system. 
                                                 
22
 Although not shown in the table, SpecTRM models also capture timing information as described in [104, 143, 144]. 
The necessary timing information can be derived from the STPA Step 1 context table columns “too early” and “too late” 
or from the defined contexts. 
23
 Note that conflicts first had been resolved, which was done following the procedure in the next section. 
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Figure 28: SpecTRM-RL requirements with traceability to system hazards for the nuclear 
power plant system studied in chapter 3 
The requirements in Figure 28 are complete in that they include all contexts in which the MSIV 
valve command must be provided, and each context can be refined to include more detail if 
necessary. Figure 28 also shows the traceability between each column and the corresponding system 
hazards that can occur if that behavior is not enforced. The columns in Figure 28 do not use “don’t 
cares” or wildcards. They represent the disjunctive normal form of the formal requirement: 
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R(“MSIV Controller”, “Close MSIV”, Co) = Co  ¬SGTR  ¬MFPL  MSL  ¬SSI  Co  
¬SGTR  MFPL  ¬MSL  ¬SSA  Co  ¬SGTR  MFPL  MSL  ¬SSA  Co  SGTR  
¬MFPL  ¬MSL  ¬SSA  Co  SGTR  ¬MFPL  MSL  ¬SSA  Co  SGTR  MFPL  
¬MSL  ¬SSA  Co  SGTR  MFPL  MSL  ¬SSA  Co  ¬SGTR  ¬MFPL  MSL  
SSA  Co  ¬SGTR  MFPL  ¬MSL  SSA  Co  ¬SGTR  MFPL  MSL  SSA  Co  
SGTR  ¬MFPL  MSL  SSA  Co  SGTR  MFPL  ¬MSL  SSA  Co  SGTR  
MFPL  MSL  SSA 
 
where  SGTR=True iff Steam Generator Tube is Ruptured, 
MFPL=True iff Condition of Main Feedwater Pipe is Leak 
MSL=True iff Condition of Main Steamline is Leak 
SSI=True iff Operation of other support systems is Inadequate 
Automated algorithms can be used to produce a simpler representation of the same requirement for 
engineering review if desired, as shown in Figure 29. Note that this requirement is based on the 
assumptions discussed earlier when the context tables were created. Namely, it was assumed that if 
there is a steam generator tube rupture and other support systems are inadequate, then it may be best 
to keep the MSIV valve open to maximize cooling capability until the temperature and reactivity 
can be controlled by other means. As mentioned earlier, these assumptions should be reviewed 
carefully by domain experts. The goal here is to show how requirements can be automatically 
generated given the hazard analysis and assumptions—not to provide the final word about dealing 
with steam generator tube and other leaks. 
 
 
Figure 29: SpecTRM-RL requirements for the nuclear power plant system studied in chapter 
3 
Lower-level requirements can also be generated using this approach. For example Figure 30 below 
shows the formal requirements for the same controller at a more detailed level. However, the 
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extensions described in chapter 5 were found to be a much more efficient and practical way of 
producing these lower-level requirements as the complexity increases. 
 
 
Figure 30: Low-level SpecTRM-RL requirements generated for the nuclear power plant 
system 
4.4 Identifying conflicts and potential design flaws 
As mentioned in the previous section, if there is no solution to equations (1) and (2), then there 
exists a context for which there is no safe action—i.e. it is hazardous for the controller to provide 
the control action while at the same time it is hazardous for the controller not to provide the control 
action. If the same system hazard results from both action and inaction, then there is a fundamental 
design flaw that must be resolved. If action causes one hazard while inaction causes another hazard, 
then there is a conflict in the design between two safety-related goals that must be resolved. 
Although in some cases the hazards can be prioritized and conflicts can be resolved by accepting 
the lesser hazard while preventing the greater hazard, in general it is often necessary and possible to 
find a design solution that does not cause any hazards. 
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The following additional criterion can be defined to search the hazard analysis context tables or 
generated requirements and detect these problems as early as possible: 
∀ H1 ∈ 𝓗, H2 ∈ 𝓗, SC ∈ Ş , CA ∈ 𝓒𝓐(SC), Co ∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC): HP(H1, SC, CA, Co) ⇒  
¬HNP(H2, SC, CA, Co) (3) 
The third criterion above is a consistency check that can be applied to the hazardous control actions 
independently of the formal specification R. If this criterion does not hold, there is a design or 
requirements flaw in the system. Both action and inaction by controller SC would lead to a hazard 
and violate a safety requirement. 
In a limited set of cases, the identified conflicts can be automatically resolved. If the set of hazards 
are prioritized and the conflict is between hazards of different priorities, then the “best” control 
action (i.e. the one that causes the least important hazard) can be automatically selected to resolve 
the conflict. However, in general it is not acceptable to create a design that intentionally causes 
hazards. The best solutions usually involve fundamental design changes that can only be identified 
through careful application of engineering creativity and expertise. Although these conflicts cannot 
usually be automatically resolved, they can be automatically detected and flagged for review by the 
engineering team.  
4.5 Extensions for non-safety-related functional requirements 
The first column in Figure 27, representing the non-safety-related functional requirement for the 
train door controller, can be generated automatically using a procedure similar to the one developed 
for safety requirements. Although the context tables were defined relative to system-level hazards 
that must be prevented, context tables can be developed for system-level functional goals in the 
same way. By deriving the functional behavior of the system in the same way that hazardous 
behavior was derived, automated algorithms can be used to generate the full set of safety and non-
safety requirements as the example in Figure 27 shows. Functional specifications can then be 
generated along with the safety-related specifications by following a parallel method. 
In addition to HP and HNP, which capture hazardous control actions, a new function FP can be 
introduced to define functional control actions—control actions that are needed to achieve 
functional goals: 
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 FP(F, SC, CA, Co): This function is True if and only if system-level function F must be 
achieved, in whole or in part, by controller SC providing command CA in context Co 
The function FP can be defined by identifying which control actions in each context are necessary 
to achieve the system-level functions 𝓕. The same process used in chapter 3 to identify hazardous 
control actions with context tables can be used, with the exception that system-level functions 𝓕 are 
considered instead of the system-level hazards 𝓗. The required behavior R can then be computed 
as in the previous section, but with one additional criterion to capture the functional behavior: 
 ∀ F ∈ 𝓕, S ∈ Ş𝓒, CA ∈ 𝓒𝓐(SC), Co ∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC): FP(F, SC, CA, Co) ⇒ R(SC, CA, Co) (4) 
Applying this criterion, any behavior appearing in FP must also appear in R. Note that if the same 
behavior appears in FP and HP, then there is a design or requirements flaw in the system because 
the same control action is both necessary to achieve a system-level function yet prohibited because 
it presents a system-level hazard. In this case, no R exists that prevents the hazards while achieving 
the system functions. This new type of conflict can be identified with the following criterion: 
∀ H ∈ 𝓗, F ∈ 𝓕, SC ∈ Ş𝓒, CA ∈ (SC), Co ∈ 𝓒𝓸(SC): HP(H, SC, CA, Co) ⇒ 
¬FP(F, SC, CA, Co) (5) 
This final criterion describes a consistency check that can be implemented to detect conflicts 
between hazardous and functional behavior. Similarly to conflicts between different hazards, these 
conflicts usually cannot be automatically resolved but they can be automatically detected and 
flagged for review by the engineering team. 
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Chapter 5. Scalability to complex systems 
Like any hazard analysis technique, the approaches described in this dissertation can require more 
effort as the complexity of the system being analyzed increases. The basic problem of ensuring 
safety in complex systems—a property that emerges from the combined behavior of many 
components with many interactive effects—increases significantly as complexity introduces more 
and more potentially hazardous or dysfunctional interactions among components. Although it may 
be unavoidable that more complex systems require more careful analyses, there are a number of 
ways to manage system complexity during the analysis and frame the problem in ways that are 
easier for engineers and experts to comprehend and reason about. This chapter presents a number of 
techniques that can be used to deal with system complexity and improve the scalability of the 
methods proposed in this dissertation. 
5.1 Abstraction and hierarchy 
The first technique—abstraction and hierarchy—is commonly used to help people deal with 
complexity. STPA is a top-down approach and makes extensive use of abstraction and hierarchy in 
developing and analyzing hazards, safety constraints, and control structures. Abstraction can also be 
applied to control actions to allow high-level analyses that can later be refined. Problems that are 
solved at high levels of abstraction may not need to be analyzed at lower levels of analysis, thereby 
reducing the total analysis effort. For example, when analyzing new aviation procedures for pilots, 
the control action “pilots execute passing maneuver” can be analyzed to identify problems and 
solutions at that high level as opposed to first considering the various lower level control actions—
like entering information into autopilot systems or communicating with copilots—that together 
make up the passing maneuver. This control action abstraction can significantly reduce the number 
of context tables that need to be created to complete STPA Step 1 and to begin identifying new 
procedures, requirements, and causal factors in STPA Step 2. 
More important, the use of abstraction is essential in defining the columns for the context tables. 
For example, the train door example in chapter 3 used one column labeled “emergency”. Clearly 
there are many different kinds of emergencies that could occur—fire, smoke, toxic gases, etc. The 
context table could be created with separate columns for each of these cases, however the table 
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would quickly grow and become much more complex than is necessary at this stage. For the 
purpose of determining high-level door controller behavior, the exact type of emergency is not what 
matters; what matters is that an evacuation is required. Therefore, “emergency” is defined in chapter 
3 as any condition that requires passenger evacuation. Further analysis can and should eventually 
identify and define all the types of emergencies that might require evacuation so that design efforts 
can be made to prevent those occurrences. However, the analysis of the door controller—including 
the context tables—can be performed at a higher level of abstraction before that level of detail is 
defined. 
In fact, an important goal of the approaches in this dissertation is to provide benefit to early phases 
of design when very little is known about the system. In these cases, abstraction is natural because 
most details have not yet been defined, and the analysis can be used to drive the design and 
determine which details may need to be defined or developed first.  
The process model hierarchy in chapter 3 is another example of employing abstraction and 
hierarchy. Instead of trying to identify all the low-level process variables from the start, the process 
model hierarchy provides a way to deal with complex processes by deriving progressively lower 
levels of detail from the system-level conditions in the defined hazards. The process model 
hierarchy can also provide a conduit for connecting the high-level analysis with lower levels of 
refinement, allowing traceability between different levels of analysis and providing the ability to 
select appropriate and feasible levels of analysis for complex systems. In fact, section 5.5 describes 
how the process model hierarchy can be exploited to automatically generate detailed low-level 
context tables given a smaller set of abstract context tables along with a few pieces of additional 
information. 
5.2 Logical simplification 
The second technique—logical simplification—was already employed when introducing the context 
tables for the train door as seen in Table 19. In this example, the four columns of variables each 
with two possible values would require a 16 row table using a brute force approach. However, 
Table 19 only requires five rows. By reducing similar rows with “doesn’t matter” terms, the table 
can be drastically simplified. For example, the last row in Table 19 represents eight unique contexts. 
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This simplification is possible because if the train is moving, then the specific value of the other 
variables don’t matter – keeping the door closed is not hazardous. 
Table 19: Context table for the open door control action 
Control 
Action 
Train Motion Emergency Train Position Door State 
Hazardous if 
not provided in 
this context? 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Aligned with 
platform 
Person not in 
doorway 
No
24
 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Not aligned 
with platform 
Person not in 
doorway 
No 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Aligned with 
platform 
Person in 
doorway 
Yes 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Not aligned 
with platform 
Person in 
doorway 
No
25
 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped 
Emergency 
exists 
(doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) Yes 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is moving (doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) No 
Automated tools can help perform this reduction automatically or assist the user in identifying and 
specifying these simplifications, as discussed in section 5.6. 
5.3 Continuous process model variables 
The context table examples provided in this dissertation describe a number of continuous process 
variables. For example, train motion is a continuous variable with an infinite number of possible 
values. However, it is not necessary to consider an infinite number of values or even a large number 
of values. What is important for the purpose of analyzing door commands that cause a system 
                                                 
24
 This row is not hazardous because it does not lead to any of the system-level hazards (see H-1,H-2,H-3 in the 
previous section). If the hazards and accidents included in the safety analysis were extended to include inconvenience to 
the passengers, then this row would describe a hazardous control action. 
25
 For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed that in this case it is best to keep the door closed and alert a crew 
member to assist the potentially trapped passenger. 
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hazard is simply whether the train is stopped (velocity equals zero) or moving (velocity not equal to 
zero). Through careful discretization of process variables up front based on the system hazards, the 
complexity of the context tables and subsequent analysis can be significantly reduced. Although this 
process is dependent on the user, the process model hierarchy and system hazards can provide 
guidance to help reduce unnecessary complexity in the analysis. In addition, automated tools 
discussed in section 5.6 can provide ways to easily expand or simplify the defined values during the 
analysis as necessary (e.g. to split “train is moving” into “train is moving slow” and “train is 
moving fast”). The tools in section 5.6 can also automatically identify whether the set of values in a 
finished context table can be further reduced, which can significantly simplify subsequent steps in 
the hazard analysis. 
It is important to note that the set of values defined for each variable does not necessarily need to be 
detailed, but they must be complete so that every possibility is included. For example, the set train 
is moving and train is stopped is complete because the set includes every possibility. Analyzing the 
set of values—even at high levels of abstraction during early development stages—can lead to 
important insights. For example, the set door open and door closed may appear complete at first, 
but upon closer inspection the continuous nature of the variable can immediately reveal a 
potentially critical state—partially open—that must be accounted for in the analysis.  
5.4 Defining rules to quickly create and evaluate large tables 
Although the first three techniques can be particularly useful during early stages of development, it 
is also possible to work with larger and more detailed context tables during later stages of 
development. Although most of the context table can be generated automatically given information 
in the control structure, as discussed in chapter 4 the final column must still be defined manually in 
most cases. When faced with this task, it can be more efficient to define a set of rules such that 
automated tools can fill out the table. For example, in the nuclear reactor example of Table 20, a 
rule can be defined to represent the fact that closing the MSIV any time support systems are 
inadequate will risk causing H-2 (reactor temperature too high). The automated tool can then apply 
the rule to generate rows 9-16 of column 6 with the appropriate hazard. Similar rules can be defined 
from basic principles to quickly fill the entire table. 
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Table 20: Context table for Operator provides Close MSIV control action 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Control 
Action  
Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Condition of 
Main Feedwater 
Pipe 
Condition of 
Main 
Steamline 
Operation of 
other support 
systems 
Control Action 
Hazardous? 
Control Action 
Hazardous if 
Too Late? 
Control Action 
Hazardous if 
Too Early? 
1 
Close 
MSIV 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Adequate H-4 H-4 H-4 
2 Ruptured No Leak No Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
3 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
4 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
5 Ruptured Leak No Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
6 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
7 Ruptured No Leak Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
8 Ruptured Leak Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
9 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Inadequate H-2, H-4 H-2, H-4 H-2, H-4 
10 Ruptured No Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
11 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
12 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
13 Ruptured Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
14 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
15 Ruptured No Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
16 Ruptured Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
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Although this approach is similar to logical simplification, it does not result in a simplified table and 
a different process is used—each rule is defined for a specific hazard and the rules are applied 
sequentially as the table is developed. The rule-based approach applies only to a completely 
enumerated set of rows—each of which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive—and 
can produce much more complex tables while requiring less effort than a brute force approach. One 
advantage is that overlapping rules can be quickly defined from basic principles without first 
considering if all cases are covered or whether rules may present conflicts. Once the rules are 
defined, automated methods can then generate the table, apply logical simplification, detect whether 
overlapping rules conflict, and detect whether there are any rows for which no rules apply 
(indicating an incomplete set of rules).  
Although concepts in this dissertation are primarily intended to help guide early stages of 
development, this rule-based approach has been used successfully to define tables with hundreds of 
rows using only a few well-understood and easy to evaluate rules. Larger tables are also possible, 
although the technique in the next section is a much more practical way to include such low levels 
of detail. 
5.5 Automatically generating low-level tables 
Because STPA is a top-down approach, higher levels of behavior are analyzed before more detailed 
lower levels of behavior. It should be possible, therefore, to leverage information and analysis that 
has already been performed at higher levels to derive lower-level context tables. This section 
describes a technique that can be used to generate extremely detailed context tables from more 
abstract tables and information. 
5.5.1 Train door controller example 
First consider the high-level context table for the train door controller, reproduced in Table 21. This 
context table defines the effect of a control action (hazardous, nonhazardous) given variables in the 
first level of the process model hierarchy (train motion, emergency, etc.). Although lower-level 
tables could be defined by repeating the whole process with lower level process model variables, 
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doing so can be tedious and inefficient because it does not leverage the information already in this 
table. What kind of information is needed in addition to Table 21 to define the same table at a lower 
level of detail? The new information needed is the precise relationship between the first and second 
levels of variables in the process model hierarchy. 
Table 21: Context table for the open door control action 
Control 
Action 
Train Motion Emergency Train Position Door State 
Hazardous if 
not provided in 
this context? 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Aligned with 
platform 
Person not in 
doorway 
No
26
 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Not aligned 
with platform 
Person not in 
doorway 
No 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Aligned with 
platform 
Person in 
doorway 
Yes 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped No emergency 
Not aligned 
with platform 
Person in 
doorway 
No
27
 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is stopped 
Emergency 
exists 
(doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) Yes 
Door open 
command not 
provided 
Train is moving (doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) (doesn’t matter) No 
 
An example process model hierarchy for the train door controller can be constructed as follows: 
                                                 
26
 This row is not hazardous because it does not lead to any of the system-level hazards (see H-1,H-2,H-3 in the 
previous section). If the hazards and accidents included in the safety analysis were extended to include inconvenience to 
the passengers, then this row would describe a hazardous control action. 
27
 For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed that in this case it is best to keep the door closed and alert a crew 
member to assist the potentially trapped passenger. 
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Example process model hierarchy for train door controller: 
 Door obstructed {obstructed, not obstructed} 
o Light curtain reading {blocked, not blocked} 
o Door force sensor reading {normal, door pushed open} 
 Train motion {moving, stopped} 
o Speed sensor #1 status {continuous speed} 
o Speed sensor #2 status {continuous speed} 
o Speed sensor #3 status {continuous speed} 
 Train platform alignment {aligned, not aligned} 
o Left platform sensor {aligned, not aligned} 
o Right platform sensor {aligned, not aligned} 
 Emergency {no emergency, evacuation required} 
o Fire present {normal, fire detected} 
 Engine compartment fire sensor {normal, fire detected} 
 Passenger compartment fire sensor {normal, fire detected} 
o Smoke present {normal, smoke detected} 
 Ionization smoke sensor {normal, smoke detected} 
 Optical smoke sensor {normal, smoke detected} 
o Toxic gas sensor {normal, toxic gas detected} 
To define the precise relationship between the first and second levels of process model variables, 
the SpecTRM-RL tables in Figure 31 could be defined. 
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Figure 31: Example SpecTRM-RL tables defining the relationships between process model 
variables 
From this basic information, more detailed context tables can be automatically generated by 
substituting each process model variable in the high-level context table with the set of lower level 
process model variables defined in Figure 31. Table 22 shows the first part of the automatically 
generated low-level context table for the train door controller. The table is quite large and only part 
can be reproduced here. Although it would be unreasonable to ask engineers to read this table and 
perform analysis on it, a formal black-box model of the system can be constructed from this 
information using automated techniques and reduced into a form that can be understood and 
evaluated. 
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Table 22: Partial low-level generated context table for train door controller 
Light 
curtain 
Door 
force 
sensor 
Speed 
sensor #1 
Speed 
sensor #2 
Speed 
sensor #3 
Left 
platform 
sensor 
Right 
platform 
sensor 
Fire 
present 
Smoke 
present 
Toxic gas 
sensor 
Hazardous if 
not provided? 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Aligned 
Fire 
detected 
Normal Normal Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Aligned 
Fire 
detected 
Normal 
Toxic gas 
detected 
Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Aligned 
Fire 
detected 
Smoke 
detected 
Normal Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Aligned 
Fire 
detected 
Smoke 
detected 
Toxic gas 
detected 
Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Not aligned Normal Normal Normal No 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Not aligned Normal Normal 
Toxic gas 
detected 
Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Not aligned Normal 
Smoke 
detected 
Normal Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Not aligned Normal 
Smoke 
detected 
Toxic gas 
detected 
Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Not aligned 
Fire 
detected 
Normal Normal Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Not aligned 
Fire 
detected 
Normal 
Toxic gas 
detected 
Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Not aligned 
Fire 
detected 
Smoke 
detected 
Normal Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Stopped 
Not 
aligned 
Not aligned 
Fire 
detected 
Smoke 
detected 
Toxic gas 
detected 
Yes 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Moving Aligned Aligned Normal Normal Normal No 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Moving Aligned Aligned Normal Normal 
Toxic gas 
detected 
No 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Moving Aligned Aligned Normal 
Smoke 
detected 
Normal No 
Blocked Normal Stopped Stopped Moving Aligned Aligned Normal 
Smoke 
detected 
Toxic gas 
detected 
No 
… … … … … … … … … … … 
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Detailed requirements and control algorithms can be generated from the low-level context tables 
using the automated methods in chapter 4. Figure 32 shows the first part of the SpecTRM-RL 
requirements generated from the low-level context tables for the train door controller. The full 
generated SpecTRM-RL table is quite large; however, applying logical simplification techniques 
based on the formal semantics defined in chapter 4, the specification can be automatically reduced 
to an equivalent but much smaller form. Figure 33 shows the logically simplified final SpecTRM-
RL table that is generated based on the high-level context tables (e.g. Table 21) and defined 
relationships between process model variables (e.g. Figure 31). 
 
Figure 32: Partial low-level SpecTRM-RL table generated for the train door controller 
example 
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Figure 33: Logically simplified low-level SpecTRM-RL table generated for the train door 
controller example 
5.5.2 Nuclear power plant example 
The same process can be applied to more complex systems, such as the nuclear power plant system 
studied in chapter 3 and in the appendix. The high-level context tables in chapter 3 are defined in 
terms of high-level contexts such as whether or not there is a steam generator tube rupture. 
However, in reality the software controllers do not receive information at this high level; they must 
infer the condition of the steam generator tube, for example, from a set of lower-level inputs 
including various pressure sensors, water levels, and radioactivity sensors. Therefore, lower level 
requirements are needed to specify the black-box behavior of the controller in terms of actual inputs 
and outputs. 
In other words, high-level context tables in chapter 3 produce requirements about the desired 
controller output in terms of the controller’s internal process model as shown in (1) of Figure 34 
below. Another step is required to infer the state of process model variables from the various inputs 
such as pressure readings, water levels, etc. as indicated by (2) in the figure. This inference process 
can be flawed leading to hazardous control actions, and such flaws may only be identified through a 
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low-level analysis. Therefore, the software requirements ultimately need to define the black-box 
requirements of the whole controller as indicated by (3) in the figure. Once (1) and (2) are specified 
at a high level using relatively simple context tables and SpecTRM-RL tables respectively, the 
detailed requirements for (3) can be automatically generated.  
 
 
Figure 34: Application of high-level and low-level requirements to a controller 
Figure 35 shows an example of SpecTRM-RL tables that could be used to define the relationship 
between controller inputs and updates to the internal process model variables. For example, how 
would the Protection System controller know when there is a Steam Generator Tube Rupture 
(SGTR)? The PS has inputs indicating the SG Water Level and the radioactivity of the SG water. 
An SGTR would have the effect of raising the SG Water Level and contaminating the SG water 
with radioactive coolant. Therefore, the controller could infer the existence of an SGTR when the 
water level is too high or radioactivity is detected. 
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Figure 35: Example SpecTRM-RL tables defining the relationships between process model 
variables for the nuclear power plant example.
28
 
                                                 
28
 Note that these are only examples. The goal here is to demonstrate how low-level details could be incorporated into a 
comprehensive hazard analysis. The accuracy of these tables will depend on the specific design considered and the 
assumptions made. Although not possible with the limited funding provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for 
141 
 
Once the high-level context tables and the process model update algorithms have been defined, the 
low-level context tables can be generated as shown in Table 23 below. Using the methods defined 
in chapter 4, the black-box requirements can then be automatically generated from the low-level 
context table as shown in Figure 36. The generated requirements can then be logically simplified 
and displayed as SpecTRM-RL black-box requirements as shown in Figure 37. Although it is not 
practical to review incredibly large tables such as Table 23 and Figure 36, the logically equivalent 
requirements generated in Figure 37 can be easily understood and reviewed by domain experts. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
this research case study, in practice these relationships and assumptions need to be carefully reviewed by domain 
experts before they are used to generate black-box requirements and models.  
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Table 23: Partial low-level generated context table for the nuclear reactor example 
Radioactivity 
sensor 
Steam 
generator 
water level 
Steam 
generator 
pressure 
drop rate 
Steam 
generator 
pressure 
Containment 
pressure 
Safety 
injection 
system 
Emergency 
feedwater 
system 
Emergency 
cooling 
system 
Hazardous to 
not close 
MSIV? (to 
keep MSIV 
open) 
Normal Too low More than X Less than Y Less than Z 
Not 
operating 
Operating Operating Yes 
Normal Too low More than X Less than Y Less than Z 
Not 
operating 
Operating Not operating Yes 
Normal Too low More than X Less than Y Less than Z 
Not 
operating 
Not operating Operating Yes 
Normal Too low More than X Less than Y Less than Z 
Not 
operating 
Not operating Not operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y More than Z Operating Operating Operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y More than Z Operating Operating Not operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y More than Z Operating Not operating Operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y More than Z Operating Not operating Not operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y More than Z 
Not 
operating 
Operating Operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y More than Z 
Not 
operating 
Operating Not operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y More than Z 
Not 
operating 
Not operating Operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y More than Z 
Not 
operating 
Not operating Not operating Yes 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y Less than Z Operating Operating Operating No 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y Less than Z Operating Operating Not operating No 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y Less than Z Operating Not operating Operating No 
Normal Too low Less than X More than Y Less than Z Operating Not operating Not operating No 
… … … … … … … … … 
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Figure 36: Partial low-level SpecTRM-RL table generated for the nuclear reactor example 
 
 
Figure 37: Logically simplified low-level SpecTRM-RL table generated for the nuclear 
reactor example 
5.6 Automated tools  
The techniques described above offer several opportunities for the development of automated tools 
to assist users performing the analysis. Because the methods are based on formal structures, even 
parts of the analysis that cannot be automated can still benefit from tools that can restructure the 
problem in new ways and perform user-directed low-level tasks to improve efficiency, reduce 
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repetition, and leverage results from earlier parts of the analysis. This section describes a number of 
automated tools, some of which are currently being developed. 
Given an existing context table, automated tools can help with logical simplification by identifying 
the areas that can be simplified to reduce the size of the table. For incomplete tables being 
developed, tools can assist the user in identifying and specifying these simplifications. For example, 
a user could highlight multiple rows and ask the tool to expand or reduce the set of contexts by 
inserting or removing “doesn’t matter” cells. 
Tools can also help users create and modify the process model variables. For example, if it is 
discovered that the train door controller behavior depends on whether the train is moving forward or 
backward, tools could allow the user to select a “train is moving” cell and split it into two sub-cases. 
Another possibility is to help users understand how important a process model variable is, for 
example, by identifying which hazards could result from a specific process model flaw or which 
process model variables have no affect and can be removed from columns in the context table. 
Tools could help users understand which process model variables are the most important by 
prioritizing them based on the severity of the hazards that each process model flaw can lead to. The 
process model values can also be analyzed to determine whether the values for a given variable can 
be further simplified or reduced without losing information in the context table. For example, if the 
set of values for a process model variable includes (high, normal, low), then tools can analyze the 
context table to automatically determine whether a smaller set such as (high, not high) contains all 
the necessary information relevant to that table. 
A promising tool currently in development automatically applies a set of rules to generate larger 
context tables. The tool allows users to specify any number of rules and can detect when rules 
conflict with each other or when the set of rules is incomplete. The tool can also be used to quickly 
modify existing tables, for example, to reflect design changes or controller re-use in new systems 
and environments.  
Finally, tools can help users define the process model hierarchy and the relationship between levels 
in the hierarchy, permitting automatic generation of low-level context tables and detailed 
requirements. The generated requirements could then be represented in SpecTRM-RL and executed 
or imported into a requirements or systems engineering framework such as Intent Specifications 
145 
 
[147] and existing software tools like SpecTRM [144] that help document traceability and 
document rationale behind decisions. Existing specification analysis techniques, such as those 
defined in [143], can then be applied to assess consistency and completeness criteria. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and future work 
This dissertation presented a number of extensions to STPA hazard analysis that provide a 
framework for discovering potentially hazardous behavior and the causal factors behind accidents in 
complex human- and software-intensive systems. In chapter 3 it was found that a general structure 
can be defined for hazardous control actions, and a more rigorous procedure was developed to 
systematically identify hazardous control actions based on that general structure. The STAMP 
concept of a process model was extended to create a process model hierarchy that provides 
traceability between system hazards and the contextual elements of a hazardous control action. 
Once established, the process model hierarchy can also guide subsequent iterations of the STPA 
analysis by defining relationships between varying levels of the analysis. 
Chapter 3 also developed a method of forming basic accident scenarios to guide the identification of 
causal factors in an STPA analysis. It was found that the total effort required to perform the analysis 
can be reduced by more efficiently leveraging the results of earlier analysis stages. For example, the 
specific types of process model flaws that are relevant to the defined hazards was found to be 
identifiable directly from the set of hazardous control actions by decomposing the actions using the 
general structure defined in chapter 3. To further reduce repetition in more detailed analyses, an 
approach was developed to perform the causal factor analysis based on specific types of process 
model flaws. Each specific process model flaw may be relevant to several different hazardous 
control actions, which might otherwise be analyzed separately resulting in the same causal factor 
being identified or re-identified many times throughout the analysis. The proposed procedures were 
found to reduce these kinds of repetitions in the analysis. 
While chapter 3 proposed comprehensive procedures that provide more guidance to engineers and 
analysts performing a hazard analysis manually, chapter 4 formalized STPA and STAMP using 
logical and mathematical structures that can be used by automated tools. Several opportunities for 
automated methods to assist in performing the hazard analysis were discussed and a number of 
algorithms and formal methods were proposed. For example, given certain information, a set of 
potential hazardous control actions can be automatically generated for engineering analysis and 
review. The specific process model flaws that could be hazardous can be extracted automatically 
from the set of hazardous control actions, and complete traceability back to the system-level hazards 
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can be generated. Some primitive basic scenarios can also be generated to guide the analysis; 
however human engineering analysis and review is required to identify the causal factors in most 
cases. 
Chapter 4 also explored the potential for completely automatic hazard analysis and several major 
limitations were identified, particularly for early phases of development and systems in which no 
complete model of the system and its environment exists at the time of analysis. Techniques for 
partial automation to assist manual (human) analysis were developed and found to be appropriate 
for the systems studied so far.  
A significant limitation to hazard analysis—the growing complexity of modern systems—was 
discussed in chapter 5 and several techniques to help manage and control complexity in the analysis 
were proposed. More efficient methods for performing subsequent low-level analysis iterations 
were developed, including methods that decompose the necessary tasks into manual and automated 
components for in-depth analyses. Several tools were also proposed to assist and interact with 
human engineers performing the analysis, some of which are currently in development. Finally, the 
proposed extensions were applied to more complex versions of the train door controller example 
used throughout this dissertation as well as the case study of the nuclear reactor control system. 
There are many potential avenues for future work that builds on these extensions. Although more 
detailed procedures were introduced for identifying accident scenarios and causal factors, there is a 
potential for improvements that can further reduce repetition in the analysis and provide 
visualizations that better facilitate documentation and review of hazard analysis results. The work in 
[136] represents a promising start in this direction. In addition, there are a number of formal 
requirements analysis techniques in the literature (e.g. [143] and [148]); given the formal definitions 
in chapter 4, these existing techniques could be adapted or integrated into STPA to better study the 
necessary safety requirements and support low-level hazard analyses. 
The preliminary tools defined in chapter 5 can also be improved, especially in terms of their 
interface and the organization of the results produced during an STPA analysis. Although chapters 3 
and 4 address hazardous behavior and requirements related to timing information, the automated 
tools proposed in chapter 5 still need to incorporate this information. There is also the potential to 
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develop new tools in addition to those in chapter 5, including tools that better facilitate the 
application of STPA Step 2 and potentially generate better visualizations like those in [136].  
In conclusion, this dissertation opened the door to a number of new possibilities both in practice and 
in theory. For practitioners, chapter 3 provides more detailed guidance for those learning STPA 
hazard analysis and adds more rigor for those already engaged in applying STPA. For academics 
and theorists advancing state-of-the-art methods, chapter 4 describes a first step in formalizing 
STPA and defining automated methods that can detect requirements flaws and design conflicts from 
STPA results—even before detailed or executable models of the system exist. Chapter 5 attempts to 
leverage components from both worlds to propose useful and practical tools that can be 
implemented to improve safety today. Several organizations and industries from automotive to 
aviation have already begun applying these approaches, and new ideas and more powerful 
improvements are sure to follow. Whatever the future holds, it is my hope that this work will help 
stimulate new ideas in our community and that it has inspired you, the diligent reader, to go out and 
make a safer world! 
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Appendix A: Case Study of Nuclear Power Plant Systems 
This appendix presents an analysis of a generalized version of an EPR (Evolutionary Power 
Reactor), a version of which appears in [140]. The EPR studied is a type of PWR (Pressurized 
Water Reactor). The system includes one Steam Generator (SG) and one Main Steam Isolation 
Valve (MSIV). The EPR reactor is fully digital, that is, all control systems, including the Reactor 
Protection System, are digital. The analysis focuses on a sub-set of the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
system: the systems involved in closing the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). The same process 
could be applied to the rest of the system. 
A generic diagram of a PWR is shown in Figure 38. During normal operation, the coolant in the 
primary cooling system (left of the diagram) transfers heat from the reactor to the Steam Generator 
(SG). The SG contains water that cools the primary coolant and evaporates into steam. The SG 
prevents primary coolant, which is radioactive, from mixing with the water, which is not 
radioactive. The steam produced in the SG travels to a turbine connected to a generator to produce 
electricity. The steam is cooled in the condenser and pumped back into the SG to begin the cycle 
again. The loop formed by the SG, turbine, and condenser is known as the secondary cooling 
system. 
The MSIV is a valve located on the main steam line from the SG. During normal operation, the 
MSIV is kept open to permit cooling of the primary cooling system via the secondary system. In 
case of an abnormal situation, the MSIV can be closed to isolate the SG from the rest of the 
secondary system. MSIV closure is necessary if there is a break in the main feedwater pipe to the 
SG that allows water to leak out, an internal SG Tube Rupture (SGTR) that allows primary coolant 
to mix with secondary water, or a break in the main steam line exiting the SG. 
Because MSIV closure prevents the secondary system from adequately cooling the primary system, 
a number of backup systems are provided to cool the primary coolant in case of MSIV closure. 
These backup systems include redundant SGs, turbine bypass valves, main steam relief isolation 
valves (MSRIV) and main steam relief control valves (MSRCV), safety relief valves (SRV), the 
Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS), and the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). 
These systems are included in the analysis only to the extent that they impact the decision to close 
the MSIV. 
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The STPA analysis that follows begins by identifying the accidents, hazards, and control structure 
for the overall system. The remaining steps focus on those systems related to closure of the MSIV. 
-
 
Figure 38: Pressurized Water Reactor (Diagram from [141]) 
A.1 Accidents 
The first step is to identify the system-level losses, or accidents, to be considered. Accidents often 
involve loss of human life or injury, but any loss can be included that is unacceptable and must be 
prevented. Table 24 below shows the system-level accidents that are analyzed in this analysis. 
Table 24: NPP system-level accidents to be prevented 
A-1: People injured or killed 
A-2: Environment contaminated 
A-3: Equipment damage (economic loss) 
A-4: Loss of electrical power generation 
People injured or killed (A-1) includes both employees and the general population, and may involve 
radiation exposure, explosion, or any other mechanism. Environment contaminated (A-2) includes 
radiation or other harmful release to the air, ground, or groundwater, or any other part of the 
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environment. Equipment damage (A-3) refers to the economic loss associated with any damage to 
equipment regardless of whether any radiation is released. Loss of electrical power generation (A-4) 
includes any unplanned plant shutdown.  
Priorities may be assigned as not all accidents are equally important. In addition, the accidents are 
not mutually exclusive, and in fact it is possible to experience all four losses at once. Finally, 
economic damage such as equipment loss or the loss of electrical power generation (A-4) may not 
be of immediate importance in a licensing review or a traditional safety analysis but it is certainly a 
concern for the utility. STPA can be used for any type of loss that is important to those doing the 
analysis. Incorporating other types of losses, such as mission or economic losses, can not only allow 
better decision making with respect to achieving multiple requirements but can also assist in 
identifying and making tradeoffs between conflicting goals. 
A.2 System Hazards 
Once the system accidents have been defined, the hazards can be identified. Table 25 summarizes 
the hazards included in this analysis and the accidents to which they are related. 
Table 25: NPP system-level hazards  
Hazard Related Accident 
H-1: Release of radioactive materials A-1, A-2 
H-2: Reactor temperature too high  A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 
H-3: Equipment operated beyond limits A-3, A-4 
H-4: Reactor shut down A-4 
Release of radioactive materials (H-1) refers to any release outside the primary system, regardless 
of quantity, including releases into the secondary cooling system, groundwater, and air inside or 
outside the containment structure(s). These releases should be controlled to prevent exposure to 
people or the environment (A-1 and A-2). Reactor temperature too high (H-2) is a dangerous 
condition that can cause every system-level accident (for example, if the fuel rods melt), or it may 
lead to A-1 and A-2 without any radiation release (for example, through hydrogen production or 
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other dangerous conditions).29 Although H-2 may exist without an accident (for example, if there is 
a hydrogen explosion but containment holds), H-2 is a dangerous condition that should be 
controlled in the design. Equipment operated beyond limits (H-3) includes operation beyond safe 
limits that causes reactor damage or operation beyond design limits that causes damage to other 
equipment. Reactor shut down (H-4) includes any unplanned shutdown that may result in a loss of 
electrical power generation.  
A.3 Safety Control Structure 
The high-level safety control structure developed for this project is shown in Figure 39. The 
components inside the dashed (red) box control the closing of the MSIV. They are analyzed in 
further detail for the remainder of the case study. Figure 40 shows a more detailed control structure 
for the systems highlighted in the dashed box. 
The dotted (green) arrow represents the communication between the MSIV controllers and other 
controllers. For example, the Protection System (PS) contacts the Safety Control System (SCS) in 
order to initiate the Engineering Safety Features (ESF) controls following ESF actuation. The 
Reactor Controls (RC) controller also communicates with Non-Safety System Controller (NSSC) in 
order to provide command signals for actuators used in RC functions other than control rods, such 
as the BMC (Boron and Makeup Control) components for Boron control. 
There are four controllers that can provide a control action to close the MSIV: the Operator, the 
NSSC, the PS, and the Diverse Automation System (DAS). These four controllers send control 
actions to the MSIV Priority Module (PM), which uses a pre-programmed priority setting to 
determine which control actions to forward to the MSIV actuator. In this sense, the PM can also 
send control actions. 
If the operator detects a need to close the MSIV, he or she may issue a Close MSIV command to the 
PM. The PM determines which controller is in charge according to a priority scheme, and forwards 
                                                 
29
 “Too high” is in relation to NRC standards and operation guidelines. 
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commands directly to the MSIV actuator. In this case, the PM would normally forward the 
command from the operator to the MSIV actuator. 
The operator may also send a Close MSIV command to the NSSC, which provides manual control 
for the MSIV. In this situation, the NSSC would normally forward the command from the operator 
to the PM, which would then forward the command to the MSIV actuator. 
The PS is an automated system that can automatically detect some situations in which a Close MSIV 
command is necessary. In these situations the PS can provide the Close MSIV command to the PM 
which can forward the command to the MSIV actuator. 
Finally, the DAS is a backup protection system that is used if there is a problem with the PS. The 
DAS can issue a Close MSIV command to the PM, which would normally forward the command to 
the MSIV actuator. 
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Figure 39: High-Level PWR Safety Control Structure  
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Figure 40: More detailed safety control structure for MSIV control 
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A sensor provides feedback about the MSIV status directly to the PM. This sensor does not sense 
process variables such as pressure, temperature, or steam flux. Instead, it senses torque applied to 
the valve itself to detect if the valve has closed. The PM receives this feedback and can provide 
confirmation back to the controller that originally requested the MSIV closure.  
Other process sensors report process variables to the controllers including various pressures, SG 
water level, and the operation of other backup systems. This information is used by the controllers 
to determine, among other things, whether the MSIV should be closed. 
A.4 Controller Responsibilities 
The controllers have responsibilities as follows: 
Operator : 
 Validate/inhibit permissives  
 Bring the plant to a controlled shutdown in case of Anticipated Operational Occurrence 
(AOO) or Postulated Accidents (PA), such as leakage from primary into the secondary loop. 
 Activate the safety engineering features (ESF) 
 Start main steam line isolation when necessary 
 Monitor parameters and look for abnormalities or trends (fault diagnostic) 
 Operate the plant during startup 
 Operate the plant during programmed shutdown 
 Take actions in accordance to written guides upon any transient or emergency 
PS - Protection System: 
 Bring the plant to a controlled shutdown in case of Anticipated Operational Occurrence 
(AOO) or Postulated Accidents (PA), such as leakage from primary into the secondary loop. 
 Activate the safety engineering features (ESF) 
 Start main steam line isolation when necessary 
DAS - Diverse Automation System 
 Same as PS. DAS is a backup for PS. 
159 
 
NSSC - Non-Safety System Controller 
 If an operator command to open/close MSIV is received, then send that command to PM  
 If feedback is received from PM, then send that feedback to Operator. 
PM - Priority Module  
 Select one controller to be active 
 Forward commands to MSIV actuator 
 Forward feedback from MSIV actuator to the active controller  
 Ensure that checkback is received when MSIV is closed (indicating that valve torque has 
reached its maximum) 
 Check for any problems with MSIV actuator operability 
A.5 Process Model Variables 
The process model variables capture the information needed by each controller to decide what 
control action to provide. Different process model variables may be associated with each control 
action. 
The high-level process model variables associated with MSIV closure can be identified by 
considering the purpose of the MSIV. The MSIV remains open during normal plant operation and is 
only needed to control a few specific abnormal conditions. The relevant high-level conditions can 
be derived from the system hazards and system description as follows:30 
 Steam generator tube rupture, which can cause an uncontrolled SG level increase and can 
release contaminated fluid into the secondary system 
 Steam system piping leak, which can depressurize the SG and cause an overcooling transient 
and energy release into containment 
 Feedwater system piping leak, which can depressurize the SG and cause an overcooling 
transient and energy release into containment 
                                                 
30
 See also [142] chapter 7 pages 7.3-22 and 7.3-11 
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While these conditions could be caused by physical failures, the latter two could also be caused by 
design flaws or unsafe commands elsewhere in the system. For example, a leak in the main steam 
line could be caused by a physical failure (e.g. rupture in the line) or it could be caused by main 
steam relief valves that are opened inadvertently or at the wrong time. Both situations could require 
MSIV closure to prevent depressurization and an overcooling transient while the issue is 
investigated and resolved. 
In addition to helping to mitigate the conditions above, the MSIV also controls the heat exchange 
that takes place within the SG. Before the SG is closed, other support systems31 may need to be 
engaged to provide the additional cooling needed. Therefore, information about additional cooling 
provided by other support systems (i.e. inadequate, adequate
32
) may be needed for the decision to 
close the MSIV and should be included in the process model. 
A.6 Unsafe Control Actions 
When considering whether a potential control action is hazardous or not, it is important to avoid 
assuming that other defense barriers are intact or that they are appropriate, sufficient, and error-free. 
For example, even if there is an emergency feedwater system to provide the necessary cooling in the 
event of a relief valve inadvertently commanded open, it is still hazardous to inadvertently 
command the relief valve open. These hazardous actions must be included in the analysis and 
prevented regardless of other protective systems intended to mitigate unsafe behavior.  
Table 26 summarizes the hazardous control actions that were identified for the command Close 
MSIV.  
 
                                                 
31
 Other support systems refers to other components designed to cool the primary system. These include the CVCS, SI, 
CCS, etc.  
32
 Adequate means the system operation is sufficient to provide the cooling normally provided by the SG. 
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Table 26: Hazardous Control Actions for Close MSIV 
Control 
Action 
Hazardous Control Actions 
Not Providing 
Causes 
Hazard 
Providing 
Causes Hazard 
Wrong Timing or 
Order Causes Hazard 
Stopped Too 
Soon or 
Applied Too 
Long 
Close MSIV Close MSIV 
not provided 
when there is a 
rupture in the 
SG tube, leak 
in main 
feedwater, or 
leak in main 
steam line [H-
2, H-1, H-3] 
Close MSIV 
provided when 
there is no 
rupture or leak 
[H-4] 
 
Close MSIV 
provided when 
there is a rupture 
or leak while 
other support 
systems are 
inadequate [H-1, 
H-2, H-3] 
 
 
Close MSIV provided 
too early (while SG 
pressure is high): SG 
pressure may rise, 
trigger relief valve, 
abrupt steam expansion 
[H-2, H-3] 
 
Close MSIV provided 
too late after SGTR: 
contaminated coolant 
released into secondary 
loop, loss of primary 
coolant through 
secondary system [H-1, 
H-2, H-3] 
 
Close MSIV provided 
too late after main 
feedwater or main 
steam line leak [H-1, 
H-2, H-3, H-4] 
N/A 
 
The hazardous control actions in Table 26 were identified using the following process. First, a 
controller and control action were selected. The operator and the control action Close MSIV were 
analyzed first, although the results also apply to other controllers in the system. A context table was 
then constructed for the control action using the corresponding process model variables that were 
defined previously. Table 27 shows the context table for Close MSIV provided.  
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Table 27: Context table for Operator provides Close MSIV control action 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Control 
Action  
Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Condition of 
Main 
Feedwater Pipe 
Condition 
of Main 
Steamline 
Operation of 
other support 
systems 
Control Action 
Hazardous? 
Control 
Action 
Hazardous if 
Too Late? 
Control 
Action 
Hazardous if 
Too Early? 
1 
Close 
MSIV 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Adequate H-4 H-4 H-4 
2 
Ruptured No Leak No Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
3 Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
4 Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
5 
Ruptured Leak No Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
6 Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Adequate No H-2, H-3, H-4 No 
7 
Ruptured No Leak Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
8 
Ruptured Leak Leak Adequate No 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-3, H-4 
9 Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Inadequate H-2, H-4 H-2, H-4 H-2, H-4 
10 
Ruptured No Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
11 Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
12 Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
13 
Ruptured Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
14 Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
15 
Ruptured No Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
16 
Ruptured Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
H-1, H-2, H-3, 
H-4 
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Column 1 in Table 27 is the control action being analyzed while columns 2 to 5 correspond to 
the process model variables identified in section A.5. Column 6 specifies in which contexts it is 
hazardous to provide the Close MSIV control action. For example, row 1 describes a situation in 
which it is hazardous to close the MSIV: if there is no SG tube rupture, no main feedwater pipe 
leak, and no main steam line leak, then there is no need to close the MSIV. Closing the MSIV 
will cause H-4 (reactor shut down). If the operation of other support systems cannot make up for 
the additional heat exchange required, closing the MSIV will also lead to a loss of necessary 
cooling (H-2 in row 9 column 6). 
If other support systems, including other CVCS, SI, ECCS, etc., are producing the additional 
cooling required during a rupture/leak, then closing the MSIV is not hazardous (rows 2-8, 
column 6) and a reactor shutdown is initiated regardless of any MSIV actions. If for some reason 
the other systems are not capable of producing the additional cooling needed, then closing the 
MSIV may cause other hazards (rows 10-16, column 6) including excessive temperature increase 
(H-2), release of radioactive materials (H-1), an immediate reactor shutdown or SCRAM (H-4) if 
not already triggered, and additional equipment damage (H-3). Depending on the type of rupture, 
it may actually be better to keep the MSIV open to control the temperature of the reactor (H-2) 
even though that would permit some radioactive steam to be introduced into the secondary 
system (H-1). 
The last two columns on the right in Table 27 take into account timing information. If there is a 
rupture/leak and other support systems are adequate, then it is not hazardous to close the MSIV 
(e.g. row 2-8). The MSIV should be closed. However, if the MSIV is closed too late in this 
context then it is hazardous. If the steam generator tube is ruptured, too much radioactive coolant 
may have already been released into the secondary system and the environment (H-1). If the 
steam line has a leak, excessive steam may have been released causing overcooling and 
overcompensation (H-2). If the steam line or feedwater pipe have a leak, the SG may run dry and 
cause equipment damage (H-3). Closing the MSIV too early may also be hazardous in some 
situations. For example, if the steam generator tube is ruptured then the SG pressure should be 
decreased before the MSIV is closed. Otherwise, if the MSIV is closed too early after a SG tube 
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rupture, then the SG pressure and temperature will increase and may cause equipment damage to 
the SG, SG piping, or other systems (H-3). 
The contexts used to define hazardous control actions may not be the same as contexts that are 
inherently unsafe. The tables in this section are used to analyze controller behavior and control 
actions in a number of contexts, not to analyze contexts that are unsafe by themselves. For 
example, row 1 column 6 of Table 27 is marked as hazardous because the control action Close 
MSIV will cause a hazard if provided in that context, even though the context by itself (no 
ruptures/leaks) does not describe anything hazardous. Conversely, the context in row 2 describes 
a steam generator tube rupture but column 6 is not marked as hazardous because closing the 
MSIV is not a hazardous behavior in that context. In fact, closing the MSIV is exactly what 
should happen in that situation to prevent an accident. 
Although providing a control action can be hazardous, not providing a control action can be 
equally hazardous. Table 28 shows the context table for not providing the Close MSIV control 
action. As before, a reactor shutdown should be initiated for any rupture regardless of the MSIV 
control action. However because these tables are used to identify hazardous control actions, only 
hazards that are affected by an absent Close MSIV control action are listed at this stage of the 
analysis. 
If there is no rupture/leak, keeping the MSIV open is not hazardous (rows 1 and 9). However, if 
there is a rupture/leak, different hazards may be experienced depending on what part of the 
system is affected. If the SG tube is ruptured and the MSIV is not closed, radioactive material 
will be released into the secondary system (H-1) and the SG water level may increase 
uncontrollably. A sustained release of primary coolant will decrease the effectiveness of the 
primary cooling system (H-2), and the release of radioactive material into the secondary system 
may cause equipment damage (H-3). If the main steam line has a leak and the MSIV is not 
closed, excessive steam may be released causing an overcooling transient and overcompensation 
by other systems to increase reactivity (H-2). Excessive steam release may also lower the SG 
water level, causing potential equipment damage if the SG runs dry (H-3). If the main feedwater 
pipe has a leak and the MSIV is not closed, the SG may be depressurized causing an overcooling 
transient and water level may drop, leading to H-2 and H-3 as above.  
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Table 28: Context table for Operator does not provide Close MSIV control action 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Control 
Action 
Steam 
Generator 
Tube 
Condition of 
Main 
Feedwater 
Pipe 
Condition of 
Main Steamline 
Operation 
of other 
support 
systems
33 
Not Providing 
Control Action is 
Hazardous? 
1 
Close 
MSIV  
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Adequate No 
2 Ruptured No Leak No Leak Adequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
3 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Adequate H-2, H-3 
4 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Adequate H-2, H-3 
5 Ruptured Leak No Leak Adequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
6 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Adequate H-2, H-3 
7 Ruptured No Leak Leak Adequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
8 Ruptured Leak Leak Adequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
9 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak No Leak Adequate No 
10 Ruptured No Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
11 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak No Leak Inadequate H-2, H-3 
12 
Not 
Ruptured 
No Leak Leak Inadequate H-2, H-3 
13 Ruptured Leak No Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
14 
Not 
Ruptured 
Leak Leak Inadequate H-2, H-3 
15 Ruptured No Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
16 Ruptured Leak Leak Inadequate 
H-1, H-2, H-3, H-
4 
                                                 
33
 Other support systems refers to other systems designed to cool the primary system. This includes the CVCS, SI, 
CCS, etc. Adequate means the system operation is sufficient to provide the cooling normally provided by the SG. 
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In the case of SG tube rupture, keeping the MSIV open can cause not only equipment damage 
but also a more immediate shutdown (H-4) via SCRAM and can increase the amount of time the 
plant will need to remain shut down for repairs. The overfilling of the SG could allow water to 
enter the steam lines, damaging the delicate turbine pallets and requiring extensive time for 
repairs. In addition to actual damage, equipment can be overstressed and require more detailed 
inspections before the plant can be operational again. The additional contamination will also 
require more time to decontaminate and will result in the generation of more waste. Because 
keeping the MSIV open during a SG tube rupture will cause a more severe and prolonged 
shutdown than would otherwise occur with a contained SG tube rupture, H-4 is included in Table 
28 for these cases. H-4 is not listed for other cases because it is assumed that keeping the MSIV 
open after a leak in the main steamline or main feedwater pipe will not cause a more severe or 
prolonged shutdown than if the MSIV is closed, although it does contribute to the other hazards 
listed. 
Note that for the purpose of reviewing the tables, the rationale behind each of the “hazardous” 
vs. “not hazardous” decisions should be documented during the analysis. In fact, the context 
tables can be used to help verify that the necessary rationales and assumptions are documented 
during the analysis, as opposed to ad-hoc identification of hazardous control actions that may 
immediately discount and omit non-hazardous control actions entirely. Of course, the non-
hazardous rows could easily be omitted from the context tables if desired; however, documenting 
the conclusions about what behavior is hazardous can be just as important as documenting 
behavior that is assumed to be non-hazardous. Such documentation may be especially important 
for other long-term project goals like future change management activities, design re-use in new 
environments, and other considerations that arise later in the system lifecycle.  
A comparison of Table 11 and Table 12 shows that there are conflicts that must be resolved. In 
both tables, rows 10 to 16 are marked as hazardous. In other words, in these situations it is 
hazardous to close the MSIV yet hazardous to keep the MSIV open. In some cases, it is possible 
to revisit the design to eliminate the conflict and provide a safe option. If the conflict cannot be 
resolved, a decision must be made about what action should be taken in these contexts, that is, 
which is the least hazardous? For this case study, after consultation with nuclear engineers and 
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regulators it was found that rows 10 to 16 may not have been analyzed in previous safety 
analyses with respect to MSIV control. For the purposes of this research, the consensus was to 
assume that it may be best to keep the MSIV open in the context of row 10 to maximize the 
amount of cooling provided even though doing so will contaminate the secondary cooling system 
and eventually require costly repairs. Rows 11-16, on the other hand, involve leaks in the pipe 
supplying water to the steam generator and/or the line that carries steam away. If the MSIV is 
left open in these situations, the amount of water in the steam generator can decrease and 
eventually lead to less cooling capability or an overcooling transient. Therefore, in these 
situations (rows 11-16), it was assumed that it may be best to keep the MSIV closed to maximize 
the amount of cooling provided even though it is only a temporary measure. These solutions 
were found to differ from current designs of MSIV controllers, which do not act based on the 
state of other support systems and may automatically close the MSIV during any rupture. 
Chapter 4 discusses design conflicts in more detail, including search and detection methods that 
can be performed on STPA results to automatically detect such conflicts. 
Both of these assumptions should be reviewed and evaluated carefully by domain experts. The 
purpose of this research case study was not to provide final solutions to these hazardous 
situations, but to develop and apply hazard analysis methods that can uncover hazardous control 
and provide the safety-critical questions that need to be considered. Note that although Table 11 
and Table 12 use high-level contexts, the analysis can also be performed in more detail using the 
techniques described in chapter 5. A more detailed analysis could be necessary if, for example, it 
is found that the best solution depends on the type of steam generator tube rupture, the amount of 
pressure in the SG, etc. 
Of course, in any of these situations, there are other control actions that need to take place 
outside the MSIV control loop—they can be analyzed using the same approach. In addition, 
every effort should be made to prevent many of these contextual conditions from existing in the 
first place. Although such additional efforts were outside the scope of this initial case study, they 
are mentioned here to show how the analysis may branch out into other areas of the system to 
address the issues identified.  
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A.7 Safety Constraints 
Once conflicts are resolved as discussed in the previous section, the remaining hazardous control 
actions can be summarized and translated into safety constraints as shown in Table 29. 
Table 29: Post-conflict-resolution unsafe control actions and safety constraints  
Unsafe Control Action Safety Constraint 
UCA 1: Close MSIV not provided when there 
is a leak (rupture in the SG tube, leak in main 
feedwater, or leak in main steam line) and the 
support systems are adequate 
SC 1: MSIV must be closed when there is a 
leak (rupture in the SG tube, leak in main 
feedwater, or leak in main steam line) and the 
support systems are adequate 
UCA 2: Close MSIV not provided when there 
is a main feedwater or main steam line leak 
and other support systems are inadequate 
SC 2: MSIV must be closed when there is a 
main feedwater or main steam line leak and 
other support systems are inadequate 
UCA 3: Close MSIV provided when there is a 
SGTR but support systems are inadequate 
SC 3: MSIV must not be closed when there is 
a SGTR and support systems are inadequate 
UCA 4: Close MSIV provided too early (while 
SG pressure is high) 
SC 4: MSIV must not be closed too early 
while SG pressure is too high 
UCA 5: Close MSIV provided too late after 
rupture/leak (in the SG tube, main feedwater, 
or main steam line) 
SC 5: MSIV must not be closed too late after 
rupture/leak (in the SG tube, main feedwater, 
or main steam line) 
UCA 6: Close MSIV provided when there is 
no rupture/leak 
SC 6: MSIV must not be closed when there is 
no rupture/leak 
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A.8 Causal Factors 
As described in earlier, there are two ways that a safety constraint can be violated: 
1. The controller provides an unsafe control action 
2. Appropriate control actions are provided but not followed 
The causal factors shown in Figure 41 are used for the analysis in this case study. The following 
sections analyze both cases for the Operator, DAS, and PS.  
 
Figure 41: A classification of causal factors leading to hazards 
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A.8.1 Operator Causal Factors 
A.8.1.1 Causal Factors Leading to Operator Unsafe Control Actions 
This section identifies causal factors that can lead to each unsafe control action summarized in 
Figure 29 for the Operator. 
 
Figure 42: Causal factors leading to operator unsafe control actions 
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UCA 1: Close MSIV command not provided when there is a leak (rupture in the SG tube, link in 
main feedwater, or leak in main steam line) and the support systems are adequate. 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system (CVCS or emergency feedwater system) 
a. Concurrent situation masks another. For example, a feedwater problem could 
happen concurrent with a SGTR, causing the SG water level to stay practically 
stable. 
b. Situation that requires MSIV closure is masked. For example, NSSC engages 
PZR heaters to make up for loss of RCS pressure during SGTR. 
c. Event progresses too slowly to detect 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback missing, delayed, or incorrect 
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, is not correct or delayed 
c. Steam generator water level delayed or incorrect 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not operate properly and gives wrong measures 
g. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
h. Failures in sensors, communication lines, or power 
i. PM reports both MSIV actuators as inoperable when they are 
j. PM reports MSIV already closed, when it is not 
k. NSSC reported as operational (or no feedback provided) when it is not 
(3) Outside information 
a. PZR pressure delayed or missing 
b. PZR level incorrectly indicated as normal 
c. No indication of SI initiated 
d. Delayed indication of SI initiated 
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e. Inappropriate permissives in effect34 
f. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) Operator 
a. Operator believes Steam Generator is not ruptured when it is ruptured 
b. Operator believes the main steam line has no leak when it has a leak 
c. Operator believes the main feedwater has no leak when it has a leak 
d. Operator confused about the procedure to be followed 
e. Operator confused because of conflicting indicators5 
f. Operator reluctant to shutdown the reactor, unsure if shutdown is necessary or 
warranted 
g. Operator under pressure not to trip reactor 
h. Operator waits for the PS to handle the situation (e.g. Operator recognizes 
possible SGTR but believes PS will handle it) 
i. Operator is not aware of the problem due to inadequate feedback (e.g. screen is 
frozen) 
j. Operator is not aware because NSSC is inoperative or providing inadequate 
information 
k. Operator closes the wrong valve  
l. Operator recognizes the rupture/leak but believes other support systems are 
inadequate, and keeps MSIV open to maintain sufficient cooling capability. 
m. Operator uncertain whether a rupture/leak exists (there is a conflict between being 
conservative under uncertainty versus immediate manual spurious shutdown 
which costs money and may be discouraged. May also prefer to wait for the 
automated system to resolve the problem versus intervening under uncertainty) 
                                                 
34
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. “Confusion" could mean the model is 
not clear, there is an overlap of responsibilities, or conflicting process values are indicated. The controllers check 
several indicators to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also cause 
high pressure in the main steam line compartment and low SG water level. However, SG low level together with 
permissive 13 (startup) may indicate there is no need to isolate the SG. It could happen that there is a problem with 
the sensors, the model (inside the controller) could be wrong, or the algorithm could be wrong 
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n. Operator believes NSSC is operational when it is not (could cause operator to 
provide command to an inoperative or disabled NSSC instead of directly to PM) 
 
 
UCA 2: Close MSIV command not provided when there is a main feedwater or main steam line 
leak and other support systems are inadequate. 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system (CVCS or emergency feedwater system) 
a. Concurrent situation masks another. For example, a feedwater problem could 
happen concurrent with a SGTR, causing the SG water level to stay practically 
stable. 
b. Situation that requires MSIV closure is masked.  
c. Event progresses too slowly to detect 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback missing, delayed, or incorrect 
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, is not correct or delayed 
c. Steam generator water level delayed or incorrect 
d. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
e. Voting system does not operate properly and gives wrong measures 
f. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
g. Failures in sensors, communication lines, or power 
h. PM reports both MSIV actuators as inoperable when they are 
i. PM reports MSIV already closed, when it is not 
j. NSSC reported as operational (or no feedback provided) when it is not 
(3) Outside information 
a. PZR pressure delayed or missing 
b. PZR level incorrectly indicated as normal 
c. No indication of SI initiated 
d. Delayed indication of SI initiated 
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e. Inappropriate permissives in effect35 
f. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) Operator 
a. Operator believes the main steam line has no leak when it has a leak 
b. Operator believes the main feedwater has no leak when it has a leak 
c. Operator believes there is an SGTR that does not require MSIV closure when 
there is actually a main steam line or main feedwater leak that does require MSIV 
closure 
d. Operator confused about the procedure to be followed 
e. Operator confused because of conflicting indicators5 
f. Operator reluctant to shutdown the reactor, unsure if shutdown is necessary or 
warranted 
g. Operator under pressure not to trip reactor 
h. Operator waits for the PS to handle the situation (e.g. Operator recognizes 
possible leak but believes PS will handle it) 
i. Operator is not aware of the problem due to inadequate feedback (e.g. screen is 
frozen) 
j. Operator is not aware because NSSC is inoperative or providing inadequate 
information 
k. Operator closes the wrong valve  
l. Operator recognizes the rupture/leak but because other support systems are 
inadequate, keeps MSIV open in an effort to maintain sufficient cooling 
capability. 
                                                 
35
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. “Confusion" could mean the model is 
not clear, there is an overlap of responsibilities, or conflicting process values are indicated. The controllers check 
several indicators to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also cause 
high pressure in the main steam line compartment and low SG water level. However, SG low level together with 
permissive 13 (startup) may indicate there is no need to isolate the SG. It could happen that there is a problem with 
the sensors, the model (inside the controller) could be wrong, or the algorithm could be wrong 
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m. Operator uncertain whether a rupture/leak exists (there is a conflict between being 
conservative under uncertainty versus immediate manual spurious shutdown 
which costs money and may be discouraged. May also prefer to wait for the 
automated system to resolve the problem versus intervening under uncertainty) 
n. Operator believes NSSC is operational when it is not (could cause operator to 
provide command to an inoperative or disabled NSSC instead of directly to PM) 
 
 
UCA 3: Close MSIV provided when there is SGTR but other support systems are inadequate  
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another, other support systems could appear 
adequate but may not be, and automated systems could exacerbate the situation. 
For example, main steam line high radioactivity may be detected coincident with 
safety injection, making it difficult to detect whether partial cooldown was 
initiated by the automation.  
b. Loss of power 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided, delayed, or incorrect 
b. SG Pressure or setpoints are not correct, delayed, or missing 
c. Steam generator water level not correct, delayed, or missing 
d. Conflicting data indicating a false situation 
e. Voting system does not operate properly and gives wrong measures 
f. Failures in sensors, communication lines, or power 
(3) Outside information 
a. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
b. PZR pressure delayed or missing 
c. False signal SI initiated 
(4) Operator 
a. Operator thinks support systems are working when they are not. For example, 
NSSC may appear to be working but may not be because the screen is frozen. The 
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operator may believe that a partial cool down was initiated by the automation 
because safety injection was engaged at the same time that main steam line 
radioactivity was detected 
b. Operator believes there is a main steam line or feedwater leak when there is 
actually an SGTR 
c. Operator knows support systems are working, but does not realize they are 
inadequate 
d. Operator confused about the procedure to be followed 
e. Operator confused because of conflicting indicators 
f. Operator does not realize other support systems are not operative (e.g. for 
maintenance or other reasons) 
 
 
UCA 4: Close MSIV provided too early (while SG pressure is high)  
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another. For example, a feedwater problem 
could happen concurrently with a SGTR, and the SG water level stay practically 
stable.  
b. Event progress too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of NSSC could confuse Operator. For example, PZR heaters could 
make up for loss of RCS pressure 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, is not correct 
c. Steam generator water level not correctly indicated 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
g. Sensors failure 
(3) Outside Information 
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a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
e. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect36  
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) Operator 
a. Operator believes it is already safe to initiate action after indications confirm 
SGTR 
b. Operator believes it is already safe to initiate action after indications confirm 
Main steam line break 
c. Operator believes it is already safe to initiate action after indications confirm main 
feedwater break 
d. Operator confused about the procedure to be followed 
e. Operator confused because of conflicting indicators 
 
 
UCA 5: Close MSIV command provided too late after rupture/leak (in the SG tube, main 
feedwater, or main steam line) 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
                                                 
36
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. “Confusion" could mean the 
model is not clear, there is an overlap of responsibilities, or conflicting process values are indicated. The 
controllers check several indicators to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam 
pipe break would also cause high pressure in the main steam line compartment and low SG water level. 
However, SG low level together with permissive 13 (startup) may indicate there is no need to isolate the 
SG. It could happen that there is a problem with the sensors, the model (inside the controller) could be 
wrong, or the algorithm could be wrong 
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a. A concurrent situation could mask another one. For example, a feedwater problem 
could happen concurrently with a SGTR such that the SG water level stays 
practically stable.  
b. Event progress too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of NSSC could confuse Operator. For example, PZR heaters could 
make up for loss of RCS pressure 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, is not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated or delayed 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
g. Sensor failure 
h. PM reports both MSIV actuators as inoperable when they are 
i. PM reports MSIV as already closed, when it is not 
j. NSSC reported as operational (or no feedback) when it is not 
(3) Outside Information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates PZR level is normal 
d. No indication or delayed indication of SI initiated 
e. No indication or delayed indication of partial cool down initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect 
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
h. Screen is blank or frozen/NSSC or PS provides no feedback 
(4) Operator 
a. Operator thinks it is not yet safe to initiate action after SGTR is confirmed 
b. Operator thinks it is not yet safe to initiate action after main steam line leak is 
confirmed 
179 
c. Operator thinks it is not yet safe to initiate action after main feedwater leak is 
confirmed 
d. Operator confused about the procedure to be followed 
e. Operator confused because of conflicting indicators 
f. Operator reluctant whether to shutdown the reactor  
g. Operator under pressure not to trip reactor 
h. Operator has a conflict between being conservative with uncertainty of whether 
there is a SGTR, or to do what it is expected, i.e. to wait for the automated system 
to resolve the problem. In other words, the operator tries to avoid spurious 
shutdown, which costs money and should be avoided.  
i. Operator waits for the PS to handle the situation, does not act in time 
 
 
UCA 6: Close MSIV provided when there is no rupture/leak 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. Feedwater pumps not working properly 
b. Condenser leaking (loosing water) 
c. Too much sludge in water (blocking water) 
d. Object in water that could cut flux to SG 
e. Spurious opening of relief valves 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure low (setpoints not correct) 
c. Steam generator water level delayed or incorrect 
d. False SG isolation signal37 
e. Main steam line activity (false positive signal) 
                                                 
37
 This could occur, for example, in a situation where the water level at the SG is low concurrent with a 
SG low pressure, which could be due to a open Relief Valve. 
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f. Conflicting data indicating a false situation where close valve would be needed  
g. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
h. Sensor Failure 
(3) Outside Information 
a. PZR pressure indication delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False PZR pressure feedback 
d. False feedback shows PZR level as low 
e. False signal of initiation of SI 
f. False Partial cool down initiated signal 
g. Startup/shutdown not recognized38 
h. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) Operator 
a. Operator thinks Steam Generator Tubes are ruptured when they are not 
b. Operator thinks the main steam line has a leak when it does not 
c. Operator thinks main feedwater has a leak when it does not  
d. Operator confused about the procedure to be followed 
e. Operator confused because of conflicting indicators 
f. Blank screen induces operator to think situation is different 
g. False alarm of radiation 
h. Close wrong valve, other SG 
  
                                                 
38
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. The controllers check several 
indicators to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also 
cause high pressure in the main steam line compartment. Or, SG low level combined with permissive 13 
(startup) means there is no need to isolate the SG. It could happen that there would be a problem with the 
sensors, or the model (inside the controller) could be wrong, or algorithm could be wrong. “Confusion" 
could mean the model is not clear, or that there is an overlap of values.  
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A.8.1.2 Causal factors leading to an operator control action not being followed 
In addition to identifying why unsafe control actions might be provided, it is important to 
analyze how safe control actions may not be followed appropriately. This section identifies how 
the safety constraints could be violated even if safe control actions are provided. Figure 43 shows 
areas of the control loop in which additional causal factors can lead to a violation of Safety 
Constraints 1 to 6. 
 
Figure 43: Causal factors leading to operator unsafe control actions not being followed 
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SC 1: MSIV must be closed when there is a leak (rupture in the SG tube, leak in main feedwater, 
or leak in main steam line) and the support systems are adequate. 
SC 2: MSIV must be closed when there is a main feedwater or main steam line leak and other 
support systems are inadequate. 
 
   Basic Scenario: Operator provides Close MSIV command, but MSIV does NOT close 
 
(1) NSSC 
a. Physical damage/failure 
b. Does not recognize operator command 
c. Manufacturing defects 
d. Inadequate algorithm 
e. Loss of power or blackout 
(2) PM 
a. Wrong priority settings causing PM to ignore the close command 
b. Does not recognize PS or manual command 
c. Physical damage/failure 
d. Multiplex malfunctioning  
e. An operation (for example checking status of MSIV actuators) takes much 
longer time than expected/required, and PM ignores new commands 
f. Two conflicting commands come at the same or nearly the same time, from 
different controllers: the first one with lower priority than the second one. 
g. PM previously received interlock command from PS or other controller (e.g. to 
prevent MSIV closure during startup), causing PM to ignore operator 
commands to close MSIV 
h.  Conflicting commands are sent (operator/PS, PS/DAS, etc.) 
i. Manufacturing defects 
j. Loss of power or blackout 
(3) MSIV Sensor 
a. Reports device operational when it is not (therefore close command cannot be 
followed) 
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b. Reports valve position as open when it is not (therefore close command was 
sent but cannot be followed) 
c. Physical damage/failure 
d. Manufacturing defects 
e. Loss of power or blackout 
(4) MSIV Actuator 
a. In the case of unavailability of the oil pump (lack of power supply) if the 
MSIV is already open, then it automatically remains open for a certain period 
of time. 
b.  Mechanical failure in the dump valves, preventing the oil from coming to the 
tank. 
c. Debris prevents the valve to be closed, making it to remain partially or 
completely open 
d.  The nitrogen pressure, in the upper chamber, is not enough to close the valve, 
which had not been reported accordingly 
e. Upper chamber is under maintenance to restore pressure 
f. Dump valves do not open due to mechanical failures 
g. Physical damage/failure 
h. Manufacturing defects 
i. Loss of power or blackout 
(5) MSIV  
a. The pressure in the lower chamber does not drop 
b. The gate of the valve get stuck and does not move 
c. Upper has very low pressure that creates a vacuum preventing the piston from 
moving 
d. The upper chamber pressure is not enough to push the piston 
e. Debris inside the valve prevent it from closing completely or partially 
f. Physical damage/failure 
g. Manufacturing defects 
 
184 
Safety Constraints 3-6: 
SC 3: MSIV must not be closed when there is a SGTR and support systems are inadequate 
SC 4: MSIV must not be closed too early while SG pressure is too high 
SC 5: MSIV must not be closed too late after rupture/leak (in the SG tube, main feedwater, or 
main steam line) 
SC 6: MSIV must not be closed when there is no rupture/leak 
 
    Basic Scenario: Operator does not provide Close MSIV command, but MSIV closes 
 
(1) NSSC 
a. Physical damage/failure 
b. Some error in NSSC algorithm39 
c. NSSC has manufacturing defect 
d. Manufacturing defects 
e. Loss of power or blackout 
f. Inadequate algorithm 
(2) PM  
a. PM holds execution of command requests due to interlock issued by PS. This 
causes delaying a new command 
b. Wrong priority settings (e.g. causing valve to close too late or too early) 
c. Does not recognize PS or manual command 
d. Physical damage/failure 
e. Multiplex malfunctioning  
f. Conflicting commands are sent (operator/PS, PS/DAS, etc.)40 
                                                 
39
 As the Operator has to follow a procedure to disable the NSSC automated control to enable manual control, it 
could happen that the NSSC, through some programming error, starts a control action after it is disabled, at the same 
time it is disabled, or starts a control action that it never received for some other reason. 
40
 Conflicting commands may be sent, for example and operator command sent at the same time as a PS command, 
causing PM to lock up or execute the wrong command. There may also be problems due to DAS activation after 
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g. Manufacturing defects 
h. Loss of power or blackout 
(3) MSIV Sensor 
a. Reports device not operational when it is (therefore PM does not forward close 
command) 
b. Shows valve position as closed when it is open or only partially closed (therefore 
PM does not forward close command) 
c. Physical damage/failure 
d. Manufacturing defects 
(4) MSIV Actuator 
a. The oil pump may have mechanical problems which causes the valve to 
automatically be kept open, causing delay 
b. The pilots are de-energized (two pilots in series), then the dump valve opens 
which closes the valve too early 
c. Mechanical failure in the dump valve 
d. Mechanical failure dumps the hydraulic oil from lower chamber and closes valve 
e. Test of closure causes it to be inadvertently closed 
f. Physical damage/failure 
g. Manufacturing defects 
h. Loss of power or blackout 
(5) MSIV  
a. Leakage in the upper chamber makes pressure to be not enough to close the valve 
at the right time, hence delay 
b. A mismatch between the necessary pressure, in the oil chamber, to keep the valve 
open and the actual pressure applied, may cause that the oil pressure is not enough 
to keep it open causing it to close. Project mistake or assemblage mistake. 
                                                                                                                                                             
previous PS commands, or other commands sent before PM has finished executing them. Some commands may be 
ignored because PM ignores all commands until the current command is finished executing, even if it takes a 
fraction of a second. 
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c. A mismatch between the minimum pressure in the nitrogen chamber necessary to 
close the valve may cause that the pressure applied is higher than the necessary 
and this may cause the valve to be closed. Project mistake or an assemblage 
mistake. 
d. Physical damage/failure 
e. Manufacturing defects 
  
187 
A.8.2 DAS Causal Factors 
A.8.2.1 Causal factors leading to DAS unsafe control actions 
This section identifies causal factors that can lead to each unsafe control action summarized in 
Figure 29 for the DAS. 
 
 
Figure 44: Causal factors leading to DAS unsafe control actions 
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UCA 1: Close MSIV not provided when there is a leak (rupture in the SG tube, leak in main 
feedwater, or leak in main steam line) and the support systems are adequate 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system (CVCS or emergency feedwater system) 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another. For example, a feedwater problem 
could happen concurrently with SGTR, and the SG water level may stay 
practically stable.  
b. Event progresses too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of CVCS could make up for loss of coolant inventory making DAS 
delay actuation. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback missing, delayed, or incorrect 
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
g. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
h. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
e. Delayed indication of SI initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect41 
                                                 
41
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. “Confusion" could mean the model is 
not clear, there is an overlap of responsibilities, or conflicting process values are indicated. The controllers check 
several indicators to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also cause 
high pressure in the main steam line compartment and low SG water level. However, SG low level together with 
189 
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) DAS- Diverse Actuation System 
a. DAS does not recognize Steam Generator as ruptured when it is ruptured 
b. DAS does not recognize the main steam line has a leak 
c. DAS does not recognize the main feedwater has a leak 
d. DAS does not recognize that PS is malfunctioning or non-operational and does 
not take control  
e. DAS has no power supplied 
f. DAS follows incorrect algorithm 
g. DAS has wrong process model 
h. Physical damage/failure 
i. Manufacturing defects 
j. Loss of power or blackout 
 
 
UCA 2: Close MSIV not provided when there is a main feedwater or main steam line leak and 
other support systems are inadequate 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system (CVCS or emergency feedwater system) 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another.  
b. Event progresses too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of CVCS could make up for loss of coolant inventory making DAS 
delay actuation. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback missing, delayed, or incorrect 
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
                                                                                                                                                             
permissive 13 (startup) may indicate there is no need to isolate the SG. It could happen that there is a problem with 
the sensors, the model (inside the controller) could be wrong, or the algorithm could be wrong 
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e. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
f. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
g. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
e. Delayed indication of SI initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect42 
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) DAS- Diverse Actuation System 
a. DAS does not recognize the main steam line has a leak 
b. DAS does not recognize the main feedwater has a leak 
c. DAS incorrectly believes problem is SGTR when there is actually a main steam 
line or main feedwater leak 
d. DAS does not recognize that PS is malfunctioning or non-operational and does 
not take control  
e. DAS has no power supplied 
f. DAS follows incorrect algorithm 
g. DAS has wrong process model 
h. Physical damage/failure 
i. Manufacturing defects 
j. Loss of power or blackout 
                                                 
42
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. “Confusion" could mean the model is 
not clear, there is an overlap of responsibilities, or conflicting process values are indicated. The controllers check 
several indicators to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also cause 
high pressure in the main steam line compartment and low SG water level. However, SG low level together with 
permissive 13 (startup) may indicate there is no need to isolate the SG. It could happen that there is a problem with 
the sensors, the model (inside the controller) could be wrong, or the algorithm could be wrong 
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UCA 3: Close MSIV provided when there is a SGTR but support systems are inadequate 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another and other support systems could 
appear adequate but may not be. For example, suppose main steam line high 
radioactivity is detected coincident with safety injection. This may make the 
controller assume that a partial cooldown was initiated when it may not have. 
Closing the MSIV would cause the SG pressure to rise in this case. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure not correct 
c. Steam generator water level not correct 
d. Conflicting data indicating a false situation 
e. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
f. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside information 
a. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
b. PZR pressure delayed or missing 
c. False signal SI initiated 
(4) DAS - Diverse Actuation System 
a. DAS does not recognize that the support systems are not working due to 
conflicting information 
b. DAS incorrectly believes problem is main steam line leak or feedwater leak when 
it is actually SGTR 
c. DAS has an inadequate algorithm 
d. DAS close valve while other SG valves are under maintenance or by mistake 
e. Physical damage/failure 
f. Manufacturing defects 
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UCA 4: Close MSIV provided too early (while SG pressure is high)  
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another. For example, a feedwater problem 
could happen concurrent with a SGTR, and the SG water level stay practically 
stable.  
b. Event progress too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of CVCS could make up for loss of coolant inventory making DAS 
delay actuation. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure, or setpoint, is not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
g. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside Information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
e. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect43  
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) DAS - Diverse Actuation System 
                                                 
43
 This could occur, for example, in a situation where the water level at the SG is low concurrent with a SG low 
pressure, which could be due to a open Relief Valve. 
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a. DAS has conflicting information indicating it is already safe to initiate action after 
indications confirm rupture/leak 
b. Physical damage/failure 
c. Manufacturing defects 
d. DAS has an inadequate algorithm 
e. DAS has wrong process model 
 
 
UCA 5: Close MSIV command provided too late after rupture/leak (in the SG tube, main 
feedwater, or main steam line) 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another. For example, a feedwater problem 
could happen concurrently with a SGTR such that the SG water level stays 
practically stable.  
b. Event progress too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of CVCS could make up for loss of coolant inventory making DAS 
delay actuation. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure, or setpoint, is not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
g. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside Information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
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e. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect 
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) DAS - Diverse Actuation System 
a. DAS does not recognizes the real situation until it is too late after SGTR  
b. DAS does not recognizes the real situation until it is too late after the main steam 
line leak 
c. DAS does not recognizes the real situation until it is too late after the main 
feedwater leak 
d. DAS has an inadequate algorithm  
e. DAS has wrong process model 
f. Physical damage/failure 
g. Manufacturing defects 
h. Loss of power or blackout 
 
 
UCA 6: Close MSIV provided when there is no rupture/leak 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. Feedwater pumps not working properly 
b. Condenser leaking (loosing water) 
c. Too much sludge in water (blocking water) 
d. Object in water that could cut flux to SG 
e. Spurious opening of relief valves 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure low (setpoints not correct) 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
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d. False SG isolation signal 44 
e. Main steam line activity (false positive signal) 
f. Conflicting data indicating a false situation where close valve would be needed  
g. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
h. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside Information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False PZR pressure 
d. False feedback shows PZR level is low 
e. False signal of initiation of SI 
f. False partial cool down initiated signal 
g. Startup/shutdown not recognized 45 
h. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) DAS - Diverse Actuation System 
a. DAS has wrong information indicating Steam Generator tubes are ruptured when 
they are not 
b. DAS has wrong information indicating that main steam line or main feedwater 
has leak when there is no leak  
c. DAS has wrong process model 
d. DAS has an inadequate algorithm  
e. Physical damage/failure 
f. Manufacturing defects 
                                                 
44
 This could occur, for example, in a situation where the water level at the SG is low concurrent with a SG low 
pressure, which could be due to a open Relief Valve. 
45
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. The controllers check several indicators 
to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also cause high pressure in 
the main steam line compartment. Or, SG low level plus permissive 13 (startup) indicates no need to isolate the SG. 
It could happen that there would be a problem with the sensors, or the model (inside the controller) could be wrong, 
or algorithm could be wrong. “Confusion" could mean the model is not clear, or that there is an overlap of values 
196 
g. Loss of power or blackout 
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A.8.2.2 Causal factors leading to DAS control actions not being followed 
This section identifies how the safety constraints could be violated even if safe control actions 
are provided. Figure 45 shows areas of the control loop in which additional causal factors can 
lead to a violation of Safety Constraints 1 to 6. 
 
Figure 45: Causal factors leading to DAS control actions not being followed 
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SC 1: MSIV must be closed when there is a leak (rupture in the SG tube, leak in main feedwater, 
or leak in main steam line) and the support systems are adequate. 
SC 2: MSIV must be closed when there is a main feedwater or main steam line leak and other 
support systems are inadequate. 
 
       Basic Scenario: DAS provides Close MSIV command, but MSIV does NOT close 
 
(1) Priority Module 
a. Wrong priority settings causing PM to ignore the close command 
b. Does not recognize DAS command 
c. Physical damage/failure 
d. Multiplex malfunctioning  
e. Some operation (for example checking status of MSIV actuators) takes much 
longer time than supposed to, and PM ignores new commands 
f. Two conflicting action commands come at the same or nearly the same time, 
from different controllers: the first one with lower priority than the second 
one. 
g. PM had received a interlock command from PS, but PS goes down right after, 
so PM keeps waiting for new commands and does not accept new commands. 
h. Conflicting commands are sent (operator/PS, PS/DAS, etc.) 
i. Manufacturing defects 
j. Loss of power or blackout 
(2) MSIV Sensor 
a. Reports device operational when it is not (therefore close command cannot be 
followed) 
b. Reports valve position as open when it is not (therefore close command was 
sent but cannot be followed) 
(3) MSIV Actuator 
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a. In the case of unavailability of the oil pump (lack of power supply) if the 
MSIV is already open, then it automatically remains open for a certain period 
of time. 
b. Mechanical failure in the dump valves, preventing the oil from coming to the 
tank. 
c. Debris prevents the valve to be closed, making it to remain partially or 
completely open 
d. The nitrogen pressure, in the upper chamber, is not enough to close the valve, 
which had not been reported accordingly 
e. Upper chamber is under maintenance to restore pressure 
f. Dump valves do not open due to mechanical failures 
g. Physical damage/failure 
h. Manufacturing defects 
i. Loss of power or blackout 
(4) MSIV Valve 
a. Leakage in the upper chamber makes pressure to be not enough to close the 
valve at the right time, hence delay 
b.  A mismatch between the necessary pressure, in the oil chamber, to keep the 
valve open and the actual pressure applied, may cause that the oil pressure is 
not enough to keep it open causing it to close. Project mistake or assemblage 
mistake. 
c. A mismatch between the minimum pressure in the nitrogen chamber 
necessary to close the valve may cause that the pressure applied is higher than 
the necessary and this may cause the valve to be closed. Project mistake or an 
assemblage mistake. 
d. Physical damage/failure 
e. Manufacturing defects 
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Safety Constraints 3-6: 
SC 3: MSIV must not be closed when there is a SGTR and support systems are inadequate 
SC 4: MSIV must not be closed too early while SG pressure is too high 
SC 5: MSIV must not be closed too late after rupture/leak (in the SG tube, main feedwater, or 
main steam line) 
SC 6: MSIV must not be closed when there is no rupture/leak 
 
    Basic Scenario: DAS does not provide Close MSIV command, but MSIV closes 
 
(1) Priority Module 
a. PM holds execution of command requests due to interlock issued by PS. This 
causes delaying a new command 
b. PM receives close command from another cotnroller 
c. Wrong priority settings 
d. Does not recognize PS or manual command 
e. Physical damage/failure 
f. Multiplex malfunctioning  
g. Conflicting commands are sent (operator/PS, PS/DAS, etc.)46 
h. Physical damage/failure 
i. Manufacturing defects 
j. Loss of power or blackout 
(2) MSIV Sensor 
a. Reports device not operational when it is (therefore PM does not forward 
close command) 
                                                 
46
 Conflicting commands may be sent, for example and operator command sent at the same time as a PS command, 
causing PM to lock up or execute the wrong command. There may also be problems due to DAS activation after 
previous PS commands, or other commands sent before PM has finished executing them. Some commands may be 
ignored because PM ignores all commands until the current command is finished executing, even if it takes a 
fraction of a second. 
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b. Shows valve position as closed when it is open or only partially closed 
(therefore PM does not forward close command) 
c. Physical damage/failure 
d. Manufacturing defects 
(3) MSIV Actuator 
a. The oil pump may have mechanical problems which causes the valve to 
automatically be kept open, causing delay 
b. The pilots are de-energized (two pilots in series), then the dump valve opens 
which closes the valve too early 
c. Mechanical failure in the dump valve 
d. Mechanical failure dumps the hydraulic oil from lower chamber and closes 
valve 
e. Test of closure causes it to be inadvertently closed 
f. Physical damage/failure 
g. Manufacturing defects 
h. Loss of power or blackout 
(4) MSIV Valve 
a. Leakage in the upper chamber makes pressure to be not enough to close the 
valve at the right time, hence delay 
b.  A mismatch between the necessary pressure, in the oil chamber, to keep the 
valve open and the actual pressure applied, may cause that the oil pressure is 
not enough to keep it open causing it to close. Project mistake or assemblage 
mistake. 
c. A mismatch between the minimum pressure in the nitrogen chamber 
necessary to close the valve may cause that the pressure applied is higher than 
the necessary and this may cause the valve to be closed. Project mistake or an 
assemblage mistake. 
d. Physical damage/failure 
e. Manufacturing defects 
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A.8.3 PS Causal Factors 
A.8.3.1 Causal factors leading to PS unsafe control actions 
This section identifies causal factors that can lead to each unsafe control action summarized in 
Figure 29 for the PS. 
 
Figure 46: Causal factors for PS unsafe control actions 
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UCA 1: Close MSIV not provided when there is a leak (rupture in the SG tube, leak in main 
feedwater, or leak in main steam line) and the support systems are adequate 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system (CVCS or emergency feedwater system) 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another. For example, a feedwater problem 
could happen concurrently with a SGTR, and the SG water level may stay 
practically stable.  
b. Event progress too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of CVCS could make up for loss of coolant inventory making PS delay 
actuation. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback missing, delayed, or incorrect 
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, is not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
g. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
h. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates` PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
e. Delayed indication of SI initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect47 
                                                 
47
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. “Confusion" could mean the model is 
not clear, there is an overlap of responsibilities, or conflicting process values are indicated. The controllers check 
several indicators to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also cause 
high pressure in the main steam line compartment and low SG water level. However, SG low level together with 
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g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) PS-Protection System 
a. PS does not recognize Steam Generator is ruptured 
b. PS does not recognize main steam line has a leak 
c. PS does not recognize the main feedwater has a leak 
d. PS has no power supply 
e. PS follows inadequate algorithm  
f. PS has a manufacturing defect 
g. Physical damage/failure 
h. Loss of power or blackout 
i. PS has wrong process model  
 
UCA 2: Close MSIV not provided when there is a main feedwater or main steam line leak and 
other support systems are inadequate 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system (CVCS or emergency feedwater system) 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another  
b. Event progress too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of CVCS could make up for loss of coolant inventory making PS delay 
actuation. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback missing, delayed, or incorrect 
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, is not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
e. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
f. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
g. Sensor failure 
                                                                                                                                                             
permissive 13 (startup) may indicate there is no need to isolate the SG. It could happen that there is a problem with 
the sensors, the model (inside the controller) could be wrong, or the algorithm could be wrong. 
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(3) Outside information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates` PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
e. Delayed indication of SI initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect48 
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) PS-Protection System 
a. PS does not recognize main steam line has a leak 
b. PS does not recognize the main feedwater has a leak 
c. PS believes there is an SGTR when there is actually a main steam line or 
feedwater leak 
d. PS has no power supply 
e. PS follows inadequate algorithm  
f. PS has wrong process model  
g. PS has a manufacturing defect 
h. Physical damage/failure 
i. Loss of power or blackout 
 
 
UCA 3: Close MSIV provided when there is a SGTR but support systems are inadequate  
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
                                                 
48
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. “Confusion" could mean the model is 
not clear, there is an overlap of responsibilities, or conflicting process values are indicated. The controllers check 
several indicators to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also cause 
high pressure in the main steam line compartment and low SG water level. However, SG low level together with 
permissive 13 (startup) may indicate there is no need to isolate the SG. It could happen that there is a problem with 
the sensors, the model (inside the controller) could be wrong, or the algorithm could be wrong. 
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a. A concurrent situation could mask another and other support systems could 
appear adequate but may not be. For example, suppose main steam line high 
radioactivity is detected coincident with safety injection. This may make the 
controller assume that a partial cooldown was initiated when it may not have. 
Closing the MSIV would cause the SG pressure to rise in this case. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure not correct 
c. Steam generator water level not correct 
d. Conflicting data indicating a false situation 
e. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
f. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside information 
a. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
b. PZR pressure delayed or missing 
c. False signal SI initiated 
(4) PS-Protection System 
a. PS does not recognize that the support systems are not working due to conflicting 
information 
b. PS believes there is a main steam line or feedwater leak when there is actually an 
SGTR 
c. PS has an inadequate algorithm 
d. PS has wrong process model  
e. PS close valve while other SG valves are under maintenance or by mistake 
f. PS has a manufacturing defect 
g. Physical damage/failure 
h. Manufacturing defects 
i. Loss of power or blackout 
 
UCA 4: Close MSIV provided too early (while SG pressure is high)  
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(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another. For example, a feedwater problem 
could happen concurrent with a SGTR, and the SG water level stay practically 
stable.  
b. Event progresses too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of CVCS could make up for loss of coolant inventory delaying PS 
actuation. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
g. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside Information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
e. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect * 
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) PS-Protection System 
a. PS has an inadequate algorithm 
b. PS has conflicting information indicating it is already safe to initiate action after 
indications confirm rupture/leak 
c. Physical damage/failure 
d. Manufacturing defects 
e. Loss of power or blackout 
f. PS has wrong process model  
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UCA 5: Close MSIV provided too late after rupture/leak (in the SG tube, main feedwater, or 
main steam line) 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. A concurrent situation could mask another. For example, a feedwater problem 
could happen concurrently with a SGTR such that the SG water level stays 
practically stable.  
b. Event progress too slowly to detect 
c. Actuation of CVCS could make up for loss of coolant inventory making PS delay 
actuation. 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure, or setpoints, is not correct 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. Main steam line activity not correctly indicated 
e. Conflicting data indicating a false situation  
f. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
g. Sensor failure 
(3) Outside Information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
c. False feedback indicates PZR level is normal 
d. No indication of SI initiated 
e. No indication of partial cool down initiated 
f. Permissives wrongly in effect 
g. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) PS-Protection System 
a. PS does not recognize the real situation until it is too late after SGTR  
b. PS does not recognize the real situation until it is too late after the main steam line 
or feedwater leak 
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c. PS has an inadequate algorithm  
d. PS has wrong process model  
e. PS has a manufacture defect 
f. Physical damage/failure 
g. Loss of power or blackout 
 
 
UCA 6: Close MSIV provided when there is no rupture/leak 
 
(1) Secondary cooling system 
a. Feedwater pumps not working properly 
b. Condenser leaking (loosing water) 
c. Too much sludge in water (blocking water) 
d. Object in water that could cut flux to SG 
e. Spurious opening of relief valves 
(2) Process Feedback  
a. SG level feedback not provided  
b. SG Pressure low (setpoints not correct) 
c. Steam generator water level delayed 
d. False SG isolation signal49  
e. Main steam line activity (false positive signal) 
f. Conflicting data indicating a false situation where close valve would be needed  
g. Voting system does not work properly and gives wrong measures 
h. Sensor Failure 
(3) Outside Information 
a. PZR pressure delayed 
b. PZR feedback missing 
                                                 
49
 This could occur, for example, in a situation where the water level at the SG is low concurrent with a SG low 
pressure, which could be due to a open Relief Valve. 
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c. False PZR pressure 
d. False feedback indicates PZR level is low 
e. False signal of initiation of SI 
f. False Partial cool down initiated signal 
g. Startup/shutdown not recognized 50 
h. Wrong combination of indicators from the 4 divisions 
(4) PS-Protection System 
a. PS has wrong information indicating Steam Generator tubes are ruptured when 
they are not 
b. PS has wrong information indicating that main steam line or feedwater has a leak 
they do not  
c. PS has wrong process model 
d. PS has an inadequate algorithm  
e. PS has a manufacture defect 
f. Physical damage/failure 
g. Loss of power or blackout 
  
                                                 
50
 One of the causes for wrong command can be confusion about indicators. The controllers check several indicators 
to decide what the specific problem is. For example, the main steam pipe break would also cause high pressure in 
the main steam line compartment. Or, SG low level together with permissive 13 (startup)indicates no need to isolate 
the SG. It could happen that there would be a problem with the sensors, or the model (inside the controller) could be 
wrong, or algorithm could be wrong. “Confusion" could mean the model is not clear, or that there is an overlap of 
values. 
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A.8.3.2 Causal factors leading to PS control actions not being followed 
This section identifies how the safety constraints could be violated even if safe control actions 
are provided. Figure 47 shows areas of the control loop in which additional causal factors can 
lead to a violation of Safety Constraints 1 to 6. 
 
Figure 47: Causal factors leading to PS control actions not being followed 
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SC 1: MSIV must be closed when there is a leak (rupture in the SG tube, leak in main feedwater, 
or leak in main steam line) and the support systems are adequate. 
SC 2: MSIV must be closed when there is a main feedwater or main steam line leak and other 
support systems are inadequate. 
 
       Basic Scenario: PS provides Close MSIV command, but MSIV does NOT close 
 
(1) Priority Module 
a. Wrong priority settings causing PM to ignore the close command 
b. Does not recognize PS command 
c. Physical damage/failure 
d. Multiplex malfunctioning  
e. An operation (for example checking status of MSIV actuators) takes longer 
time than expected/required, and PM ignores new commands 
f. Two conflicting action commands come at the same or nearly the same time, 
from different controllers: the first one with lower priority than the second 
one. 
g. PM had received a interlock command from PS, which is not removed so PM 
does not accept new commands. 
h. Conflicting commands are sent (operator/PS, PS/DAS, etc.) 
i. Manufacturing defects 
j. Loss of power or blackout 
(2) MSIV Sensor 
a. Reports device operational when it is not (therefore close command cannot be 
followed) 
b. Reports valve position as open when it is not (therefore close command was 
sent but cannot be followed) 
c. Physical damage/failure 
d. Manufacturing defects 
e. Loss of power or blackout 
(3) MSIV Actuator 
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a. In the case of unavailability of the oil pump (lack of power supply) if the 
MSIV is already open, then it automatically remains open for a certain period 
of time. 
b. Mechanical failure in the dump valves, preventing the oil from coming to the 
tank. 
c. Debris prevents the valve to be closed, making it to remain partially or 
completely open 
d. The nitrogen pressure, in the upper chamber, is not enough to close the valve, 
which had not been reported accordingly 
e. Upper chamber is under maintenance to restore pressure 
f. Dump valves do not open due to mechanical failures 
g. Physical damage/failure 
h. Manufacturing defects 
i. Loss of power or blackout 
(4) MSIV Valve 
a. Leakage in the upper chamber makes pressure to be not enough to close the 
valve at the right time, hence delay 
b.  A mismatch between the necessary pressure, in the oil chamber, to keep the 
valve open and the actual pressure applied, may cause that the oil pressure is 
not enough to keep it open causing it to close. Project mistake or assemblage 
mistake. 
c. A mismatch between the minimum pressure in the nitrogen chamber 
necessary to close the valve may cause that the pressure applied is higher than 
the necessary and this may cause the valve to be closed. Project mistake or an 
assemblage mistake. 
d. Physical damage/failure 
e. Manufacturing defects 
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Safety Constraints 3-6: 
SC 3: MSIV must not be closed when there is a SGTR and support systems are inadequate 
SC 4: MSIV must not be closed too early while SG pressure is too high 
SC 5: MSIV must not be closed too late after rupture/leak (in the SG tube, main feedwater, or 
main steam line) 
SC 6: MSIV must not be closed when there is no rupture/leak 
 
    Basic Scenario: PS does not provide Close MSIV command, but MSIV closes 
 
(1) Priority Module 
a. PM holds execution of command requests due to interlock issued by PS. This 
causes delaying a new command 
b. Wrong priority settings 
c. Does not recognize PS or manual command 
d. Physical damage/failure 
e. Multiplex malfunctioning  
f. Conflicting commands are sent (operator/PS, PS/DAS, etc.)51 
g. Manufacturing defects 
h. Loss of power or blackout 
(2) MSIV Sensor 
a. Reports device not operational when it is (therefore PM does not forward close 
command) 
b. Shows valve position as closed when it is open or only partially closed (therefore 
PM does not forward close command) 
c. Physical damage/failure 
                                                 
51
 Conflicting commands may be sent, for example and operator command sent at the same time as a PS command, 
causing PM to lock up or execute the wrong command. There may also be problems due to DAS activation after 
previous PS commands, or other commands sent before PM has finished executing them. Some commands may be 
ignored because PM ignores all commands until the current command is finished executing, even if it takes a 
fraction of a second. 
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d. Manufacturing defects 
e. Loss of power or blackout 
(3) MSIV Actuator 
a. The oil pump may have mechanical problems which causes the valve to 
automatically be kept open, causing delay 
b. The pilots are de-energized (two pilots in series), then the dump valve opens 
which closes the valve too early 
c. Mechanical failure in the dump valve 
d. Mechanical failure dumps the hydraulic oil from lower chamber and closes valve 
e. Test of closure causes it to be inadvertently closed 
f. Physical damage/failure 
g. Manufacturing defects 
h. Loss of power or blackout 
(4) MSIV Valve 
a. Leakage in the upper chamber makes pressure to be not enough to close the valve 
at the right time, hence delay 
b.  A mismatch between the necessary pressure, in the oil chamber, to keep the valve 
open and the actual pressure applied, may cause that the oil pressure is not enough 
to keep it open causing it to close. Project mistake or assemblage mistake. 
c. A mismatch between the minimum pressure in the nitrogen chamber necessary to 
close the valve may cause that the pressure applied is higher than the necessary 
and this may cause the valve to be closed. Project mistake or an assemblage 
mistake. 
d. Physical damage/failure 
e. Manufacturing defects 
A.9 Extension to multiple steam generators 
Thus far, the analysis has considered a single Steam Generator and a single MSIV. However, the 
results can be extended to multiple Steam Generators without repeating the entire analysis. One 
approach is to revise the existing context tables to reflect the control action “Close MSIV #1”. 
Because any feedwater or steamline leak will affect the control action “Close MSIV #1” in the 
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same way as for the single SG system, these columns can remain the same. However, only a 
Steam Generator Tube Rupture in SG #1 is relevant to the closure of MSIV #1. Therefore, the 
values in the column Steam Generator Tube Rupture could be replaced with “SG #1 ruptured” 
and “SG #1 not ruptured”, while keeping the rest of the table the same. Similarly, the resulting 
table can then be converted for the other three MSIV commands by simply replacing #1 with #2, 
#3, or #4. If each redundant SG can compensate for the heat exchange performed by another SG 
then the definition of“other support systems” in both tables can be extended to include the other 
SGs. 
A.10 Limitations of this analysis 
This case study does not contain a detailed low-level analysis down to the individual components 
such as PLDs inside the PM. The small research grant, provided by the NRC, did not include the 
time or resources to analyze down to that level, and it was not the goal. STPA is a top-down 
analysis, and the analysis has been performed from the highest level (accidents and hazards) 
down to the module level to identify the control flaws that can cause hazards. The potential flaws 
and safety constraints found should be the starting point for a more detailed analysis. For 
example, it was found that the system-level design is such that incorrect priority settings for PM 
could cause a hazard if MSIV close commands are ignored. The next step would be to make sure 
that never happens. There are many options, including changing the system architecture (may not 
be practical at this point) or enforcing constraints on lower levels. The latter might be achieved 
by making the priority settings fixed within PM and not programmable and making sure PM 
internal logic and PLD design is such that MSIV commands are never ignored regardless of 
current priority. Other solutions are also possible. Of course, any potential solutions must be 
checked to ensure other safety constraints are not violated and new hazards are not introduced.  
A.11 Results of the analysis 
Although this study covered only a limited portion of the secondary cooling system, some 
important insights can be derived from it by examining the causes of unsafe control actions for 
the assumed scenarios.  
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An example insight obtained from the analysis is the difficulty of detecting a Steam Generator 
Tube Rupture (SGTR) through the normal indicators, which can lead to a delayed response by 
the automated controllers and the operator. The current solution relies on (i.e., gives credit to) the 
operator’s ability to detect and intervene in certain cases. Relying on the operator, however, may 
not be effective because of other factors that will influence the operator decision-making process. 
These factors are identified in STPA Step 2 as possible causes for the operator not to provide the 
control action to close the MSIV or to provide it too late. The identified factors can be used to 
improve the design to make the operator error less likely or to mitigate it. 
One reasonable recommendation, for example, is for regulators to ask the designers to simplify 
the indicators for the case of SGTR by making the level of radiation at the Main Steam Line a 
major indication to isolate the affected SG. This way, the Protection System (PS) would be able 
to detect the event earlier. In the current design, an indication of radioactivity is not sufficient for 
the PS to take action, and, as a result, there are additional scenarios in which neither the operator 
nor the PS may take action. For example, the operator may feel pressed to avoid spurious 
shutdowns and, as a consequence, he or she may wait longer for stronger evidence of the real 
problem. This type of response, in fact, is a common one identified by human factors experts in 
many real accidents. There could also be a situation where, after many years of work, the 
operator learns to completely rely on the automated controls to handle some incidents and 
becomes overconfident in its correct operation. This overreliance could lead to non-action or 
delayed action even though the analysis has assumed he or she will immediately take action in 
that case. 
Part of the problem is the nuclear industry tendency to “credit the operator” (or credit some other 
device such as the PS), which means that the hazard analysis assumes that the operator (or other 
component) will detect and resolve the problem appropriately in a given situation. This thought 
process relates to the problem of only examining the “nominal” case versus identifying and 
resolving the worst case (as mentioned earlier in this dissertation). STAMP provides a more 
general alternative model that includes more potential paths (scenarios) to losses and can trace 
operator or other errors into the design to detect design flaws or weaknesses.  
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It is important to identify the factors under which a component, like the operator, may not act 
adequately and use those factors to improve the design of the system. The alternative is to simply 
blame the operators after an accident or incident for any failure to detect and resolve the problem 
as it was assumed they would. New NPP designs are placing the operators in a highly automated 
environment and telling them that the PS can handle almost everything. There are many subtle 
scenarios in which the PS may give up, or worse, ignore the problem without alerting the 
operator because it is assumed the operator will detect the problem and resolve it. Assuming that 
A is not safety-critical because B exists as a backup to A and that B is not safety-critical because 
it is only a backup system leads to circular reasoning and, potentially, accidents. A worst case 
analysis is necessary that assumes there may be design flaws or common-cause/common-mode 
failures in both. 
The introduction of digital systems exacerbates the problem. Software allows highly complex 
systems to be created. While identifying safety-critical versus non-safety-critical components in 
a nuclear power plant was relatively straightforward for primarily electromechanical designs, the 
extensive use of software allows much more complex designs than previously possible and the 
potential for unintended and unexpected interactions among components. The more interactions 
between system components and the more complex the functional design, the more the 
opportunities for unintended effects and, consequently, the more opportunities for unsafe control 
actions that can lead to hazards. In other words, the more complex the system, the more 
possibilities of unintended effects due to the interactions among components. For example, the 
operator has to manually change settings by manipulating priority logic in order to allow NSSC 
to process the manual commands. This requirement can be a problem in case of an emergency.  
Exhaustive system testing is not possible with software-intensive systems. Even if the individual 
components can be exhaustively tested, that will not guarantee system safety. The interactions 
between PM and other controllers and equipment are such that each component may operate in a 
reasonable manner given the local environment and information available, but from a global 
systems perspective the combined behavior of multiple components may be unsafe. For example, 
as discussed above, the PS may not take action in some situations where operator intervention is 
required while the operator may wait for the automated PS to take action. The STPA analysis in 
this case study was limited in scope to the MSIV commands and publically available 
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information, but a more detailed STPA analysis seems warranted due to the central importance 
of this equipment in the control system.  
Using a hazard analysis method based on STAMP allows more extensive analysis that includes 
events in which nothing failed but the hazards arise due to unsafe interactions among 
components. The identification of weaknesses in the overall PWR design are possible using 
STPA because the STPA analysis examines the interactions between the various controllers and 
system components. These weaknesses are unlikely to be found by hazard analysis methods 
based on assumptions about accidents being caused by chains of component failure events.  
These are only some of the flaws or weaknesses in the design that can be identified from the 
partial system modeling and STPA hazard analysis performed for this research effort. A more 
complete modeling and analysis effort would most likely uncover even more. 
A.12 Potential use of STPA in licensing 
STAMP provides a more comprehensive basis for analyzing safety and licensing nuclear power 
plants. The following sections review several potential advantages. 
A.12.1     Classification of components as safety-related vs. non-safety-related 
While identifying safety-critical versus non-safety-critical components in a nuclear power plant 
was relatively straightforward for primarily electromechanical designs, the extensive use of 
software allows much more complex designs than previously possible and the potential for 
unintended and unexpected interactions among components. STPA does not begin with an 
assumption that certain equipment or controllers are safety-related and non-safety-related. 
Instead, an important output of STPA is a set of unsafe control actions for every controller 
analyzed and how they can directly or indirectly affect a hazard. The unsafe control actions 
identified in Step 1 describe how each controller can contribute to a hazardous situation. The 
output of STPA, therefore, could be used to classify components as safety-related or non-safety-
related or to verify an existing classification. STPA Step 2 goes further and considers how each 
component—including sensors, actuators, logic devices, and communication paths—can 
contribute to hazardous situations. Analysts can then identify hazardous behavior related to the 
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interactions between components that otherwise may not be captured by traditional analyses, and 
label each component appropriately. 
Although there should be independence
52
 between safety-related and non-safety-related 
controllers as classified in the U.S. EPR system, the STPA analysis on the example system in 
this case study showed that some systems classified as non-safety-related can still contribute to 
hazardous situations and are not truly independent from safety-related systems and functions. For 
example, NSSC, which is defined as a non-safety related controller, can hinder or slow down the 
successful closure of the MSIV when needed by reporting erroneous feedback to the operator or 
acting in unsafe or unexpected ways upon receiving a close MSIV command from the operator 
(or a combination of both). In this way, through its interaction with several safety-related 
controllers, NSSC can affect their ability to perform their safety-related functions. 
As another example, the safety-related PM contains the non-safety-related communication 
device Profibus, which communicates with NSSC. Incorrect behavior of NSSC together with 
Profibus can potentially affect the safety-related functions of PM by potentially directly 
interfering with the control actions processed by PM. The interference could also be caused 
indirectly by interfering with the feedback provided to the operator or by providing inadequate or 
incorrect feedback to the operator. Without appropriate feedback, the operator cannot be 
assumed to be able to provide safe control actions, including MSIV and other controls. 
                                                 
52
 We use “independence” here as used in NUREG-0800: “data communication between safety channels or between 
safety and non-safety systems should not inhibit the performance of the safety function. … In practical terms, this 
means that for communications between safety and non-safety systems, the communications must be such that the 
safety system does not require any non-safety input to perform its safety function, and that any failure of the non-
safety system, communications system, or data transmitted by the non-safety system will not prevent or influence 
that independent safety determination.” [NUREG-0800 Appendix 7.1-D]. 
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A.12.2     Identifying potential operator errors and their causes and safety culture 
flaws 
STAMP/STPA treats the operator as integral part of the system and thus an integral part of the 
hazard analysis. Factors such as “pressure to save time and money” can be as dangerous as a 
mechanical failure of a component and can be captured in this method.  
A.12.3     Broadening the Analysis and Oversight 
Other aspects of the overall socio-technical system can also be included in the STPA analysis 
although they were not included in the case study. The NRC has responsibility for overseeing 
safety culture and other aspects of nuclear power plant operations. The inclusion of social, 
organizational, and managerial factors in the hazard analysis (which is possible for STPA) can 
identify potential risks and leading indicators of increasing risk that the regulators can use to 
audit performance by the utilities. 
A.12.4     Assisting in Understanding Applicant Functional Designs 
The model of the safety control structure constructed as part of the STPA analysis can help 
regulatory authorities improve their understanding of the functional design of the system and can 
aid in communication and interchanges with applicants. In performing the case study, it was 
found that existing documentation provided a comprehensive description of the physical design, 
but there was great difficulty extracting the functional or logical design from this documentation. 
The control structure diagrams can help in providing this information and identifying missing 
information or ambiguous design descriptions. 
The documentation for STPA can also facilitate discussions between experts from different 
disciplines, which in practice tend to speak different technical languages and have different 
perspectives and priorities. Simply using a control structure model of the system can help with 
communication among diverse groups concerning the functionality provided by the system 
design.  
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A.12.5     Enhancing the Review of Candidate Designs 
STAMP/STPA can be used as a platform to provide the authorities with a broader and more 
systemic view of the system and can uncover unanticipated or unexpected behavior that emerges 
from the complex interactions that occur. This approach, as mentioned earlier, has the advantage 
of being able to capture both human and equipment behavior in the same control-theoretic 
model. Because the system is modeled in an integrated control structure rather than considering 
components in isolation, authorities may be better able to visualize weaknesses that otherwise 
would not be possible. 
The Step 1 tables can provide a wide range of scenarios that could lead to unsafe control actions 
related to the identified hazards. These tables consider the possibilities of occurrences without 
relying on the availability or accuracy of probabilistic estimates, which makes STAMP/STPA a 
very powerful tool to assist in certification and licensing. Each unsafe control action can be 
directly and easily translated into component-level safety constraints, which can be compared 
with the safety requirements of an existing design to identify gaps, inconsistencies, or 
incompleteness. The Step 2 analysis guides the identification of possible causes of the unsafe 
control actions as well as other ways the safety constraints can potentially be violated. These 
results can also be used as a guide for the authorities to generate a list of requirements or 
mitigation measures that the licensee has to meet. Finally, the results can also be used as a basis 
to generate other requirements not yet identified, as there is a possibility that new issues will be 
raised after experts study the Step 1 and Step 2 results. 
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